This book focuses on markets organized as double auctions in which both buyers and sellers can submit bids and asks for standardized units of well-defined commodities and securities. It examines evidence from the laboratory and computer simulations.

Markets in Profile explores the confluence of three disparate philosophical frameworks: the Market Profile, behavioral finance, and neuroeconomics in order to present a unified theory of how markets work. The Market Profile is an ever-evolving, multidimensional graphic that gives visual form to the market's continuing auction process, revealing the myriad underlying dynamics that influence market activity. Behavioral finance posits that investors are driven more by emotional factors and the subjective interpretation of minutia than by "rationality" when making investment decisions. And neuroeconomics is the study of how investor psychology permeates and affects the financial markets. Mr. Dalton explicates the ways in which irrational human behavior influences the market's natural auction process, creating frequently predictable market structure, which results in opportunities for investors to ameliorate risk. The book will improve investors ability to interpret change in markets, enabling better, more confident investment decisions.

A broad overview of market mechanisms, with an emphasis on the interplay between theory and real-life applications; examples range from eBay auctions to school choice. This book offers an introduction to market design, providing students with a broad overview of issues related to the design and analysis of market mechanisms. It defines a market as a demand and a supply, without specifying a price system or mechanism. This allows the text to analyze a broad set of situations—including such unconventional markets as college admissions and organ donation—and forces readers to pay attention to details that might otherwise be overlooked. Students often complain that microeconomics is too abstract and disconnected from reality; the study of market design shows how theory can help solve existing, real-life problems. The book focuses on the interplay between theory and applications. To keep the text as accessible as possible, special effort has been made to minimize formal description of the models while emphasizing the intuitive, with detailed explanations and resolution of examples. Appendixes offer general reviews of elements of game theory and mechanism design that are related to the themes explored in the book, presenting the basic concepts with as many explanations and illustrations as possible. The book covers topics including the basics of simple auctions; eBay auctions; Vickrey–Clarke–Groves auctions; keyword auctions, with examples from Google and Facebook; spectrum auctions; financial markets, with discussions of treasury auctions and IPOs; trading on the stock market; the basic matching model; medical match; assignment problems; probabilistic assignments; school choice; course allocation, with examples from Harvard and Wharton; and kidney exchange.

This book focuses on markets organized as double auctions in which both buyers and sellers can submit bids and asks for standardized units of well-defined commodities and securities. It examines evidence from the laboratory and computer simulations.

This book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications. It is written by a leading economic theorist whose suggestions guided the creation of the new spectrum auction designs. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of 'optimal auctions' and newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used. The analysis explores the limitations of prominent older designs, such as the Vickrey auction design, and evaluates the practical responses to those limitations. It explores the tension between the traditional theory of auctions with a fixed set of bidders, in which the seller seeks to squeeze as much revenue as possible from the fixed set, and the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be respected to encourage participation.

A timely update to the book on using the Market Profile method to trade Emerging over twenty years ago, Market Profile analysis continues to realize a strong following among active traders. The approach explains the underlying dynamics and structure of markets, identifies value areas, price rejection points, and measures the strength of buyers and sellers. Unlike more conventional forms of technical analysis, Market Profile is an all-encompassing approach, and Mind Over Markets, Updated Edition provides traders with a solid understanding of it. Since the first edition of Mind Over Markets—considered the best book on applying Market Profile analysis to trading—was published over a decade ago, much has changed in the worlds of finance and investing. That's why James Dalton, a pioneer in the popularization of Market Profile, has returned with a new edition of this essential guide. Written to reflect today's dynamic market conditions, Mind Over Markets, Updated Edition clearly puts this unique method of interpreting market behavior and identifying trading/investment opportunities in perspective. Includes new chapters on Market Profile-based trading strategies, using Market Profile in connection with other market indicators, and much more Explains how the Market Profile approach has evolved over the past twenty-five years and how it is used by contemporary traders Written by a leading educator and authority on the Market Profile One of the key elements that has long separated successful traders from the rest is their intuitive understanding that time regulates all financial opportunities. The ability to record price information according to time has unleashed huge amounts of useful market information. Mind Over Markets, Updated Edition will show you how to profitably put this information to work for you.

This collection of papers focuses on markets organized as double auctions (DA). In a double auction, both buyers and sellers can actively present bids (offers to buy) and asks (offers to sell) for standardized units of well-defined commodities and securities. A classic example of a DA market (known by practitioners as an open outcry market) is the commodity trading pit at the Chicago Board of Trade. A related process is a call market, which is used to determine opening prices on the New York Stock Exchange. Already the predominant trading institution for financial and commodities markets, the double auction has many variants and is evolving rapidly in the present era of advancing computer technology and regulatory reform. DA markets are of theoretical as well as practical interest in view of the central role these institutions play in allocating resources. Although the DA has been studied intensively in the laboratory, and practitioners have considerable experience in the field, only recently have tools started to become available to provide the underpinning of a behavioral theory of DA markets.

This advanced text introduces the principles of noncooperative game theory in a direct and uncomplicated style that will acquaint students with the broad spectrum of the field while highlighting and explaining what they need to know at any given point. This advanced text introduces the principles of noncooperative game theory—including strategic form games, Nash equilibria, subgame perfection, repeated games, and games of incomplete information—in a direct and uncomplicated style that will acquaint students with the broad spectrum of the field while highlighting and explaining what they need to know at any given point. The analytic material is accompanied by many applications, examples, and exercises. The theory of noncooperative games studies the behavior of agents in any situation where each agent's optimal choice may depend on a forecast of the opponents' choices. "Noncooperative" refers to choices that are based on the participant's perceived selfinterest. Although game theory has been applied to many fields, Fudenberg and Tirole focus on the kinds of game theory that have been most useful in the study of economic problems. They also include some applications to political science. The fourteen chapters are grouped in parts that cover static games of complete information, dynamic games of complete information, static games of incomplete information, dynamic games of incomplete information, and advanced topics.

Agent-based Computational Economics (ACE) is a new discipline of economics, largely grounded on concepts like evolution, auto-organisation and emergence: it intensively uses computer simulations as well as artificial intelligence, mostly based on multi-agents systems. The purpose of this book is to give an up-to date view of the scientific production in the fields of Agent-based Computational Economics (mainly in Market Finance and Game Theory). Based on communications given at AE'2005 (Lille, USTL, France), this book offers a wide panorama of recent advances in ACE (both theoretical and methodological) that will interest academics as well as practitioners.

Based upon a conference held in May 1993, this book discusses the intersection of neurobiology, cognitive psychology and computational approaches to cognition.