The study of industrial organization extends to the core of some of the most important questions of economics: Who controls markets and profits from them? Does competition or monopoly result in a more beneficial economy? How can the economic playing field become fairer or more biased in either direction? Throughout the fields history, various clashing schools of thought have attempted to sort through these complex issues, examining both abstract theory and real-life cases. The Fifth Edition of this widely used, highly regarded text includes coverage of dramatic changes in the field. Shepherd and Shepherd provide broad, balanced coverage of topics without showing preference to any single point of view, encouraging readers to think independently. This emphasis on independent judgment is evident throughout the book, with discussion of structure placed before performance to assist the reader in thinking about causation. Topics are organized for maximum flexibility, with distinct chapters covering case studies, antitrust and regulation policy, and capital markets.

An issue-driven introduction to industrial organization, thoroughly updated and revised. The study of industrial organization (IO)—the analysis of the way firms compete with one another—has become a key component of economics and of such related disciplines as finance, strategy, and marketing. This book provides an issue-driven introduction to industrial organization. Although formal in its approach, it is written in a way that requires only basic mathematical training. It includes a vast array of examples, from both within and outside the United States. This second edition has been thoroughly updated and revised. In addition to updated examples, this edition presents a more systematic treatment of public policy implications. It features added advanced sections, with analytical treatment of ideas previously presented verbally; and exercises, which allow for a deeper and more formal understanding of each topic. The new edition also includes an introduction to such empirical methods as demand estimation and equilibrium identification. Supplemental material is available online.

This is the eBook of the printed book and may not include any media, website access codes, or print supplements that may come packaged with the bound book. Industrial Organization: Theory and Practice–which features early coverage of Antitrust–punctuates its modern introduction to industrial organization with relevant empirical data and case studies to show readers how to apply theoretical tools.

Industrial Organization: Markets and Strategies provides an up-to-date account of modern industrial organization that blends theory with real-world applications. Written in a clear and accessible style, it acquaints the reader with the most important models for understanding strategies chosen by firms with market power and shows how such firms adapt to different market environments. It covers a wide range of topics including recent developments on product bundling, branding strategies, restrictions in vertical supply relationships, intellectual property protection, and two-sided markets, to name just a few. Models are presented in detail and the main results are summarized as lessons. Formal theory is complemented throughout by real-world cases that show students how it applies to actual organizational settings. The book is accompanied by a website containing a number of additional resources for lecturers and students, including exercises, answers to review questions, case material and slides.

The Theory of Industrial Organization is the first primary text to treat the new industrial organization at the advanced-undergraduate and graduate level. Rigorously analytical and filled with exercises coded to indicate level of difficulty, it provides a unified and modern treatment of the field with accessible models that are simplified to highlight robust economic ideas while working at an intuitive level. To aid students at different levels, each chapter is divided into a main text and supplementary section containing more advanced material. Each chapter opens with elementary models and builds on this base to incorporate current research in a coherent synthesis. Tirole begins with a background discussion of the theory of the firm. In Part I he develops the modern theory of monopoly, addressing single product and multi product pricing, static and intertemporal price discrimination, quality choice, reputation, and vertical restraints. In Part II, Tirole takes up strategic interaction between firms, starting with a novel treatment of the Bertrand-Cournot interdependent pricing problem. He studies how capacity constraints, repeated interaction, product positioning, advertising, and asymmetric information affect competition or tacit collusion. He then develops topics having to do with long term competition, including barriers to entry, contestability, exit, and research and development. He concludes with a "game theory user's manual" and a section of review exercises. Important Notice: The digital edition of this book is missing some of the images found in the physical edition.

Research in Health Economics has developed into a separate discipline for the last 25 years. All this intense research activity, has translated in the inclusion of courses of health economics, mostly at graduate level. However, the Industrial Organization aspects of the health care market do not occupy a central place in those courses. We propose a textbook of health economics whose distinguishing feature is the analysis of the health care market from an Industrial Organization perspective. This textbook will provide teachers and students with a reference to study the market structure aspects of the health care sector. The book is structured in three parts. The first part will present the basic principles of economics. It will bring all readers to the required level of knowledge to follow subsequent parts. Part II will review the main concepts of health economics. The third part will contain the core of the book. It will present the industrial organization analysis of the health care market, based on our own research.

This collection of work by economist, consultant, and expert witness Franklin M. Fisher constitutes an integrated body of the economic analysis of the law, with particular emphasis on antitrust issues. Fisher's involvement with applying economic analysis to real disputes and to problems of microeconomic policy has resulted in valuable lessons. These lessons are incorporated in themes running through many of these essays about the uses and abuses, achievements and shortcomings, of economic analysis.The book opens with a broad overview of key issues in antitrust law. Fisher stresses the importance of understanding the analytic tools used to examine monopoly and competition. He shows that the notion that simple indicators such as market share, or especially, profit rates can be used to provide an easy test for market power is badly mistaken. And he goes on to discuss oligopoly and its modern game theoretic treatment, which he sees as missing the questions that matter in real situations. Throughout, specific cases and policy issues are used to illustrate these important points.The second part of the book looks at the regulation of television, particularly cable, an area in which Fisher has been active since cable television's early days. The book concludes with a section on economic analysis and the law with essays on such matters as the uses of statistical methods and punishment as a deterrent to crime.Franklin M. Fisher is Professor of Economics at MIT. He was the lead expert economist for the defense, assisted by John J. McGowan and Joen E. Greenwood of Charles River Associates, in the major antitrust case U.S. v. IBM. John Monz is a Ph.D. candidate in economics at MIT.

This timely book surveys and illuminates the recent literature on industrial organization by contrasting the analyses based on the idea of "natural" adaptation of industry to environmental conditions and those that focus on the "strategic" dimension and manipulation of environment. Among the topics dealt with are the sociobiology of economic organizations and such allied issues as evolutionary economics, natural selection, and adaptation; game-theoretic models of strategic behavior; and the social, political, and legal implications of industrial policy.In the introduction, Jacquemin discusses and compares the features of classical industrial organization and those of the "new industrial organization." The first chapter - on market selection processes - sounds the book's keynote. It blends traditional themes such as long-run competitive equilibrium and Darwinian economic selection with recent research on contestable markets and equilibrium in imperfectly competitive industries. It also sharply contrasts the views of the natural selection theory and the maximization process on the one hand, with those of the new industrial organization and strategic behavior, on the other.Other chapters deal with oligopoly, concentration, and market power; with barriers to entry, both natural and strategic; with open problems in organization theory (a treatment that blends Williamson's transactions-costs concept with analytical modes to explain the divisionalization of the modern corporation, including Japanese firms); and with intersections of industrial policy and social theory. The last chapter discusses broad social issues, relating such diverse topics as Japanese industrial policy (MITI), Hirschman's "Exit, Voice, and Loyalty," and the writings of Rawls and Nozick.Alexis Jacquemin directs the Centre for Economic and Legal Research in Industrial Organization in the Department of Economics at the Université Catholique de Louvain in Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium.