This fresh look at the 1963 crisis in the western alliance following de Gaulle's veto of the British EEC application uses much new unpublished source material to offer a fascinating insight into the personal relationships of the western leaders. It challenges the orthodox view, showing that the ultimate breakdown came after Anglo-German and Anglo-American cooperation to ensure that de Gaulle was made the sole scapegoat, in order to isolate France within the EEC.

Following its foundation in 1957, the European Economic Community set about establishing itself as a major player on the world stage. One of the first key arenas in which the new organisation began to make its presence felt was the GATT negotiations that took place between 1963 and 1967, known as the Kennedy Round. Through a reconstruction of these on-going negotiations, this book charts the emergence of the EEC as a world trading power and the strategies it adopted that were to have a lasting effect upon European trade policies. As well as proving an important background to the Kennedy Round, the study explains how the EEC/European Union became a powerful actor in international trade, championing a liberal attitude toward the industrial sector but a protectionist one in agriculture. It also addresses the impact of the EEC/EU as regional trading area on the multilateral and global trading system and the EEC/EU trade policy-making. Through an historical analysis of these topics, a much fuller understanding of the actual role and stance of the EEC/EU in world trade is provided, one that not only illuminates events at the time, but provides essential background to the challenges still faced by the international trading system and the World Trade Organization. Based on a wealth of documentary research drawn from European and US archives, this book will be welcomed by all wishing to better understand the complex nature of international trade in an increasingly globalised market place.

This fresh look at the 1963 crisis in the western alliance following de Gaulle's veto of the British EEC application uses much new unpublished source material to offer a fascinating insight into the personal relationships of the western leaders. It challenges the orthodox view, showing that the ultimate breakdown came after Anglo-German and Anglo-American cooperation to ensure that de Gaulle was made the sole scapegoat, in order to isolate France within the EEC.

A new and detailed study of the European Community's development between 1963 and 1969, with a special focus on the struggle between France and its EC partners over the purpose, structure and membership of the emerging European Community. On all three, French President Charles de Gaulle held divergent views from those of his fellow leaders. The six years in question were hence marked by a succession of confrontations over what the Community did, the way in which it functioned, and the question of whether new members (notably Britain) should be allowed to enter. Despite these multiple crises, however, the six founding members continued to press on with their joint experiment, demonstrating a surprisingly firm commitment to cooperation with each other. The period thus highlights both the strengths and the weaknesses of the early Community and highlights the origins of many of the structures and procedures that have survived until the current day.

The empty chair crisis of 1965, resolved in the Luxembourg Compromise of 1966, forms part of the dramatic past of the European Union, and is for many a turning-point in European political integration. This volume, based on new research, revisits these events. It sheds fresh light on the mixed motives of the principal member states, European institutions and third-country actors, and identifies the shadows cast over subsequent legal and political practice. The book results from a collaborative project among historians, lawyers, and political scientists. It draws on new archival material and on many insights from practitioners, both some involved in the events of 1965-66 and others engaged in subsequent negotiations in the Council of the EU. Traces of these events persist in the consensus-oriented culture in the Council, where a concern to avoid sharply polarised confrontation limits recourse to active voting, even though the formal use of qualified majority voting has been greatly extended. Arguments over agricultural policy, the EU budget and world trade negotiations thus continue to provide occasions for some member states to insist on their 'very important interests'. This book stems from a co-funded project of the Fondation Paul-Henri Spaak in Brussels and of the European University Institute and the Historical Archives of the European Union in Florence.

The Politics of Crisis in Europe explores the resilience of the European Union in the face of repeated crises perceived to threaten its very existence. While it is often observed after the fact that these crises serve as opportunities for integration, this is the first critical analysis to suggest that we cannot fully understand the nature and severity of these crises without recognising the role of societal reaction to events and the nature of social narratives about crisis, especially those advanced by the media. Through a close examination of the 2003 Iraq crisis, the 2005 constitutional crisis, and the 2010–12 Eurozone crisis, this book identifies a pattern across these episodes, demonstrating how narratives about crises provide the means to openly air underlying societal tensions that would otherwise remain under the surface, impeding further integration.

The European Union (EU) is in crisis. The crisis extends beyond Brexit, the fluctuating fortunes of the eurozone and the challenge of mass migration. It cuts to the core of the EU itself. Trust is eroding; power is shifting; politics are toxic; disillusionment is widespread; and solidarity has frayed. In this major new text leading academics come together to unpack all dimensions of the EU in crisis, and to analyse its implications for the EU, its member states and the ongoing study of European integration.

The book presents a new history of the first enlargement of the EU. It charts the attempts by the European Commission to influence the outcome of the British and Irish bids to join the Common Market during the 1960s and 1970s. The most politically divisive EU enlargement is examined through extensive research in British, Irish, EU, and US archives.

This fresh look at the 1963 crisis in the western alliance following de Gaulle's veto of the British EEC application uses much new unpublished source material to offer a fascinating insight into the personal relationships of the western leaders. It challenges the orthodox view, showing that the ultimate breakdown came after Anglo-German and Anglo-American cooperation to ensure that de Gaulle was made the sole scapegoat, in order to isolate France within the EEC.