During the decades from 1982 to 1992, Texas banks failed at a rate unprecedented in United States history, even including the Great Depression of the 1930s. In all, 506 Texas commercial banks failed (accounting for 36% of all failures nationally), including seven of the ten largest banks in Texas. In this fascinating insider's account, Joseph M. "Jody" Grant, former chairman and chief executive officer of Texas American Bancshares, Inc. of Fort Worth (the seventh largest), tells the story of the collapse of Texas' major banks. He vividly re-creates the three-year struggle to save his own organization, Texas American Bancshares. This sobering account makes a compelling case against the FDIC's handling of Texas' financial crisis. In Grant's view, the bank failures have deprived Texas of the engine of capital that spawned the nation's third largest industrial economy, built Texas' major cities, bankrolled its entrepreneurs, and provided a pool of talented business and civic leaders. Grant's book will be thought-provoking reading for everyone in the financial community, as well as for students of Texas history and of business and government relations.

The deflation of the subprime mortgage bubble in 2006-7 is widely agreed to have been the immediate cause of the collapse of the financial sector in 2008. Consequently, one might think that uncovering the origins of subprime lending would make the root causes of the crisis obvious. That is essentially where public debate about the causes of the crisis began—and ended—in the month following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers and the 502-point fall in the Dow Jones Industrial Average in mid-September 2008. However, the subprime housing bubble is just one piece of the puzzle. Asset bubbles inflate and burst frequently, but severe worldwide recessions are rare. What was different this time? In What Caused the Financial Crisis leading economists and scholars delve into the major causes of the worst financial collapse since the Great Depression and, together, present a comprehensive picture of the factors that led to it. One essay examines the role of government regulation in expanding home ownership through mortgage subsidies for impoverished borrowers, encouraging the subprime housing bubble. Another explores how banks were able to securitize mortgages by manipulating criteria used for bond ratings. How this led to inaccurate risk assessments that could not be covered by sufficient capital reserves mandated under the Basel accords is made clear in a third essay. Other essays identify monetary policy in the United States and Europe, corporate pay structures, credit-default swaps, banks' leverage, and financial deregulation as possible causes of the crisis. With contributions from Richard A. Posner, Vernon L. Smith, Joseph E. Stiglitz, and John B. Taylor, among others, What Caused the Financial Crisis provides a cogent, comprehensive, and credible explanation of why the crisis happened. It will be an essential resource for scholars and students of finance, economics, history, law, political science, and sociology, as well as others interested in the financial crisis and the nature of modern capitalism and regulation.

Relying on a broad array of records used together for the first time, Panic in the Loop reveals widespread fraud and insider abuse by bankers--and the complicity of corrupt politicians--that caused the Chicago banking debacle of 1932. It provides a fresh interpretation of the role played by bankers who turned the nation's financial crisis of the early 1930s into the decade-long Great Depression. It also calls for the abolition of secrecy that still permeates the bank regulatory system, which would have prevented the Enron fiasco and the financial meltdown of 2008. This book focuses on the recurrent failures of the financial system--the savings and loan crisis of the 1980s, the Enron debacle of the early 2000s, and finally the financial collapse of 2008. Because of regulatory secrecy, knowing what happened in Chicago in 1932 is critical to understanding the glaring problems in the regulation of American finance, in particular the lack of transparency, the abuse of financial institutions by insiders, and the capture of public institutions by insiders going through the revolving door between the private and public sectors. Eight decades later little has changed. The regulatory failures of the 1930s--especially the pervasive system of secrecy that allowed the fraud and insider abuse to flourish--were repeated during the collapse of 2008. Transparency would strike at the alliance between the executives of financial institutions and public officials, who caused the worst economic upheaval since the Great Depression.

The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report, published by the U.S. Government and the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission in early 2011, is the official government report on the United States financial collapse and the review of major financial institutions that bankrupted and failed, or would have without help from the government. The commission and the report were implemented after Congress passed an act in 2009 to review and prevent fraudulent activity. The report details, among other things, the periods before, during, and after the crisis, what led up to it, and analyses of subprime mortgage lending, credit expansion and banking policies, the collapse of companies like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and the federal bailouts of Lehman and AIG. It also discusses the aftermath of the fallout and our current state. This report should be of interest to anyone concerned about the financial situation in the U.S. and around the world.THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION is an independent, bi-partisan, government-appointed panel of 10 people that was created to "examine the causes, domestic and global, of the current financial and economic crisis in the United States." It was established as part of the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009. The commission consisted of private citizens with expertise in economics and finance, banking, housing, market regulation, and consumer protection. They examined and reported on "the collapse of major financial institutions that failed or would have failed if not for exceptional assistance from the government."News Dissector DANNY SCHECHTER is a journalist, blogger and filmmaker. He has been reporting on economic crises since the 1980's when he was with ABC News. His film In Debt We Trust warned of the economic meltdown in 2006. He has since written three books on the subject including Plunder: Investigating Our Economic Calamity (Cosimo Books, 2008), and The Crime Of Our Time: Why Wall Street Is Not Too Big to Jail (Disinfo Books, 2011), a companion to his latest film Plunder The Crime Of Our Time. He can be reached online at www.newsdissector.com.

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Even when lawsuits disclosed the chicanery, state and federal regulators misled the public. Despite the official denials, the public panicked. The ensuing runs caused the banking crash.

Based on reporting for which the author was named a finalist for the Pulitzer Prize and the Gerald Loeb Award, this book traces the rise and spectacular fall of Washington Mutual.

Banksters, Bosses, and Smart Money uncovers the causes of one city's economic collapse by tracing the interlocking directorships, political machines, and insider deals that made quick fortunes for the well-connected while jeopardizing the savings of tens of thousands of depositors. It documents how the power of the city's financial elites continued even after the calamitous bank crash of 1931, skewing the liquidation of insolvent banks in their favor and shielding those responsible from criminal prosecution.

The history of banking in Texas from the Republic era through the Great Depression is a tale of uncertainty, distrust and confusion, but it is not without a cast of heroic figures. This is the story of the pioneering institutions and individuals that laid the foundation for the current system of banking in Texas, despit enormous legislative and economic obstacles. The Texas Revolution, repeated constitutional prohibitions on banks, civil war and unstable economic conditions hampered the development of an established system of dependable institutions. From the embattled history of the first bank chartered in Mexican Texas (The Commercial & Agricultural Bank) to far more obscure firms, the essential facts are here. The product of years of research drawing on primary documents, this work has been cited extensively in subsequent works relating to Texas and southern banking. Originally published in 1930 by the Fort Worth National Bank upon the death of the bank's founding father, this title has been out-of-print since. This new edition has been wholly revised and re-designed for improved readability.