This is a collection of both classic and recent scholarship on the economics of remedies in tort and contract law.

In recent years there has been a revival of interest in the philosophical study of contract law. In 1981 Charles Fried claimed that contract law is based on the philosophy of promise and this has generated what is today known as 'the contract and promise debate'. Cutting to the heart of contemporary discussions, this volume brings together leading philosophers, legal theorists, and contract lawyers to debate the philosophical foundations of this area of law. Divided into two parts, the first explores general themes in the contract theory literature, including the philosophy of promising, the nature of contractual obligation, economic accounts of contract law, and the relationship between contract law and moral values such as personal autonomy and distributive justice. The second part uses these philosophical ideas to make progress in doctrinal debates, relating for example to contract interpretation, unfair terms, good faith, vitiating factors, and remedies. Together, the essays provide a picture of the current state of research in this revitalized area of law, and pave the way for future study and debate.

“Efficient breach” is one of the most discussed topics in the literature of law and economics. What remedy incentivizes the parties of a contract to perform contracts if and only if it is efficient? This book provides a new perception based on an in-depth analysis of the impact the market structure, asymmetry of information, and deviations from the rational choice model have, comprehensively. The author compares the two predominant remedies for breach of contract which have been adopted by most jurisdictions and also found access to international conventions like the Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CiSG): Specific performance and expectation damages. The book illustrates the complexity such a comparison has under more realistic assumptions. The author shows that no simple answer is possible, but one needs to account for the circumstances. The comparison takes an economic approach to law applying game theory. The game-theoretic models are consistent throughout the entire book which makes it easy for the reader to understand what effects different assumptions about the market structure, the distribution of information, and deviations from the rational choice model have, and how they are intertwined.

A distinguished Yale economist and legal scholar’s argument that law, of all things, has the potential to rescue us from the next economic crisis. After the economic crisis of 2008, private-sector spending took nearly a decade to recover. Yair Listokin thinks we can respond more quickly to the next meltdown by reviving and refashioning a policy approach whose proven success is too rarely acknowledged. Harking back to New Deal regulatory agencies, Listokin proposes that we take seriously law’s ability to function as a macroeconomic tool, capable of stimulating demand when needed and relieving demand when it threatens to overheat economies. Listokin makes his case by looking at both positive and cautionary examples, going back to the New Deal and including the Keystone Pipeline, the constitutionally fraught bond-buying program unveiled by the European Central Bank at the nadir of the Eurozone crisis, the ongoing Greek crisis, and the experience of U.S. price controls in the 1970s. History has taught us that law is an unwieldy instrument of macroeconomic policy, but Listokin argues that under certain conditions it offers a vital alternative to the monetary and fiscal policy tools that stretch the legitimacy of technocratic central banks near their breaking point while leaving the rest of us waiting and wallowing.

Intellectual property refers to exclusive rights in, among other things, inventions (patents), works of authorship (copyright), and source-identifying symbols (trademarks). Intellectual property law is generally viewed as a means for inducing the optimal supply of inventions, works, and symbols. Economics provides some useful tools for determining whether the legal rules at issue are more or less likely to achieve this goal. This book in particular addresses the law and economics of a variety of topics that have been underanalyzed in the existing literature, including remedies such as injunctions and damages, the relevance of the defendant's mental state, and matters relating to the enforcement of intellectual property rights in court proceedings.

A comprehensive analysis of merger outcomes based on all empirical studies, with an assessment of the effectiveness of antitrust policy toward mergers. In recent decades, antitrust investigations and cases targeting mergers—including those involving Google, Ticketmaster, and much of the domestic airline industry—have reshaped industries and changed business practices profoundly. And yet there has been a relative dearth of detailed evaluations of the effects of mergers and the effectiveness of merger policy. In this book, John Kwoka, a noted authority on industrial organization, examines all reliable empirical studies of the effect of specific mergers and develops entirely new information about the policies and remedies of antitrust agencies regarding these mergers. Combined with data on outcomes, this policy information enables analysis of, and creates new insights into, mergers, merger policies, and the effectiveness of remedies in preventing anticompetitive outcomes. After an overview of mergers, merger policy, and a common approach to merger analysis, Kwoka offers a detailed analysis of the studied mergers, relevant policies, and chosen remedies. Kwoka finds, first and foremost, that most of the studied mergers resulted in competitive harm, usually in the form of higher product prices but also with respect to various non-price outcomes. Other important findings include the fact that joint ventures and code sharing arrangements do not result in such harm and that policies intended to remedy mergers—especially conduct remedies—are not generally effective in restraining price increases. The book's uniquely comprehensive analysis advances our understanding of merger decisions and policies, suggests policy improvements for competition agencies and remedies, and points the way to future research.

