How much does the Soviet Union spend on defense, economic development, social welfare, and education? How does it finance the enormous scale of its expenditures under all these heads? What typical sequences are disclosed, and how do they mesh with other types of behavior in the Soviet economy? Can one even believe the official figures? If so, what do they tell us? If not, in which directions may they need to be corrected? Has the degree of secretiveness varied over time? (Evidence is adduced to show that it has.) What are the branch and territorial components of the budget, and how are they put together, under which pressures and within which timescale? What is the budget s legal status, and how is it affected by legislative procedures? In this in-depth investigation into the scope, structure, and meaning of the Soviet budget, Raymond Hutchings answers these questions. Based largely on an intensive analysis of quantitative series built up over a very long period, this book contributes to understanding the Soviet economy from an angle made possible by no other approach. Students of the Soviet economy, economists, and specialists in international affairs will find the book s data, conclusions, and methods of analysis extremely useful."

This book uses the formerly secret Soviet state and Communist Party archives to describe the creation and operations of the Soviet administrative command system. It concludes that the system failed not because of the 'jockey'(i.e. Stalin and later leaders) but because of the 'horse' (the economic system). Although Stalin was the system's prime architect, the system was managed by thousands of 'Stalins' in a nested dictatorship. The core values of the Bolshevik Party dictated the choice of the administrative command system, and the system dictated the political victory of a Stalin-like figure. This study pinpoints the reasons for the failure of the system - poor planning, unreliable supplies, the preferential treatment of indigenous enterprises, the lack of knowledge of planners, etc. - but also focuses on the basic principal-agent conflict between planners and producers, which created a sixty-year reform stalemate.

Analysis of the central role of militarization in the devel opment of state, society and economy in the U.S.S.R. between the end of the "New Economic Plan" in 1926 and the conclusion of the first "Five-Year Plan" in 1933.

The classic reference work that provides annually updated information on the countries of the world.

Taking a fresh approach to the study of the Soviet Union, this Very Short Introduction blends political history with an investigation into Soviet society and culture from 1917 to 1991. Stephen Lovell examines aspects of patriotism, political violence, poverty, and ideology, and provides answers to some of the big questions about the Soviet experience. Throughout, the book takes a refreshing thematic approach to the Soviet Union and provides an up-to-date consideration of the Soviet Union's impact and what we have learnt since its end.