This book shows that legislative transparency does not impact representation directly, but instead aids organized interests in influencing legislatures.

Does open governance strengthen democracy? The Illusion of Accountability contends that it does not. Leveraging a wealth of data from decades of legislative politics in the American states, the book assesses the causes and consequences of 'open meetings laws,' which require public access to proceedings in state legislatures. The work traces the roots of these laws back to the founding constitutions of some states and analyzes the waves of adoptions and exemptions to open meetings that occurred in the twentieth century. The book then examines the effects of these transparency laws on a host of politically consequential outcomes both inside and outside the legislature. This analysis consistently finds that open meetings do not influence legislators' behavior or citizens' capacity to alter that behavior. Instead, a link between transparent legislatures and an expanded system of organized interests is established. This illuminating work concludes that transparency reform only creates the illusion of accountability in state government.

This book examines accountability in the EU from different perspectives and considers whether EU citizens have real opportunities for holding decision-makers accountable. This book critically analyses five arguments which claim there are sufficient means for holding decision-makers to account in the Union. The main conclusion is that the current institutional set-up and practice of decision-making in the EU is one that merely creates an illusion of accountability. Using a strict framework focusing on the difference between formal mechanisms and actual opportunities for accountability, this highly coherent volume will be of interest to students and scholars of European politics, especially those interested in the democratic foundations of the European political system. Chapter 1 of this book is freely available as a downloadable Open Access PDF under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial-No Derivatives 3.0 license. https://s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/tandfbis/rt-files/docs/Open+Access+Chapters/9780415480994_oachapter1.pdf

Do EU citizens have real opportunities to hold decision-makers accountable, or does the current institutional set-up in the Union merely create an illusion of accountability? That is the central question of this volume. There are widespread and growing concerns that the political system of the EU does not, in fact, afford citizens appropriate mechanisms of accountability. The aim of the current study is to ascertain whether such concerns are warranted.

The presence of sound corporate governance in a financial institution is important in maintaining the confidence of both the market and the public. The power that corporate governance holds over the success of some of the largest financial institutions in the world is not to be downplayed. This book methodically assesses the quality of corporate governance and mechanisms of accountability disclosures to various stakeholders. It is further intended to provide fresh insights into some specific corporate governance recommendations to help improve good governance in financial institutions, particularly in the United Kingdom and the EU but will also be applicable to other major economies. It explores what, when and how corporate governance has changed the financial institution functions and corporate executive behaviour by critically reviewing the pre- and post-financial crisis theoretical and empirical literature. Increasingly driven by the nature of complications, complexities and opacity in the operations of financial systems, corporate governance reporting plays an important role in the financial sector. It will provide insights into corporate governance disclosures over a long-term basis. This book should be a valuable asset to support the research of practitioners, students and all academics due to its stimulating and reflective insights into this fascinating topic.

Transparency is generally seen as a corporate priority and a central attribute for promoting business growth and social morality. From a philosophical perspective, society has experienced a gradual paradigm shift which intensified after the Second World War with the advent of the information era. As a fundamental part of an inescapable, hegemonic capitalist system and given the insistent emphasis on it as a moral imperative, transparency, this book avers, needs to be examined and challenged as to its true governance value in building a sustainable twenty-first century society. Rather than clinging to the fantasy of complete transparency as the only form of accountability, corporate governance is strengthened in this way by practicing true social responsibility, which emerges not from outward-looking compliance but from a deeper place in the corporate psyche through inward-looking contemplation and the development of moral maturity.

Exploring the Illusion of Free Will and Moral Responsibility investigates the philosophical and scientific arguments for free will skepticism and their implications. Skepticism about free will and moral responsibility has been on the rise in recent years. In fact, a significant number of philosophers, psychologists, and neuroscientists now either doubt or outright deny the existence of free will and/or moral responsibility—and the list of prominent skeptics appears to grow by the day. Given the profound importance that the concepts of free will and moral responsibility hold in our lives—in understanding ourselves, society, and the law—it is important that we explore what is behind this new wave of skepticism. It is also important that we explore the potential consequences of skepticism for ourselves and society. Edited by Gregg D. Caruso, this collection of new essays brings together an internationally recognized line-up of contributors, most of whom hold skeptical positions of some sort, to display and explore the leading arguments for free will skepticism and to debate their implications.