From the outset of his presidency, Donald Trump sought to narrow differences between Israel and the six monarchies of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)-Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)-as part of his strategy to isolate Iran.With that objective in mind, Trump's first visit abroad as president was to Riyadh in May 2017-where he addressed the U.S.-Arab-Islamic Summit-immediately followed by a visit to Israel.The President's message was clear: Saudi Arabia and Israel would serve as co-pillars of the U.S. security architecture for the broader Middle East. Under that vision, Egypt, Jordan and the six Gulf monarchies-together with Israel-would isolate Iran diplomatically. The second plank of this strategy was anchored in the so-called "Maximum Pressure" campaign, which sought for all practical purposes to expedite the collapse of Iran's economy as part of an effort to strengthen Washington's standing vis-à-vis Tehran. The third plank focused on solving the Israel-Palestinian conflict. These dynamics, the Trump-administration reasoned, would help set the stage for the renegotiation of the Iran agreement, formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.Trump's vision, however, faced immediate resistance-not from Iran or its regional proxies, but rather from some of Washington's very own Gulf partners when they imposed a blockade on Qatar only weeks after his Riyadh address. While the crisis between Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain and Egypt over Qatar was initially understood in Washington as an inter-Arab dispute, Sigurd Neubauer examines the overlooked and widely misunderstood Israeli and Omani roles in this feud.The Gulf crisis, Neubauer goes on to argue, has shattered a widely held preconception, namely that Israel and the Gulf states are drawing closer because of their shared animosity towards Iran and its regional agenda. While the Gulf states and Israel are indeed drawing closer, it is not primarily driven by fear of Iran but rather by inter-GCC rivalry, including in Washington, where an inexperienced administration had to dedicate significant political capital to solve the Gulf crisis.

Relations between Israel and the Gulf states are not anything new. In the immediate aftermath of the 1993 Oslo Accords, both Qatar and Oman established low-level yet open diplomatic ties with Israel. In 2010, Ha'aretz reported that the former Israeli foreign minister, Tzipi Livni, was on friendly terms with Shaykh Abdullah Ibn Zayed, her counterpart from the UAE, despite the absence of formal diplomatic ties between the two states. The shared suspicion towards the regional designs of Iran that undoubtedly underpinned these ties even extended, it was alleged, to a secret dialogue between Israel and Saudi Arabia, led by the late Meir Dagan, the former head of Mossad. Cooperation between Israel and Saudi Arabia in thwarting Iran's regional ambitions also casts light on Washington's lack of strategic leadership, which had previously been the totem around which Israel and the Gulf states had based regional security strategies. Jones and Guzansky contend that, at the very least, ties between Israel and many of its Gulf counterparts are now more vibrant than hitherto realized. They constitute a tacit security regime which, while based on hard power interests, does not preclude competition in other areas. Ultimately, these relations are helping shape a new regional order in the Middle East.

This book examines the regional order in the Gulf Region and the wider Middle East, focusing on regional rivalries and security alliances. The authors analyze the regional system in terms of its general structure as well as the major inter-state and non-state security alliances. The structure of the regional system in the wider Middle East and the shake-ups it has experienced explain the ongoing regional rivalry and polarization since 2011 in hotspots such as Syria, Yemen, and Libya. As such, the various chapters address regional transition and power dynamics between and among regional great powers and non-state militant actors across the Gulf Region and the wider Middle East in terms of the alliance building, persistence, and disintegration since 2011.

This analysis seeks to analyse the main trends in Gulf security in light of the changes in the regional and international arena, while examining the relationship between external and internal threats, which are intertwined in the Gulf security agenda.

This book explores the phenomenon of political Islam in the Gulf region. Existing scholarship on this topic is mostly dedicated to the varied religious groups' position on violence and democracy. This book expands on the topic and investigates the complexities of the relationship of individuals to religion, the state, and societies, and the organization of their lives and spiritual affairs in the Middle East with particular emphasis on the unique environment of the Gulf. Given the importance of the political Islamic context to the politics, regional interventions, economics, and society of the Gulf states, this book will be an essential tool in giving, policy makers, practitioners, and the larger public a detailed view of a complicated but essential topic.

