An examination of the savings and loan crisis and subsequent bailout reveals that the welfare state is a dynamic process: the bailout is an extension of a larger process of state projects for economic intervention that began with banking regulation following the Great Depression of the 1930s, and continued with the Chrysler bailout legislation in 1979 and the Garn-St. Germain Act of 1982, which deregulated the banking industry. In viewing the welfare state as a power process involving shifts in relative emphases on corporate and social welfare policies and expenditures, this book provides both central case studies and a new conceptual framework for policy debates on "welfare as we know it."

The financial crises that began unexpectedly in Southeast Asia in 1997 spread rapidly around the globe, causing banks to fail, stock markets to plummet, and other newsmaking disruptions. Gup and his contributors examine these failures and crises in the main arenas where they occurred—Thailand, Indonesia, South Korea, Russia, Argentina—and provide some important answers to the critical questions these frightening events raised. The result is a readable, easily grasped study of issues relating to bank failure and the effectiveness of bank regulation, and important reading for academics and practitioners alike. In July 1997 Thailand devalued its currency. This one event sparked financial crises that spread with astonishing speed from Southeast Asia around the world to Russia. Even in the United States and South America the impact was felt. Southeast Asia had been considered a model—in fact a miracle—of economic growth. No one foresaw the crises that soon occurred there, and the severity and contagion of these crises raised questions globally: What happened? Why? And what can we do about it? Gup and his contributors offer some answers to these critical questions. Gup and his panel finally conclude that government actions were at the root of these crises. Banks were pawns in the hands of governments, and banks helped fuel the booms that ultimately burst, booms supported by investments from other countries around the world, not incidentally. Gup goes on to lay out other provocative questions, among them: How effective are bank regulations? And how do we resolve failed and insolvent banks? The result is an important contribution to the literature in banking, finance, investment, and the role government plays in these activities—a book not only for academics but for practitioners and informed laymen as well.

One of the major financial market events of the 1980s was the precipitous rise of depository institution failures including banks, savings and loan associations, and credit unions. Not since the 1930s has there been a similar period of turmoil in these industries. The events of the 1980s have inspired a renewed interest in the causes and cost of financial institution failure and several questions that had seldom been asked in the post-World War II economics literature have resurfaced Why do financial institutions fail? What are the costs of their failure? How do they differ from other firms and industries? What are the implications for financial market regulation? The Causes and Costs of Depository Institution Failures critically surveys and extends previous analyses of these questions. Audience: Scholars and researchers in the areas of money and banking, financial institutions, and financial markets, as well as regulators and policymakers.