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Excerpt from The English Reports, Vol. 144: Common Pleas XXII, Containing Common Bench Reports (New Series), Vols. 17 to 20 Williams, J I am entirely of the same opinion. At the trial the question was treated by the plaintiff's counsel as one of law: and I dealt with it accordingly. I entirely agree with my Lord in the conclusion he has come to, and also in the reasons he has given. An [37] attempt was made on the part of the plaintiff to give evidence of a custom peculiar to huntsmen, assuming a huntsman to fall within the class of menial servants. But I told the jury I could discover no evidence upon which they could properly find such a custom. The utmost the evidence for the plaintiff amounted to, was the story of the individual experiences of his Witnesses. There was nothing which could be considered as a legal foundation for any such custom. The real question to be decided was, whether the hiring of a huntsman was determinable at a month's notice. After maturely considering all the evidence that was given, I have come to the conclusion that the ease of the huntsman must be governed by the general rule applicable to all other domestic servants. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works.

V. 1-11. House of Lords (1677-1865) -- v. 12-20. Privy Council (including Indian Appeals) (1809-1865) -- v. 21-47. Chancery (including Collateral reports) (1557-1865) -- v. 48-55. Rolls Court (1829-1865) -- v. 56-71. Vice-Chancellors' Courts (1815-1865) -- v. 72-122. King's Bench (1378-1865) -- v. 123-144. Common Pleas (1486-1865) -- v. 145-160. Exchequer (1220-1865) -- v. 161-167. Ecclesiastical (1752-1857), Admiralty (1776-1840), and Probate and Divorce (1858-1865) -- v. 168-169. Crown Cases (1743-1865) -- v. 170-176. Nisi Prius (1688-1867).

The Model Rules of Professional Conduct provides an up-to-date resource for information on legal ethics. Federal, state and local courts in all jurisdictions look to the Rules for guidance in solving lawyer malpractice cases, disciplinary actions, disqualification issues, sanctions questions and much more. In this volume, black-letter Rules of Professional Conduct are followed by numbered Comments that explain each Rule's purpose and provide suggestions for its practical application. The Rules will help you identify proper conduct in a variety of given situations, review those instances where discretionary action is possible, and define the nature of the relationship between you and your clients, colleagues and the courts.

Excerpt from The English Reports, Vol. 20: Privy Council 9, Containing Moore, Indian Appeals, Volumes 11 to 14 This is an application for permission to appeal to the Privy Council against the Order of the High Court passed in the execution of a decree of the Privy Council. Notice was ordered to be issued to the opposite party to come in and show cause against this application within one month from the date of service of notice. Subsequently, both parties having appeared, and as the case involved a new point of considerable importance, it was ordered on the 26th August, 1865, to be brought-up before the miscellaneous Bench of Judges. It accordingly came before the Court (present, Justices Loch and Glover) on the 13th September, 1865. Mr. Justice Loch delivered judgment and an Order was passed by this Court on the 27th April, 1865, confirming an Order passed by the Principal Sudder Ameen in execution of a decree for a sum above Rs. And application is now made to the Court for permission to appeal to the Privy Council under section 39 of the Charter of the High Court. The words of the Charter quoted in support of the application are from any final judgment, decree, or Order of the said High Court made in appeal. The words, no doubt, are very wide: we think that they are not intended to extend the privilege of appealing to the Privy Council in miscellaneous cases, or to alter the present rules which restrict an appeal to 'judgments, decrees, or decretal Orders.' In Regulation XVI. Of 1797, the word judgment was alone used, but, notwithstanding, parties had been allowed to send miscellaneous cases to the Privy Council: the practice was put a stop to in 1837 by a construction of the late Sudder Court, dated the 18th August, 1837, No. 1102. In 1838 an Order in Council was passed, bearing date the l0th April, issuing rules for the admission of appeals to the Privy Council; and in the first of these rules we have the words judgment, decree, or decretal order, ' all of which words, we think, are intended to have one and the same meaning, viz., the judgment or decisions come to in a suit, ' and that they do not refer to Orders passed in execution of a decree. Such has been the interpretation put upon the words by the public, for up to the present time no application has been made to submit miscellaneous appeals to the Privy Council through this Court Since the rules of 1838 were promulgated. In the Charter of the High Court the same words are used, with the omission of the word decretal before Order no doubt it is a remarkable omission, but reading it with the assistance we have from the letter of the Secretary of State for India, of the 14th May, 1862, par. 37, we do not think that so material a change in the past practice of the Courts as the permission to appeal from miscellaneous Orders would have been passed by without comment, when he notices very particularly the introduction of a section in the Charter allowing of appeals from interlocutory Orders with the permis sion of a Judge of the High Court. In the paragraph of the letter referred to it is distinctly stated, that in regard to appeals to the Privy Council the object has' been to avoid unnecessary innovation; that the existing rules which regulate theme appeals are, therefore, left in force, with one or two additions only; and the writer proceeds to instance the introduction of a section permitting appeals from interlocutory Orders: and we think that there is a very great and sufficient reason why an appeal from Orders passed in execution of a decree should not be allowed, which is, that if allowed it would open a fresh door for harassing an Opponent who has already had to fight his battle perhaps up to the Privy Council, and deprive him of the power of executing his decree without further trouble and vexation. We think, therefore, that this and such like appeals cannot. Be received. And we reject the application.

Most vols. have appendices consisting of reports of various State offices.