This book presents the papers and comments on those papers delivered at a colloquium held at the Australian National University in December 2008 to celebrate 50 years since the publication in the Harvard Law Review of the famous and wide-ranging debate between HLA Hart and Lon L Fuller. These essays do not to re-run that debate and they are not confined to discussion of the jurisprudential issues canvassed by Hart and Fuller. Rather they pick up on strands in the debate and re-think them in the light of social, political and intellectual developments in the past 50 years and changed ways of understanding law and other normative systems. This collection looks forward rather than backward using the debate as a point of departure and inspiration.

Lon L Fuller's account of what he termed 'the internal morality of law' is widely accepted as the classic twentieth century statement of the principles of the rule of law. Much less accepted is his claim that a necessary connection between law and morality manifests in these principles, with the result that his jurisprudence largely continues to occupy a marginal place in the field of legal philosophy. In 'Forms Liberate: Reclaiming the Jurisprudence of Lon L Fuller', Kristen Rundle offers a close textual analysis of Fuller's published writings and working papers to explain how his claims about the internal morality of law belong to a wider exploration of the ways in which the distinctive form of law introduces meaningful limits to lawgiving power through its connection to human agency. By reading Fuller on his own terms, 'Forms Liberate' demonstrates why his challenge to a purely instrumental conception of law remains salient for twenty-first century legal scholarship.

This book presents the papers and comments on those papers delivered at a colloquium held at the Australian National University in December 2008 to celebrate 50 years since the publication in the Harvard Law Review of the famous and wide-ranging debate between HLA Hart and Lon L Fuller. These essays do not to re-run that debate and they are not confined to discussion of the jurisprudential issues canvassed by Hart and Fuller. Rather they pick up on strands in the debate and re-think them in the light of social, political and intellectual developments in the past 50 years and changed ways of understanding law and other normative systems. This collection looks forward rather than backward using the debate as a point of departure and inspiration.

The rule of law has been celebrated as “an unqualified human good," yet there is considerable disagreement about what the ideal of the rule of law requires. When people clamor for the preservation or extension of the rule of law, are they advocating a substantive conception of the rule of law respecting private property and promoting liberty, a formal conception emphasizing an “inner morality of law,” or a procedural conception stressing the right to be heard by an impartial tribunal and to make arguments about what the law is? When are exertions of executive power “outside the law” justified on the ground that they may be necessary to maintain or restore the conditions for the rule of law in emergency circumstances, such as defending against terrorist attacks? In Getting to the Rule of Law a group of contributors from a variety of disciplines address many of the theoretical legal, political, and moral issues raised by such questions and examine practical applications “on the ground” in the United States and around the world. This timely, interdisciplinary volume examines the ideal of the rule of law, questions when, if ever, executive power “outside the law” is justified to maintain or restore the rule of law, and explores the prospects for and perils of building the rule of law after military interventions.

American culture is changing, a sentiment echoed in phrases such as “the new normal,” and “in these uncertain times,” that regularly introduce all forms of public discourse now, signally a national sense of vulnerability and transformation. Cultural shifts generally involve multiple catalysts, but in this collection the contributors focus on the role changing discourse norms play in cancel culture, corporatism, the counter-sexual revolution, racialism, and a radically divided political climate. Three central themes arise in the arguments. First, that contemporary discourse norms emphasize outcomes rather than shared understanding, which support institutional and political goals but contribute to the contemporary political divide, and the notion that we are engaged in a zero-sum game. These discourse norms give rise to a form of Adorno’s administered world, such that we order society according to dominant opinions, which generally means those well acclimated to institutional and corporate culture. Finally, as Arendt feared, the personal has become political, meaning that the toxic public discourse invades private discourse, reducing personal autonomy and leaving us perpetually under the scrutiny of institutional authority.

What is the nature of law and what is the best way to discover it? This book argues that law is best understood in terms of the social functions it performs wherever it is found in human society. In order to support this claim, law is explained as a kind of institution and as a kind of artefact. To say that it is an institution is to say that it is designed for creating and conferring special statuses to people so as to alter their rights and responsibilities toward each other. To say that it is an artefact is to say that it is a tool of human creation that is designed to signal its usability to people who interact with it. This picture of law's nature is marshalled to critique theories of law that see it mainly as a product of reason or morality, understanding those theories via their conceptions of law's function. It is also used to argue against those legal positivists who see law's functions as relatively minor aspects of its nature. This method of conceptualizing law's nature helps us to explain how the law, understood as social facts, can make normative demands upon us. It also recommends a methodology for understanding law that combines elements of conceptual analysis with empirical research for uncovering the purposes to which diverse peoples put their legal activities.

Fuller, Lon L. The Law in Quest of Itself. Boston: Beacon Press, 1966. [vi], 150 pp. Reprinted 1999 by The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. LCCN 99-32863. ISBN-13: 978-1-58477-016-9. ISBN-10: 1-58477-016-3. Cloth. $60.* Three lectures by the Harvard Law School professor examine legal positivism and natural law. In the course of his analysis Fuller discusses Kelsen's theory as a reactionary theory, and Hobbes' theory of sovereignty. He defines legal positivism as the viewpoint that draws a distinction "between the law that is and the law that ought to be..." (p.5) and interprets natural law as that which tolerates a combination of the two. He looks at the effects of positivism's continued influence on American legal thinking and concludes that law as a principle of order is necessary in a democracy.

Bentham's law -- The possibility and probability of noncoercive law -- In search of the puzzled man -- Do people obey the law? -- Are officials above the law? -- Coercing obedience -- Of carrots and sticks -- Coercion's arsenal -- Awash in a sea of norms -- The differentiation of law