The future of coal under carbon cap and trade : hearing before the Select Committee on Energy Independence and Global Warming, House of Representatives, One Hundred Tenth Congress, first session, September 6, 2007.

The future of coal under carbon cap and trade: hearing before the Select Committee on Energy Independence and Global Warming, House of Representatives, One Hundred Tenth Congress, first session, September 6, 2007.

Coal will continue to provide a major portion of energy requirements in the United States for at least the next several decades. It is imperative that accurate information describing the amount, location, and quality of the coal resources and reserves be available to fulfill energy needs. It is also important that the United States extract its coal resources efficiently, safely, and in an environmentally responsible manner. A renewed focus on federal support for coal-related research, coordinated across agencies and with the active participation of the states and industrial sector, is a critical element for each of these requirements. Coal focuses on the research and development needs and priorities in the areas of coal resource and reserve assessments, coal mining and processing, transportation of coal and coal products, and coal utilization.

Help your readers understand and confront the role of big industry in global warming. This volume expertly discusses the effects of emissions on the climate. Readers will learn about the Montreal and Kyoto Protocols. They will analyze the future of coal and nuclear alternatives. Carbon trading is explained. Readers will appreciate the discussion on Green Industry as well. Author Tom Streissguth has consulted the works of leading experts in the field to present accurate, unbiased information and to explore all sides.

Shows readers how we can all help solve the climate crisis by focusing on a few key, achievable actions.

Why the traditional “pledge and review” climate agreements have failed, and how carbon pricing, based on trust and reciprocity, could succeed. After twenty-five years of failure, climate negotiations continue to use a “pledge and review” approach: countries pledge (almost anything), subject to (unenforced) review. This approach ignores everything we know about human cooperation. In this book, leading economists describe an alternate model for climate agreements, drawing on the work of the late Nobel laureate Elinor Ostrom and others. They show that a “common commitment” scheme is more effective than an “individual commitment” scheme; the latter depends on altruism while the former involves reciprocity (“we will if you will”). The contributors propose that global carbon pricing is the best candidate for a reciprocal common commitment in climate negotiations. Each country would commit to placing charges on carbon emissions sufficient to match an agreed global price formula. The contributors show that carbon pricing would facilitate negotiations and enforcement, improve efficiency and flexibility, and make other climate policies more effective. Additionally, they analyze the failings of the 2015 Paris climate conference. Contributors Richard N. Cooper, Peter Cramton, Ottmar Edenhofer, Christian Gollier, Éloi Laurent, David JC MacKay, William Nordhaus, Axel Ockenfels, Joseph E. Stiglitz, Steven Stoft, Jean Tirole, Martin L. Weitzman