All three parts [of the book] are without question extremely detailed and thorough treatises of the three different instruments of contingent protection. The case law of the DSB as well as policy proposals put forward in the Doha Round are referred to and analysed extensively. Every part of the book is an excellent and very thoughtful work on the respective instrument and will be helpful for everyone working in the field. Christoph Herrmann, Common Market Law Review Although the legal landscape is littered with literature about the WTO, antidumping, safeguards, subsidies and countervailing measures, the missing piece has been a comprehensive text tying together the law and economics of these topics. Mavroidis, Messerlin and Wauters fill this gap. The authors form an unparalleled triumvirate who successfully draw on their complementary legal-economic experiences from policymaking, practitioner expertise and academic scholarship to comprehensively examine contingent protection. In a single book, they manage to explain the economics to the lawyers, the law to the economists, and the increasing importance of contingent protection policies to everyone. Chad P. Bown, Brandeis University, US The new book by Petros Mavroidis, Patrick Messerlin and Jasper Wauters, The Law and Economics of Contingent Protection in the WTO, fills a gap in the international trade literature by providing a comprehensive, interdisciplinary (law and economics) treatment of three of the most arcane and least well-understood trade protection regimes permitted under the GATT/WTO, i.e., anti-dumping, countervailing duties, and safeguards. The authors expertly weave together both a comprehensive and rigorous analysis of the complex legal rules and case law with an economic critique of the law governing each of these three regimes. The book is a tour de force and will become the standard reference work for scholars, policy makers, and practitioners specializing in these areas. Michael Trebilcock, University of Toronto, Canada Trade barriers that are contingent on the existence of specific conditions dumping by, or subsidization of, exporters, and injury of domestic firms have historically been used intensively by many OECD countries and are now increasingly applied by developing countries. This volume provides an excellent discussion and accessible analysis of WTO rules on contingent protection and the rapidly expanding case law. The authors have done a major service to both legal practitioners and trade policy analysts with an interest in this area. Bernard Hoekman, The World Bank, US In this important book, three of the leading authors in the field of international economic law discuss the law and economics of the three most frequently used contingent protection instruments: anti-dumping, countervailing measures, and safeguards. When discussing countervailing measures, the authors also discuss legal challenges against prohibited and/or actionable subsidies. The authors choice is mandated by the fact that the effects of a subsidy cannot always be confined to the market of the WTO Member wishing to react against it. Assuming there are effects outside its market, an injured WTO Member can challenge the scheme as such before a WTO Panel. Taking the three agreements for granted as a starting point, the book provides comprehensive discussion of both the original contracts, and the case law that has substantially contributed to the understanding of these agreements. The agreements discussed by the authors provide generally worded disciplines on Members and leave a lot of discretion to the investigating authorities of such Members. A great number of the many questions that arise in the course of a domestic trade remedies investigation are not explicitly addressed in these agreements. In such a situation, the authors highlight the important role that the judge has to play. Much like domestic investigating authorities adopt a line which is either more liberal

“A hugely valuable contribution. . . . In setting out a defence of the best in economics, Rodrik has also provided a goal for the discipline as a whole.” —Martin Sandbu, Financial Times In the wake of the financial crisis and the Great Recession, economics seems anything but a science. In this sharp, masterfully argued book, Dani Rodrik, a leading critic from within, takes a close look at economics to examine when it falls short and when it works, to give a surprisingly upbeat account of the discipline. Drawing on the history of the field and his deep experience as a practitioner, Rodrik argues that economics can be a powerful tool that improves the world—but only when economists abandon universal theories and focus on getting the context right. Economics Rules argues that the discipline's much-derided mathematical models are its true strength. Models are the tools that make economics a science. Too often, however, economists mistake a model for the model that applies everywhere and at all times. In six chapters that trace his discipline from Adam Smith to present-day work on globalization, Rodrik shows how diverse situations call for different models. Each model tells a partial story about how the world works. These stories offer wide-ranging, and sometimes contradictory, lessons—just as children’s fables offer diverse morals. Whether the question concerns the rise of global inequality, the consequences of free trade, or the value of deficit spending, Rodrik explains how using the right models can deliver valuable new insights about social reality and public policy. Beyond the science, economics requires the craft to apply suitable models to the context. The 2008 collapse of Lehman Brothers challenged many economists' deepest assumptions about free markets. Rodrik reveals that economists' model toolkit is much richer than these free-market models. With pragmatic model selection, economists can develop successful antipoverty programs in Mexico, growth strategies in Africa, and intelligent remedies for domestic inequality. At once a forceful critique and defense of the discipline, Economics Rules charts a path toward a more humble but more effective science.

A 2002 survey of economics of contracts appealing to scholars in economics, management and law.

Up-to-date, holistic and comprehensive discussion of public expenditure, its history, value for money, risks and remedies.