The authors of The Economic Effects of Constitutions use econometric tools to study what they call the "missing link" between constitutional systems and economic policy; the book is an uncompromisingly empirical sequel to their previous theoretical analysis of economic policy. Taking recent theoretical work as a point of departure, they ask which theoretical findings are supported and which are contradicted by the facts. The results are based on comparisons of political institutions across countries or time, in a large sample of contemporary democracies. They find that presidential/parliamentary and majoritarian/proportional dichotomies influence several economic variables: presidential regimes induce smaller public sectors, and proportional elections lead to greater and less targeted government spending and larger budget deficits. Moreover, the details of the electoral system (such as district magnitude and ballot structure) influence corruption and structural policies toward economic growth.Persson and Tabellini's goal is to draw conclusions about the causal effects of constitutions on policy outcomes. But since constitutions are not randomly assigned to countries, how the constitutional system was selected in the first place must be taken into account. This raises challenging methodological problems, which are addressed in the book. The study is therefore important not only in its findings but also in establishing a methodology for empirical analysis in the field of comparative politics.

This classic study — one of the most influential in the area of American economic history — questioned the founding fathers' motivations and prompted new perceptions of the supreme law of the land.

This concise survey of the questions, methods, and empirical findings central to constitutional political economy fills a gap in the literature of political economy. Voigt, a pioneer of the field, demonstrates how constitutional rules affect political economy, appealing to both scholars of the field and readers with no familiarity of the topic.

Many constitutions include provisions intended to limit the discretion of governments in economic policy. In times of financial crises, such provisions often come under pressure as a result of calls for exceptional responses to crisis situations. This volume assesses the ability of constitutional orders all over the world to cope with financial crises, and the demands for emergency powers that typically accompany them. Bringing together a variety of perspectives from legal scholars, economists, and political scientists, this volume traces the long-run implications of financial crises for constitutional order. In exploring the theoretical and practical problems raised by the constitutionalization of economic policy during times of severe crisis, this volume showcases an array of constitutional design options and the ways they channel governmental responses to emergency.

Captures significant transformations in the theory and practice of economic and social rights in constitutional and human rights law.

Examines constitutional change in Latin America from 1900 to 2008 and provides the first systematic explanation of the origins of constitutional designs.

Assesses what we know - and do not know - about comparative constitutional design and particular institutional choices concerning executive power and other issues.

Making, amending, and interpreting constitutions is a political game that can yield widespread suffering or secure a nation's liberty and prosperity. Given these high stakes, Robert Cooter argues that constitutional theory should trouble itself less with literary analysis and arguments over founders' intentions and focus much more on the real-world consequences of various constitutional provisions and choices. Pooling the best available theories from economics and political science, particularly those developed from game theory, Cooter's economic analysis of constitutions fundamentally recasts a field of growing interest and dramatic international importance. By uncovering the constitutional incentives that influence citizens, politicians, administrators, and judges, Cooter exposes fault lines in alternative forms of democracy: unitary versus federal states, deep administration versus many elections, parliamentary versus presidential systems, unicameral versus bicameral legislatures, common versus civil law, and liberty versus equality rights. Cooter applies an efficiency test to these alternatives, asking how far they satisfy the preferences of citizens for laws and public goods. To answer Cooter contrasts two types of democracy, which he defines as competitive government. The center of the political spectrum defeats the extremes in "median democracy," whereas representatives of all the citizens bargain over laws and public goods in "bargain democracy." Bargaining can realize all the gains from political trades, or bargaining can collapse into an unstable contest of redistribution. States plagued by instability and contests over redistribution should move towards median democracy by increasing transaction costs and reducing the power of the extremes. Specifically, promoting median versus bargain democracy involves promoting winner-take-all elections versus proportional representation, two parties versus multiple parties, referenda versus representative democracy, and special governments versus comprehensive governments. This innovative theory will have ramifications felt across national and disciplinary borders, and will be debated by a large audience, including the growing pool of economists interested in how law and politics shape economic policy, political scientists using game theory or specializing in constitutional law, and academic lawyers. The approach will also garner attention from students of political science, law, and economics, as well as policy makers working in and with new democracies where constitutions are being written and refined.

Constitutional political economy in the European Union / Dennis C. Mueller -- Constitutional design : proposals versus processes / Donald L. Horowitz -- The wave of power-sharing democracy / Arend Lijphart -- Forces and mechanisms in the constitution-making process / Jon Elster -- The consequences of popular participation in constitutional choice : towards a comparative analysis / Stefan Voigt -- Does it matter how a constitution is created? / John M. Carey -- Does the process of constitution-making matter? / Tom Ginsburg, Zachary Elkins and Justin Blount -- The economic effects of human rights / Lorenz Blume and Stefan Voigt -- Social rights in the constitution and in practice / Avi Ben-Bassat and Momi Dahan -- Electoral rules and government spending in parliamentary democracies / Torsten Persson, Gerard Roland and Guido Tabellini -- Endogenous constitutions / Davide Ticchi and Andrea Vindigni -- Separation of powers and political accountability / Torsten Persson, Gérard Roland and Guido Tabellini -- Endogenous political institutions / Philippe Aghion, Alberto Alesina and Francesco Trebbi -- On the merits of bicameral legislatures : intragovernmental bargaining and policy stability / Roger D. Congleton -- Bicameralism and corruption / Cecilia Testa -- Self-enforcing federalism / Rui J.P. de Figueiredo, Jr. and Barry R. Weingast -- Federalism and the democratic transition : lessons from South Africa / Robert P. Inman and Daniel L. Rubinfeld -- Direct democracy : designing a living constitution / Bruno S. Frey and Alois Stutzer -- The economic effects of direct democracy : a first global assessment / Lorenz Blume, Jens Müller and Stefan Voigt -- The new separation of powers / Bruce Ackerman -- Choosing not to choose : when politicians choose to delegate powers / Stefan Voigt and Eli M. Salzberger -- Locking in democracy : constitutions, commitment, and international law / Tom Ginsburg -- Improving credibility by delegating judicial competence : the case of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council / Stefan Voigt, Michael Ebeling and Lorenz Blume.