This award-winning study traces the shifting relations between Israel, Iran, and the U.S. since 1948—including secret alliances and treacherous acts. Vitriolic exchanges between the leaders of Iran and Israel are a disturbingly common feature of the news cycle. But the real roots of their enmity mystify Washington policymakers, leaving no promising pathways to stability. In Treacherous Alliance, U.S. foreign policy expert Trita Parsi untangles to complex and often duplicitous relationship among Israel, Iran, and the United States from 1948 to the present. In the process, he reveals shocking details of unsavory political maneuverings that have undermined Middle Eastern peace and disrupted U.S. foreign policy initiatives in the region. Parsi draws on his unique access to senior American, Iranian, and Israeli decision makers to present behind-the-scenes revelations that will surprise even the most knowledgeable readers: Iran’s prime minister asks Israel to assassinate Khomeini; Israel reaches out to Saddam Hussein after the Gulf War; the United States foils Iran’s plan to withdraw support from Hamas and Hezbollah; and more. Treacherous Alliance not only revises our understanding of the recent past, it also spells out a course for the future. An Arthur Ross Book Award Silver Medal Winner A Choice Magazine Outstanding Academic Title

This book analyzes four main episodes of conflict and defense which have affected the region during the last three decades: the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988), which effected the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) from a close, neighborly distance; the Iraq-Kuwait war (1990-1991), which constituted an attempt to invade the GCC and eliminate one of its member states, Kuwait. And the subsequent attempts to reestahblish a regional inter-state stability in the Gulf (during the mid-1990s, approximately), and the war of Islamic terrorism (notably al-Qa'ida) against Saudi Arabia (leading up to 2005). Each episode was driven by inimical interests and evolved as a distabilizintg influence on the Gulf states. At the same time, each conflict resulted in a paradoxical combination rivalry and cooperation among the GCC states themselves. A perpetual sequence of conflict and cooperation thus developed.

This book discusses the various critical dimensions of the Qatar Crisis as a development that has fundamentally reshaped the nature of regional integration for the near future. It represents the first academic attempt to challenge the commonly propagated binary view of this conflict. Further, the book explains the Gulf Crisis in the context of the transformation of the Gulf in the early 21st century, with new alliances and balances of power emerging. At the heart of the book lies the question of how the changing global and regional order facilitated or even fuelled the 2017 Crisis, which it argues was only the most recent climax in an ongoing crisis in the Gulf, on that had been simmering since 2011 and is rooted in historical feuds that date back to the 1800s. While contextualizing the crisis historically, the book also seeks to look beyond historical events to identify underlying patterns of identity security in connection with state and nation building in the Gulf.

"The U.S.-Israel relationship is in trouble," warn Council on Foreign Relations Senior Fellows Robert D. Blackwill and Philip H. Gordon in a new Council Special Report, Repairing the U.S.-Israel Relationship. Significant policy differences over issues in the Middle East, as well as changing demographics and politics within both the United States and Israel, have pushed the two countries apart. Blackwill, a former senior official in the Bush administration, and Gordon, a former senior official in the Obama administration, call for "a deliberate and sustained effort by policymakers and opinion leaders in both countries" to repair the relationship and to avoid divisions "that no one who cares about Israel's security or America's values and interests in the Middle East should want."

A critical examination of the history of US-Palestinian relations The United States has invested billions of dollars and countless diplomatic hours in the pursuit of Israeli-Palestinian peace and a two-state solution. Yet American attempts to broker an end to the conflict have repeatedly come up short. At the center of these failures lay two critical factors: Israeli power and Palestinian politics. While both Israelis and Palestinians undoubtedly share much of the blame, one also cannot escape the role of the United States, as the sole mediator in the process, in these repeated failures. American peacemaking efforts ultimately ran aground as a result of Washington’s unwillingness to confront Israel’s ever-deepening occupation or to come to grips with the realities of internal Palestinian politics. In particular, the book looks at the interplay between the U.S.-led peace process and internal Palestinian politics—namely, how a badly flawed peace process helped to weaken Palestinian leaders and institutions and how an increasingly dysfunctional Palestinian leadership, in turn, hindered prospects for a diplomatic resolution. Thus, while the peace process was not necessarily doomed to fail, Washington’s management of the process, with its built-in blind spot to Israeli power and Palestinian politics, made failure far more likely than a negotiated breakthrough. Shaped by the pressures of American domestic politics and the special relationship with Israel, Washington’s distinctive “blind spot” to Israeli power and Palestinian politics has deep historical roots, dating back to the 1917 Balfour Declaration and the British Mandate. The size of the blind spot has varied over the years and from one administration to another, but it is always present.