The Domain Of Reasons
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Author |
: John Skorupski |
Publisher |
: OUP Oxford |
Total Pages |
: 558 |
Release |
: 2012-11-08 |
ISBN-10 |
: 9780191651632 |
ISBN-13 |
: 019165163X |
Rating |
: 4/5 (32 Downloads) |
Synopsis The Domain of Reasons by : John Skorupski
This book is about normativity and reasons. By the end, however, the subject becomes the relation between self, thought, and world. If we understand normativity, we are on the road to understanding this relation. John Skorupski argues that all normative properties are reducible to reason relations, so that the sole normative ingredient in any normative concept is the concept of a reason. This is a concept fundamental to all thought. It is pervasive (actions, beliefs, and sentiments all fall within its range), primitive (all other normative concepts are reducible to it), and constitutive of the idea of thought itself. Thinking is sensitivity to reasons. Thought in the full sense of autonomous cognition is possible only for a being sensitive to reasons and capable of deliberating about them. In Part II of the book Skorupski examines epistemic reasons, and shows that aprioricity, necessity, evidence, and probability, which may not seem to be normative at all, are in fact normative concepts analysable in terms of the concept of a reason. In Part III he shows the same for the concept of a person's good, and for moral concepts including the concept of a right. Part IV moves to the epistemology and metaphysics of reasons. When we make claims about reasons to believe, reasons to feel, or reasons to act we are asserting genuine propositions: judgeable, truth-apt contents. But these normative propositions must be distinguished from factual propositions, for they do not represent states of affairs. So Skorupski's ambitious theory of normativity has broad and deep implications for philosophy. It shows how reflection on the logic, epistemology, and ontology of reasons finally leads us to an account of the interplay of self, thought, and world.
Author |
: John Skorupski |
Publisher |
: Oxford University Press |
Total Pages |
: 558 |
Release |
: 2010-11-25 |
ISBN-10 |
: 9780199587636 |
ISBN-13 |
: 0199587639 |
Rating |
: 4/5 (36 Downloads) |
Synopsis The Domain of Reasons by : John Skorupski
This book is about normativity and reasons. But by the end the subject becomes the relation between self, thought and world. Skorupski argues that the key concepts of epistemology and moral theory are normative concepts, and that what makes them normative is that they depend on reasons. The concept of a reason is fundamental to all thought.
Author |
: James G. Lennox |
Publisher |
: Cambridge University Press |
Total Pages |
: 337 |
Release |
: 2021-05-20 |
ISBN-10 |
: 9780521193979 |
ISBN-13 |
: 0521193974 |
Rating |
: 4/5 (79 Downloads) |
Synopsis Aristotle on Inquiry by : James G. Lennox
Argues that, for Aristotle, scientific inquiry is governed both by a domain-neutral erotetic framework and by domain-specific norms.
Author |
: Michael Rabinder James |
Publisher |
: |
Total Pages |
: 260 |
Release |
: 2004 |
ISBN-10 |
: UOM:39076002391527 |
ISBN-13 |
: |
Rating |
: 4/5 (27 Downloads) |
Synopsis Deliberative Democracy and the Plural Polity by : Michael Rabinder James
In this pathbreaking work, the author integrates questions of justice and stability through a model of deliberative democracy in the plural polity. "Deliberative Democracy and the Plural Polity" provides a realistic but critical reform agenda that can animate struggles for justice in an enormously diverse world.
Author |
: T. M. Scanlon |
Publisher |
: OUP Oxford |
Total Pages |
: 348 |
Release |
: 2013-01-16 |
ISBN-10 |
: 9780191003158 |
ISBN-13 |
: 0191003158 |
Rating |
: 4/5 (58 Downloads) |
Synopsis Being Realistic about Reasons by : T. M. Scanlon
T. M. Scanlon offers a qualified defense of normative cognitivism--the view that there are irreducibly normative truths about reasons for action. He responds to three familiar objections: that such truths would have troubling metaphysical implications; that we would have no way of knowing what they are; and that the role of reasons in motivating and explaining action could not be explained if accepting a conclusion about reasons for action were a kind of belief. Scanlon answers the first of these objections within a general account of ontological commitment, applying to mathematics as well as normative judgments. He argues that the method of reflective equilibrium, properly understood, provides an adequate account of how we come to know both normative truths and mathematical truths, and that the idea of a rational agent explains the link between an agent's normative beliefs and his or her actions. Whether every statement about reasons for action has a determinate truth value is a question to be answered by an overall account of reasons for action, in normative terms. Since it seems unlikely that there is such an account, the defense of normative cognitivism offered here is qualified: statements about reasons for action can have determinate truth values, but it is not clear that all of them do. Along the way, Scanlon offers an interpretation of the distinction between normative and non-normative claims, a new account of the supervenience of the normative on the non-normative, an interpretation of the idea of the relative strength of reasons, and a defense of the method of reflective equilibrium.
