This textbook aims to explain the principles in international trade theory and show how some useful trade models work. The book concentrates on two fundamental issues in international trade, that is, the 'determinants of trade patterns' and the 'welfare gains from trade' in various economic environments. Chapters 1 through 3 assume perfect competition and explore the workings of the Ricardian model, the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model, the Specific Factors model and more recent development of the Eaton-Kortum model. Chapter 4 examines various welfare criteria and their relation to the 'social utility function' and, then, proves the basic gains-from-trade proposition. Chapters 5 and 6 examine the implications of imperfect competition using a unified oligopolistic model and variations of the monopolistically competitive model. The roles of the strategic interaction among firms, the economies of scale, product differentiation, the heterogeneity of firms, and the geographic distribution of agents will be highlighted. Chapter 7 deals with some trade policy issues such as the effects of tariffs, the relation of tariffs to other policy measures, and the so-called strategic trade policies.

World-renowned economist Ronald W. Jones gets to the essence of international trade theory in this collection of articles that span over half a century of his published work. As the global economy has grown, so too has the need for a deeper rooted understanding of trade -- and its assorted benefits. With clear, simplifying prose, Jones elucidates the Ricardian, Heckscher-Ohlin, and Specific-Factors models of general equilibrium theory. Jones' pioneering work anticipates, among other changes in our time, the creation of far-flung supply chains brought about by the falling costs of service links. The theoretical, technical, and historical insights in the text are peppered with personal notes that capture modern intellectual development in the field, providing a bedrock foundation in international trade for students and practitioners alike.

International Trade: Theory, Evidence and Policy provides an integrated non-mathematical account of trade theory and policy that can be read straight through. The footnotes provide caveats, extensions and entry points, or further reading.This book is divided into three parts. The first part focuses on the core theoretical analysis of international trade that has evolved over a quarter-millennium. The second part reviews recent empirical research in global value chains, trade costs, and heterogeneous firms, particularly from analysing large datasets of individual firms' characteristics and of trade flows disaggregated to very finely detailed levels. The third section of the book analyzes trade policies and discusses current policy debates.This edition is based on Pomfret's Lecture Notes on International Trade Theory and Policy, first published in 2008. The content has been extensively updated and revised to stand as a new volume.

Centering on questions of the potential optimality of some trade protection, these original contributions present research at the frontier of international trade and trade policy. They expand and test the new trade theory that has developed during the last decade, incorporating elements of industrial organization and political economy into the study of trade structure and the formation of trade policy. Essays in the first two parts take up trade policy, addressing issues such as the formation of trading blocks, strategic trade policy, the political economy of protection, growth-oriented trade policies, and including empirical studies of the welfare effects of quality - upgrading voluntary export restrictions and import quotas. Essays in the third part discuss various structural issues such as trade in services, intersectoral adjustments, and the advantage of early entry. Elhanan Helpman and Assaf Razin are Professors of Economics at Tel Aviv University and NBER Research Associates. Contents: Trade Policy: Theory. Is Bilateralism Bad? Paul R. Krugman. Strategic Trade Policy and Direct Foreign Investment: When Are Tariffs and Quotas Equivalent? James A. Levinsohn. Making Altruism Pay in Auction Quotas, Kala Krishna. On the Ineffectiveness of Made-to-Measure Protectionist Programs, Aaron Tornell. Export Subsidies and Price Competition, Peter Neary. Adverse Selection in Credit Markets and Infant Industry Protection, Harry Flam and Robert W. Staiger. Protection, Politics, and Market Structure, Arye L. Hillman. Growth and Welfare in a Small Open Economy, Gene M. Grossman and Elhanan Helpman. Trade Policy: Evidence. Quality Upgrading and Its Welfare Cost in U.S. Imports, 1969-74, Randi Boorstein and Robert C. Feenstra. Counting the Cost of Voluntary Export Restraints in the European Car Market, Alasdair Smith and Anthony J. Venables. Structural Issues. Services in International Trade, Wilfred J. Ethier and Henrik Horn. First-Mover Advantages, Blockaded Entry, and the Economics of Uneven Development, James R. Markusen. Wage Sensitivity Rankings and Temporal Convergence, Ronald W. Jones and Peter Neary.

This paper provides a theory model of trade finance to explain the "great trade collapse." The model shows that, first, the riskiness of international transactions rises relative to domestic transactions during economic downturns, and second, the exclusive use of a letter of credit in international transactions exacerbates a collapse in trade during a financial crisis. The basic model considers banks' optimal screening decisions in the presence of counterparty default risks. In equilibrium, banks will maintain a higher precision screening test for domestic firms and a lower precision screening test for foreign firms, which constitutes the main mechanism of the model.

This text is suitable for international trade courses at the undergraduate level. Knowledge of microeconomics is an assumed prerequisite for students using this text.

The author argues that a tax on imports commensurately creates a tax on exports, and that trade imbalances reflect capital flows between countries.

This book expounds trade theory emphasizing that a trading equilibrium is general rather than partial, and is often best modelled using dual or envelope functions. This yields a compact treatment of standard theory, clarifies some errors and confusions, and produces some new departures. In particular, the book (i) gives unified treatments of comparative statics and welfare, (ii) sheds new light on the factor-price equalization issue, (iii) treats the modern specific-factor model in parallel with the usual Heckscher-Ohlin one, (iv) analyses the balance of payments in general equilibrium with flexible and fixed prices, (v) studies imperfect competition and intra-industry trade.