"In the quarter century that followed American entry into World War II, the nation's armed forces moved from the reluctant inclusion of a few segregated Negroes to their routine acceptance in a racially integrated military establishment. Nor was this change confined to military installations. By the time it was over, the armed forces had redefined their traditional obligation for the welfare of their members to include a promise of equal treatment for black servicemen wherever they might be. In the name of equality of treatment and opportunity, the Department of Defense began to challenge racial injustices deeply rooted in American society. For all its sweeping implications, equality in the armed forces obviously had its pragmatic aspects. In one sense it was a practical answer to pressing political problems that had plagued several national administrations. In another, it was the services' expression of those liberalizing tendencies that were permeating American society during the era of civil rights activism. But to a considerable extent the policy of racial equality that evolved in this quarter century was also a response to the need for military efficiency. So easy did it become to demonstrate the connection between inefficiency and discrimination that, even when other reasons existed, military efficiency was the one most often evoked by defense officials to justify a change in racial policy." Morris J. MacGregor, Jr., received the A.B. and M.A. degrees in history from the Catholic University of America. He continued his graduate studies at the Johns Hopkins University and the University of Paris on a Fulbright grant. Before joining the staff of the U.S. Army Center of Military History in 1968 he served for ten years in the Historical Division of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

"In the quarter century that followed American entry into World War II, the nation's armed forces moved from the reluctant inclusion of a few segregated Negroes to their routine acceptance in a racially integrated military establishment. Nor was this change confined to military installations. By the time it was over, the armed forces had redefined their traditional obligation for the welfare of their members to include a promise of equal treatment for black servicemen wherever they might be. In the name of equality of treatment and opportunity, the Department of Defense began to challenge racial injustices deeply rooted in American society. For all its sweeping implications, equality in the armed forces obviously had its pragmatic aspects. In one sense it was a practical answer to pressing political problems that had plagued several national administrations. In another, it was the services' expression of those liberalizing tendencies that were permeating American society during the era of civil rights activism. But to a considerable extent the policy of racial equality that evolved in this quarter century was also a response to the need for military efficiency. So easy did it become to demonstrate the connection between inefficiency and discrimination that, even when other reasons existed, military efficiency was the one most often evoked by defense officials to justify a change in racial policy."_x000D_ Morris J. MacGregor, Jr., received the A.B. and M.A. degrees in history from the Catholic University of America. He continued his graduate studies at the Johns Hopkins University and the University of Paris on a Fulbright grant. Before joining the staff of the U.S. Army Center of Military History in 1968 he served for ten years in the Historical Division of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

"During the years between 1939 and 1953 the United States armed forces moved from a policy of restricting and segregating the Negro soldier, based largely on racial stereotypes that emerged from World War I, to a policy of equal opportunity and integration. Most writers point to 1954 or later as the origin of the Negro Revolution; however, this history of what was in the past an important issue for black Americans sheds light on the 'forgotten years' of the Negro Revolution, particularly World War II. The war's democratic rhetoric had a great impact on the nation's largest minority, a fact overlooked by most scholars. The hypocritical position of the United States - fighting with a racially segregated armed forces to uphold the four freedoms and to defeat an enemy preaching a master race ideology - provided Negro Americans with a clear illustration of the difference between the American creed and practice, and a powerful argument in their struggle for equality. The postwar era made it impossible for the Federal Government and the American people to ignore the race issue any longer. The Truman Administrations' legislative proposals and actions in the field of Negro rights set the pattern for a continuing federal improvement. No longer was it the Federal Government's policy to condone or extend segregation. Of the Truman Administrations' precedent-breaking actions in this area, desegregation of the armed forces was among the first. The President, as Commander-in-chief, could move in this area without legislation from a reluctant Congress. Truman's Executive Order 9981 of July, 1948, which established the President's Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services, was one of the first federal actions against the separate-but-equal doctrine, coming six years before the 1954 school desegregation decision of the Supreme Court. A reluctant Army was finally convinced of the wisdom of desegregation when the new policy proved a success in the Korean War, a success that provided a powerful argument for those who sought an end to segregation in the United States. This was truly a social revolution, and the result is indicated by the fact that to this day the armed forces remain the most integrated institution in American society"--Jacket.

Documenting the racial integration of the Air Force from the end of World War II to the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, retired Air Force colonel Alan L. Gropman contends that the service desegregated itself not for moral or political reasons but to improve military effectiveness. First published in 1977, this second edition charts policy changes to date. 31 photos.

One of the first Army bases to implement on a large scale President Truman's call for racial integration of the armed forces, Fort Jackson, South Carolina, quickly took its place in the Defense Department's official history of the process. What reporters, and later on, historians, overlooked was the interaction between the integration of Fort Jackson and developments, in particular, the civil rights movement, in the wider communities in which the base is situated.In Black, White, and Olive Drab, Andrew H. Myers redresses this oversight; taking a case-study approach, Myers meticulously weaves together a wide range of official records, newspaper accounts, and personal interviews, revealing the impact of Fort Jackson's integration on the desegregation of civilian buses, schools, housing, and public facilities in the surrounding area. Examining the ways in which commanders and staff at the installation navigated challenges over racial issues in their dealings with municipal authorities, state politicians, federal legislators, and the upper echelons of the military bureaucracy, Myers also addresses how post leaders dealt with the potential for participation in civil rights demonstrations by soldiers under their command. Original and provocative, Black, White, and Olive Drab will engage historians and sociologists who study military-social relations, the civil rights movement, African American history, and the South, as well as those who are interested in or familiar with basic training or the American armed forces.

"In the quarter century that followed American entry into World War II, the nation's armed forces moved from the reluctant inclusion of a few segregated Negroes to their routine acceptance in a racially integrated military establishment. Nor was this change confined to military installations. By the time it was over, the armed forces had redefined their traditional obligation for the welfare of their members to include a promise of equal treatment for black servicemen wherever they might be. In the name of equality of treatment and opportunity, the Department of Defense began to challenge racial injustices deeply rooted in American society. For all its sweeping implications, equality in the armed forces obviously had its pragmatic aspects. In one sense it was a practical answer to pressing political problems that had plagued several national administrations. In another, it was the services' expression of those liberalizing tendencies that were permeating American society during the era of civil rights activism. But to a considerable extent the policy of racial equality that evolved in this quarter century was also a response to the need for military efficiency. So easy did it become to demonstrate the connection between inefficiency and discrimination that, even when other reasons existed, military efficiency was the one most often evoked by defense officials to justify a change in racial policy." Morris J. MacGregor, Jr., received the A.B. and M.A. degrees in history from the Catholic University of America. He continued his graduate studies at the Johns Hopkins University and the University of Paris on a Fulbright grant. Before joining the staff of the U.S. Army Center of Military History in 1968 he served for ten years in the Historical Division of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.