Author |
: Julia Tanney |
Publisher |
: Harvard University Press |
Total Pages |
: 425 |
Release |
: 2013-01-08 |
ISBN-10 |
: 9780674071728 |
ISBN-13 |
: 0674071727 |
Rating |
: 4/5 (28 Downloads) |
Synopsis Rules, Reason, and Self-Knowledge by : Julia Tanney
Julia Tanney offers a sustained criticism of today’s canon in philosophy of mind, which conceives the workings of the rational mind as the outcome of causal interactions between mental states that have their bases in the brain. With its roots in physicalism and functionalism, this widely accepted view provides the philosophical foundation for the cardinal tenet of the cognitive sciences: that cognition is a form of information-processing. Rules, Reason, and Self-Knowledge presents a challenge not only to the cognitivist approach that has dominated philosophy and the special sciences for the last fifty years but, more broadly, to metaphysical-empirical approaches to the study of the mind. Responding to a tradition that owes much to the writings of Davidson, early Putnam, and Fodor, Tanney challenges this orthodoxy on its own terms. In untangling its internal inadequacies, starting with the paradoxes of irrationality, she arrives at a view these philosophers were keen to rebut—one with affinities to the work of Ryle and Wittgenstein and all but invisible to those working on the cutting edge of analytic philosophy and mind research today. This is the view that rational explanations are embedded in “thick” descriptions that are themselves sophistications upon ever ascending levels of discourse, or socio-linguistic practices. Tanney argues that conceptual cartography rather than metaphysical-scientific explanation is the basic tool for understanding the nature of the mind. Rules, Reason, and Self-Knowledge clears the path for a return to the world-involving, circumstance-dependent, normative practices where the rational mind has its home.
Author |
: David Plunkett |
Publisher |
: Oxford University Press |
Total Pages |
: 813 |
Release |
: 2019-01-11 |
ISBN-10 |
: 9780190640422 |
ISBN-13 |
: 0190640421 |
Rating |
: 4/5 (22 Downloads) |
Synopsis Dimensions of Normativity by : David Plunkett
Understood one way, the branch of contemporary philosophical ethics that goes by the label "metaethics" concerns certain second-order questions about ethics-questions not in ethics, but rather ones about our thought and talk about ethics, and how the ethical facts (insofar as there are any) fit into reality. Analogously, the branch of contemporary philosophy of law that is often called "general jurisprudence" deals with certain second order questions about law- questions not in the law, but rather ones about our thought and talk about the law, and how legal facts (insofar as there are any) fit into reality. Put more roughly (and using an alternative spatial metaphor), metaethics concerns a range of foundational questions about ethics, whereas general jurisprudence concerns analogous questions about law. As these characterizations suggest, the two sub-disciplines have much in common, and could be thought to run parallel to each other. Yet, the connections between the two are currently mostly ignored by philosophers, or at least under-scrutinized. The new essays collected in this book are aimed at changing this state of affairs. Dimensions of Normativity collects together works by metaethicists and legal philosophers that address a number of issues that are of common interest, with the goal of accomplishing a new rapprochement between the two sub-disciplines.
Author |
: Kent Greenawalt |
Publisher |
: Oxford University Press |
Total Pages |
: 545 |
Release |
: 2016-05-02 |
ISBN-10 |
: 9780190606947 |
ISBN-13 |
: 0190606940 |
Rating |
: 4/5 (47 Downloads) |
Synopsis From the Bottom Up by : Kent Greenawalt
Kent Greenawalt's From the Bottom Up constitutes a collection of articles and essays written over the last five decades of his career. They cover a wide range of topics, many of which address ties between political and moral philosophy and what the law does and should provide. A broad general theme is that in all these domains, what really is the wisest approach to difficult circumstances often depends on the particular issues involved and their context. Both judges and scholars too often rely on abstract general formulations to provide answers. A notable example in political philosophy was the suggestion of the great and careful scholar, John Rawls, that laws should be based exclusively on public reason. The essays explain that given uncertainty of what people perceive as the line between public reason and their religion convictions, the inability of public reason to resolve some difficulty questions, such as what we owe to higher animals, and the feeling of many that their religious understanding should count, urging exclusive reliance on public reason is not a viable approach. Other essays show similar problems with asserted bases for legal interpretations and the content of provisions such as the First Amendment.
Author |
: Charles Larmore |
Publisher |
: Cambridge University Press |
Total Pages |
: 247 |
Release |
: 2021-06-17 |
ISBN-10 |
: 9781108699969 |
ISBN-13 |
: 1108699960 |
Rating |
: 4/5 (69 Downloads) |
Synopsis Morality and Metaphysics by : Charles Larmore
In this book, Charles Larmore develops an account of morality, freedom, and reason that rejects the naturalistic metaphysics shaping much of modern thought. Reason, Larmore argues, is responsiveness to reasons, and reasons themselves are essentially normative in character, consisting in the way that physical and psychological facts - facts about the world of nature - count in favor of possibilities of thought and action that we can take up. Moral judgments are true or false in virtue of the moral reasons there are. We need therefore a more comprehensive metaphysics that recognizes a normative dimension to reality as well. Though taking its point of departure in the analysis of moral judgment, this book branches widely into related topics such as freedom and the causal order of the world, textual interpretation, the nature of the self, self-knowledge, and the concept of duties to ourselves.
Author |
: |
Publisher |
: |
Total Pages |
: 598 |
Release |
: 1849 |
ISBN-10 |
: CHI:26398441 |
ISBN-13 |
: |
Rating |
: 4/5 (41 Downloads) |
Synopsis The Edinburgh Review by :