Explanations of the causes of the Asian crisis have focused on macroeconomic factors leading to the crisis. This paper offers a complementary corporate distress perspective linking the crisis to corporate finances. Key ratios for companies in various countries are presented in the paper. The global benchmarking imposes a consistent cross-border analysis of financial risk and performance, and sheds light on the crisis. The study provides a statistical review of the financial practices and performance of corporates in Asia: Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan, and Thailand benchmarked against financials of corporates in other countries: Latin America, and industrialized countries: France, Germany, Japan and USA. A thematic point that comes across in all the results of the corporate financial analysis is unsustainable rapid (and probably excessive) investment in fixed assets financed by excessive borrowing in some Asian countries- e.g., Indonesia, Korea and Thailand. The East Asian investment-spending spree resulted in poor profitability, reflected in low, and declining return on equity, and return on capital employed. It leads to the conclusion that at the core of the corporate crisis were financial excesses that violated prudent financial practices, and eventually lead to the inevitable financial distress we are witnessing. Therefore, the empirical findings presented in the paper lend credence to the view advanced by Krugman that crony capitalism was at the core of the crisis. Crony capitalism was manifested in supportive bad policies-e.g., implicit government guarantees, and poor banking supervision- that lead to poor credit allocation decisions in the banking dominated financial system. Preliminary findings suggest as well vast differences in Economic Value Added between countries- developing and developed alike. The conclusions from an economic value added approach indicate, that in an era of increasing capital mobility, corporates are not adhering to global standards in creating shareholder value. The analysis leads to policy conclusions.

In the late 1990s, Korea, Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia experienced a series of major financial crises evinced by widespread bank insolvencies and currency depreciations, as well as sharp declines in gross domestic production. This sudden disruption of the Asian economic `miracle' astounded many observers around the world, raised questions about the stability of the international financial system and caused widespread fear that this financial crisis would spread to other countries. What has been called the Asian crisis followed a prolonged slump in Japan dating from the early 1980s and came after the Mexican currency crisis in the mid-1990s. Thus, the Asian crisis became a major policy concern at the International Monetary Fund as well as among developed countries whose cooperation in dealing with such financial crises is necessary to maintain the stability and efficiency of global financial markets. This book collects the papers and discussions delivered at an October 1998 Conference co-sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago and the International Monetary Fund to examine the causes, implications and possible solutions to the crises. The conference participants included a broad range of academic, industry, and regulatory experts representing more than thirty countries. Topics discussed included the origin of the individual crises; early warning indicators; the role played by the global financial sector in this crisis; how, given an international safety net, potential risks of moral hazard might contribute to further crises; the lessons for the international financial system to be drawn from the Asian crisis; and what the role of the International Monetary Fund might be in future rescue operations. Because the discussions of these topics include a wide diversity of critical views and opinions, the book offers a particularly rich presentation of current and evolving thinking on the causes and preventions of international banking and monetary crises. The book promises to be one of the timeliest as well as one of the most complete treatments of the Asian financial crisis and its implications for future policymaking.

The 1997 Asian Crisis principally affected Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Korea, as well as other East Asian countries heavily dependent on intra-regional trade. Banks and other financial institutions quickly become insolvent, and heavily indebted industrial firms went bankrupt. Many of these firms were affiliated with the business groups of this region, yet most groups did not immediately collapse, indeed they proved remarkably robust, some surviving and even prospering. This book examines these East Asian business groups and their subsequent restructuring following the Asian Crisis. East Asian nations embarked on very different trajectories to this common external shock. The Asian Crisis affected the inter-relationships among the socio-cultural environment, the state, and the market of each country quite differently and had distinct effects on the operations of these countries' business groups. This slow yet divergent pattern of development provides evidence against theories of rapid global convergence. Yet East Asian business groups face an uncertain future. Foreign investors' influence has increased substantially since the crisis, as East Asian governments had to accommodate their demands to keep attracting foreign capital. Governments supervise banks more closely and have loosened restrictions on mergers and hostile takeovers, further strengthening the discipline of the market. Various entry barriers that had inhibited foreign multinationals from competing in national markets were lifted, exposing business groups to intensified foreign competition. Under these new conditions, business groups in East Asia should reconfigure their business structures and adjust their corporate governance systems to regain momentum for further growth. Business groups will continue to be important vehicles for the sustained future growth of this region, and this book presents a substantial amount of new data on this, which will be of interest to academics, researchers, and advanced students of East Asian business, and business practitioners working within the region.

