Labeled “Amazons” by the national press, women played a central role in the Huk rebellion, one of the most significant peasant-based revolutions in modern Philippine history. As spies, organizers, nurses, couriers, soldiers, and even military commanders, women worked closely with men to resist first Japanese occupation and later, after WWII, to challenge the new Philippine republic. But in the midst of the uncertainty and violence of rebellion, these women also pursued personal lives, falling in love, becoming pregnant, and raising families, often with their male comrades-in-arms. Drawing on interviews with over one hundred veterans of the movement, Vina A. Lanzona explores the Huk rebellion from the intimate and collective experiences of its female participants, demonstrating how their presence, and the complex questions of gender, family, and sexuality they provoked, ultimately shaped the nature of the revolutionary struggle. Winner, Kenneth W. Baldridge Prize for the best history book written by a resident of Hawaii, sponsored by Brigham Young University–Hawaii

Newly available with an updated bibliographic essay, this highly acclaimed work explores the Huk rebellion, a momentous peasant revolt in the Philippines. Unlike prevailing top-down analysis, Kerkvliet seeks to understand the movement from the point of view of its participants and sympathizers. He argues that seeing a peasant revolt through the eyes of those who rebelled explains and clarifies the actions of people who otherwise might appear irrational. Drawing on a rich array of documents and in-depth interviews with peasants and rebel leaders, the author provides definitive answers to the causes of the rebellion, the goals of the rebels, and the process of resistance.

In Bullets Not Ballots, Jacqueline L. Hazelton challenges the claim that winning "hearts and minds" is critical to successful counterinsurgency campaigns. Good governance, this conventional wisdom holds, gains the besieged government popular support, denies support to the insurgency, and makes military victory possible. Hazelton argues that major counterinsurgent successes since World War II have resulted not through democratic reforms but rather through the use of military force against civilians and the co-optation of rival elites. Hazelton offers new analyses of five historical cases frequently held up as examples of the effectiveness of good governance in ending rebellions—the Malayan Emergency, the Greek Civil War, the Huk Rebellion in the Philippines, the Dhofar rebellion in Oman, and the Salvadoran Civil War—to show that, although unpalatable, it was really brutal repression and bribery that brought each conflict to an end. By showing how compellence works in intrastate conflicts, Bullets Not Ballots makes clear that whether or not the international community decides these human, moral, and material costs are acceptable, responsible policymaking requires recognizing the actual components of counterinsurgent success—and the limited influence that external powers have over the tactics of counterinsurgent elites.

This publication in the Center for Military History Historical Analysis Series addresses the American role in the Philippine Hukbalahap Insurrection. Brought to the verge of collapse by a wide-spread Communist-inspired insurgency, the government of the Philippines, supported by limited U.S. aid, advice, and assistance, virtually eliminated Huk resistance by 1955. This study examines this remarkable achievement and demonstrates how efforts of uniquely qualified individuals, combined with American foreign policy initiatives and international events, prevented the collapse of an important allied nation. Published originally in 1987 by the Research and Analysis Division's Special Studies Series, The Hukbalahap Insurrection has received wide acclaim and sufficient attention to warrant wider distribution. Reprinted in its entirety, it provides contemporary planners with insights and observations that remain as valid today as when American and Filipino officials combined their efforts to defeat the well-organized Huk insurgency.

Founded in 1930, the Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas (now called the PKP-1930 to distinguish it from the Communist Party of the Philippines, formed in 1969) was soon declared illegal by the U.S. colonial authorities. Regaining its legality later in the decade, by 1942 it was at the helm of the Hukbalahap, the most effective guerrilla organization during the Japanese occupation. With the reconquest of the Philippines by the returning American forces, the PKP and the Huks found themselves under attack by their presumed wartime allies. As congressmen elected as part of the postwar Democratic Alliance were prevented from taking their seats by President Roxas and Huk areas were bombarded by government forces, the PKP returned to guerrilla warfare. While at first adopting a defensive posture, in 1950 the party adopted a strategy for the seizure of power. By the mid-1950s, however, the "Huk rebellion" had been defeated by the Philippine government, guided and assisted by the U.S. Forcing the Pace analyzes the factors responsible for the PKP's many teething problems and the defeat of the Huk rebellion, taking issue with some previous accounts. Detailed consideration is given to PKP documents, many of which have not previously appeared in the literature on the subject.

Freedom Incorporated demonstrates how anticommunist political projects were critical to the United States' expanding imperial power in the age of decolonization, and how anticommunism was essential to the growing global economy of imperial violence in the Cold War era. In this broad historical account, Colleen Woods demonstrates how, in the mid-twentieth century Philippines, US policymakers and Filipino elites promoted the islands as a model colony. In the wake of World War II, as the decolonization movement strengthened, those same political actors pivoted and, after Philippine independence in 1946, lauded the archipelago as a successful postcolonial democracy. Officials at Malacañang Palace and the White House touted the 1946 signing of the liberating Treaty of Manila as a testament to the US commitment to the liberation of colonized people and celebrated it under the moniker of Philippine–American Friendship Day. Despite elite propaganda, from the early 1930s to late 1950s, radical movements in the Philippines highlighted US hegemony over the new Republic of the Philippines and, in so doing, threatened American efforts to separate the US from sordid histories of empire, imperialism, and the colonial racial order. Woods finds that in order to justify US intervention in an ostensibly independent Philippine nation, anticommunist Filipinos and their American allies transformed local political struggles in the Philippines into sites of resistance against global communist revolution. By linking political struggles over local resources, like the Hukbalahap Rebellion in central Luzon, to a war against communism, American and Filipino anticommunists legitimized the use of violence as a means to capture and contain alternative forms of political, economic, and social organization. Placing the post-World War II history of anticommunism in the Philippines within a larger imperial framework, in Freedom Incorporated Woods illustrates how American and Filipino intelligence agents, military officials, paramilitaries, state bureaucrats, academics, and entrepreneurs mobilized anticommunist politics to contain challenges to elite rule in the Philippines.

This book examines the long, complex experience of American involvement in irregular warfare. It begins with the American Revolution in 1776 and chronicles big and small irregular wars for the next two and a half centuries. What is readily apparent in dirty wars is that failure is painfully tangible while success is often amorphous. Successfully fighting these wars often entails striking a critical balance between military victory and politics. America's status as a democracy only serves to make fighting - and, to a greater degree, winning - these irregular wars even harder. Rather than futilely insisting that Americans should not or cannot fight this kind of irregular war, Russell Crandall argues that we would be better served by considering how we can do so as cleanly and effectively as possible.