This book is a consideration of Hegel’s view on logic and basic logical concepts such as truth, form, validity, and contradiction, and aims to assess this view’s relevance for contemporary philosophical logic. The literature on Hegel’s logic is fairly rich. The attention to contemporary philosophical logic places the present research closer to those works interested in the link between Hegel’s thought and analytical philosophy (Stekeler-Weithofer 1992 and 2019, Berto 2005, Rockmore 2005, Redding 2007, Nuzzo 2010 (ed.), Koch 2014, Brandom 2014, 1-15, Pippin 2016, Moyar 2017, Quante & Mooren 2018 among others). In this context, one particularity of this book consists in focusing on something that has been generally underrated in the literature: the idea that, for Hegel as well as for Aristotle and many other authors (including Frege), logic is the study of the forms of truth, i.e. the forms that our thought can (or ought to) assume in searching for truth. In this light, Hegel’s thinking about logic is a fundamental reference point for anyone interested in a philosophical foundation of logic.

Blake E. Hestir's examination of Plato's conception of truth challenges a long tradition of interpretation in ancient scholarship.

Denis McManus presents a novel account of Martin Heidegger's early vision of our subjectivity and the world we inhabit. He explores key elements of Heidegger's philosophy, and argues that Heidegger's central claims identify genuine demands that must be met if we are to achieve the feat of thinking determinate thoughts about the world around us.

This book reconsiders the traditional correspondence theory of truth, which takes truth to be a matter of correctly representing objects. Drawing Heideggerian phenomenology into dialogue with American pragmatic naturalism, Christopher P. Long undertakes a rigorous reading of Aristotle that articulates the meaning of truth as a co-operative activity between human beings and the natural world that is rooted in our endeavours to do justice to the nature of things. By following a path of Aristotle's thinking that leads from our rudimentary encounters with things in perceiving through human communication to thinking, this book traces an itinerary that uncovers the nature of truth as ecological justice, and it finds the nature of justice in our attempts to articulate the truth of things.

Hartry Field presents a selection of thirteen essays on a set of related topics at the foundations of philosophy; one essay is previously unpublished, and eight are accompanied by substantial new postscripts.Five of the essays are primarily about truth, meaning, and propositional attitudes, five are primarily about semantic indeterminacy and other kinds of 'factual defectiveness' in our discourse, and three are primarily about issues concerning objectivity, especially in mathematics and in epistemology. The essays on truth, meaning, and the attitudes show a development from a form of correspondence theory of truth and meaning to a more deflationist perspective.The next set of papers argue that a place must be made in semantics for the idea that there are questions about which there is no fact of the matter, and address the difficulties involved in making sense of this, both within a correspondence theory of truth and meaning, and within a deflationary theory. Two papers argue that there are questions in mathematics about which there is no fact of the mattter, and draw out implications of this for the nature of mathematics. And the final paper arguesfor a view of epistemology in which it is not a purely fact-stating enterprise.This influential work by a key figure in contemporary philosophy will reward the attention of any philosopher interested in language, epistemology, or mathematics.

Truth is one of the most debated topics in philosophy; Wolfgang Künne presents a comprehensive critical examination of all major theories. Conceptions of Truth is organized around a flow-chart comprising sixteen key questions, ranging from 'Is truth a property?' to 'Is truth epistemically constrained?' Künne expounds and engages with the ideas of many thinkers, from Aristotle and the Stoics, to Continental analytic philosophers like Bolzano, Brentano, andKotarbinski, to such leading figures in current debates as Dummett, Putnam, Wright, and Horwich. He explains many important distinctions (between varieties of correspondence, for example, between different conceptions of making true, between various kinds of eternalism and temporalism) which have so far been neglected in theliterature. Künne argues that it is possible to give a satisfactory 'modest' account of truth without invoking problematic notions like correspondence, fact, or meaning. And he offers a novel argument to support the realist claim that truth outruns justifiability.The clarity of exposition and the wealth of examples will make Conceptions of Truth an invaluable and stimulating guide for advanced students and scholars in metaphysics, epistemology and the philosophy of language.

In Aristotle on Practical Truth, C.M.M. Olfert gives the first book-length treatment of Aristotle's notion of practical truth. The book covers the origins of practical truth in Plato's philosophy; practical truth's role in practical reasoning; its contributions to motivation and action; and its implications for ethical development.

Truth is one of the oldest and most central topics in philosophy. Formal theories explore the connections between truth and logic, and they address truth-theoretic paradoxes such as the Liar. Three leading philosopher-logicians now present a concise overview of the main issues and ideas in formal theories of truth. Beall, Glanzberg, and Ripley explain key logical techniques on which such formal theories rely, providing the formal and logical background needed to develop formal theories of truth. They examine the most important truth-theoretic paradoxes, including the Liar paradoxes. They explore approaches that keep principles of truth simple while relying on nonclassical logic; approaches that preserve classical logic but do so by complicating the principles of truth; and approaches based on substructural logics that change the shape of the target consequence relation itself. Finally, inconsistency and revision theories are reviewed, and contrasted with the approaches previously discussed. For any reader who has a basic grounding in logic, this book offers an ideal guide to formal theories of truth.

This brief book takes readers to the very heart of what it is that philosophy can do well. Completed shortly before Donald Davidson's death at 85, Truth and Predication brings full circle a journey moving from the insights of Plato and Aristotle to the problems of contemporary philosophy. In particular, Davidson, countering many of his contemporaries, argues that the concept of truth is not ambiguous, and that we need an effective theory of truth in order to live well. Davidson begins by harking back to an early interest in the classics, and an even earlier engagement with the workings of grammar; in the pleasures of diagramming sentences in grade school, he locates his first glimpse into the mechanics of how we conduct the most important activities in our life--such as declaring love, asking directions, issuing orders, and telling stories. Davidson connects these essential questions with the most basic and yet hard to understand mysteries of language use--how we connect noun to verb. This is a problem that Plato and Aristotle wrestled with, and Davidson draws on their thinking to show how an understanding of linguistic behavior is critical to the formulating of a workable concept of truth. Anchored in classical philosophy, Truth and Predication nonetheless makes telling use of the work of a great number of modern philosophers from Tarski and Dewey to Quine and Rorty. Representing the very best of Western thought, it reopens the most difficult and pressing of ancient philosophical problems, and reveals them to be very much of our day.

What is truth? Michael Lynch defends a bold new answer to this question. Traditional theories of truth hold that truth has only a single uniform nature. All truths are true in the same way. More recent deflationary theories claim that truth has no nature at all; the concept of truth is of no real philosophical importance. In this concise and clearly written book, Lynch argues that we should reject both these extremes and hold that truth is a functional property. To understand truth we must understand what it does, its function in our cognitive economy. Once we understand that, we'll see that this function can be performed in more than one way. And that in turn opens the door to an appealing pluralism: beliefs about the concrete physical world needn't be true in the same way as our thoughts about matters — like morality — where the human stain is deepest.