Two Crises, Different Outcomes examines East Asian policy reactions to the two major crises of the last fifteen years: the global financial crisis of 2008–9 and the Asian financial crisis of 1997–98. The calamity of the late 1990s saw a massive meltdown concentrated in East Asia. In stark contrast, East Asia avoided the worst effects of the Lehman Brothers collapse, incurring relatively little damage when compared to the financial devastation unleashed on North America and Europe. Much had changed across the intervening decade, not least that China rather than Japan had become the locomotive of regional growth, and that the East Asian economies had taken numerous steps to buffer their financial structures and regulatory regimes. This time Asia avoided disaster; it bounced back quickly after the initial hit and has been growing in a resilient fashion ever since. The authors of this book explain how the earlier financial crisis affected Asian economies, why government reactions differed so widely during that crisis, and how Asian economies weathered the Great Recession. Drawing on a mixture of single-country expertise and comparative analysis, they conclude by assessing the long-term prospects that Asian countries will continue their recent success.

Abstract: June 1999 - Evidence from East Asia suggests that a firm's ownership relationship with a family or bank provides insurance against the likelihood of bankruptcy during bad times, possibly at the expense of minority shareholders. Bankruptcy is more likely in countries with strong creditor rights and a good judicial system - perhaps because creditors are more likely to force a firm to file for bankruptcy. The widespread financial crisis in East Asia caused large economic shocks, which varied by degree across the region. That crisis provides a unique opportunity for investigating the factors that determine the use of bankruptcy processes in a number of economies. Claessens, Djankov, and Klapper study the use of bankruptcy in Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan (China), and Thailand. These economies differ in their institutional frameworks for resolving financial distress, partly because of the different origins of their judicial systems. One difference is the strength of creditor rights, which Claessens, Djankov, and Klapper document. They expect that differences in legal enforcement and judicial efficiency should affect the resolution of financial distress. Using a sample of 4,569 publicly traded East Asian firms, they observe a total of 106 bankruptcies in 1997 and 1998. They find that: · The likelihood of filing for bankruptcy is lower for firms with ownership links to banks and families, controlling for firm and country characteristics. Filings are more likely in countries with better judicial systems; Filings are more likely where there are both strong creditor rights and a good judicial system. These results alone do not allow Claessens, Djankov, and Klapper to address whether increased use of bankruptcy is an efficient resolution mechanism. This paper - a product of the Financial Economics Unit, Financial Sector Practice Department - is part of a larger effort in the department to study corporate financing and governance mechanisms in emerging markets.

'Business Groups in East Asia' examines some East Asian business groups and their subsequent restructuring following the Asian Crisis of 1997. This crisis affected the inter-relationships among the socio-cultural environment, the state and the market of each country quite differently.

Financial systems in the East Asian region are commanding worldwide attention. Japan's financial sector, with an ailing banking system in the aftermath of a bubble economy, is undergoing a "Big Bang" deregulation, liberalization, and securitization. At the same time, the rehabilitation of Southeast Asian and Korean economies in the wake of the Asian financial crisis awaits restoration of their banking sectors. The region's bank-dominated and development finance-oriented financial systems are coming into friction with global capital markets that lack adequate architecture. In this volume, researchers from ten East Asian think- tanks analyse the financial systems in their respective economies. They survey the financial sector deregulation and liberalization that took place in the midst of economic booms and they evaluate the role of the financial systems in the region's current economic misfortunes. Together, the pieces in this volume lay the groundwork for understanding how financial systems in East Asia have evolved as the economies have grown more complex and capital markets have globalized, and how these systems must adapt to move beyond today's crisis to serve the region's economies in the future.

Currency and banking crises such as those originating in Mexico (1994), Thailand (1997), and the Russian Federation (1998) tend to be associated and often take place together across countries. The East Asian experience was a fruitful laboratory for examining key questions. For example: How did contagion occur so extensively, and why was it so devastating? Did policy responses to crises and contagion minimize their impact on the real economy? What type of international financial architecture is needed to prevent and manage crises and contagion?