Statement of Werner Grosshans, Deputy Director, Procurement, Logistics and Readiness Division, before the House Armed Services Committee, Investigations Subcommittee, to discuss the subcommittee1s follow-up work on the Dept. of Defense1s (DoD) system of managing physical security at U.S. military bases. The testimony, which is in two parts, on Aug. 12 and Dec. 8, 1982, contains Grosshans1 statement on actions taken by DoD on the recommendations contained in the Subcommittee report dated Nov. 5, 1981, the recommendations in its March 6, 1981 report, and base entry procedures.

The Department of Defense's System of Managing Physical Security at U.S. Military Bases

The military services spend enormous amounts of money annually for people, equipment, research, and for programs to upgrade facilities to maintain the physical security of military people and equipment. An evaluation was performed of the system for providing physical security at U.S. military bases. Although the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Review has the authority and responsibility to establish uniform physical security policy, the Department of Defense (DOD) and its Physical Security Review Board have not taken an active role in providing guidance except for a few highly sensitive assets such as nuclear weapons. The design of security programs for all other assets is left to the services and local commands. This approach does not ensure consistent coverage of similar assets or proper emphasis on the most appropriate assets. No specific efforts are being made within DOD or among the services to ensure that proper physical security is provided at a reasonable cost. As a result, protective measures at many locations appear unneeded or questionable considering the cost and the degree of protection provided. In view of the enormous cost of protection, the disparate and independent approaches taken to provide security by the services and bases, and the questionable need for security people and equipment at many locations, an established management system within DOD or among the services would appear to offer opportunities to assure adequate protection at a reasonable cost.

Army Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (ATTP) 3-39.32 provides doctrinal guidance for personnel who are responsible for planning and executing physical security programs. It is the basic reference for training security personnel and is intended to be used in conjunction with the Army Regulation (AR) 190 series (Military Police), Security Engineering Unified Facilities Criteria (UFC) publications, Department of Defense (DOD) directives, and other Department of the Army (DA) publications. This publication applies to the Active Army, the Army National Guard (ARNG)/Army National Guard of the United States (ARNGUS), and the United States Army Reserves (USAR) unless otherwise stated. Prevention and protection are the two primary concerns of physical security; both serve the security interests of people, equipment, and property. This ATTP establishes physical security as a supporting component of the protection warfighting function and describes defensive measures that enable protection tasks, such asoperations security, antiterrorism, operational area security, survivability, and information protection.

This U.S. Army field manual (FM 3-19.30) ?sets forth guidance for all personnel responsible for physical security. It is the basic reference for training security personnel. It is intended to be a ?one-stop? physical security source for the Department of Defense (DOD), the Department of the Army (DA), and other proponents and agencies of physical security. Prevention and protection are the two primary concerns of physical security. Both serve the security interests of people, equipment, and property. These interests must be supported at all staff and command levels; and this support must be unified in joint, multinational, and interagency operations. Support to joint, multinational, and interagency operations relies on the fact that the Army will not conduct operations alone. Additionally, force-projection operations conducted by the military will involve the integration of war-fighting capabilities with stability and support operations. This manual?s primary focus is the articulation of a balanced understanding of physical security for joint, multinational, and interagency operations throughout the environments of peacetime, conflict, and war. Physical security must integrate the various capabilities of joint, multinational, and interagency operations in pursuit of a seamless connection between the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. Physical security must also address an expanded range of threats that embraces not only traditional threat components of war, but also nontraditional threats generated by guerrillas, terrorists, criminals, and natural or man-made disasters. In addition, physical security must address the concept of Homeland Defense due to the aforementioned threats. Homeland Defense is the military?s role in the United States (US) government?s principal task of protecting its territory and citizens. Homeland Defense includes supporting domestic authorities for crisis and consequence management with regard to weapons of mass destruction (WMD), protecting national-security assets (such as installations) and deploying forces and ensuring the availability, integrity, and adequacy of other critical assets, deterring and defending against strategic attacks while maintaining freedom of action through antiterrorism and force-protection operations. With this in mind, it is essential to address the five pillars of force protection?combating terrorism, physical security, personal security, law enforcement, and operations security (OPSEC). Physical security is a central component of force protection and provides an integrated venue to express support for operations. Physical security is a primary-leader task and an inherent part of all operations to protect soldiers, family members, civilians, and resources.? This illustrated manual is loaded with practical information: * Protective systems design approach * Vehicle bombs Speed control Exterior attack protection * Building elements * Standoff weapons * Ballistics * Covert entry and insider compromise * Surveillance and eavesdropping * Protective barriers * Security lighting * Electronic security systems * Access control * Lock and key systems * Security forces * In-transit security * Inspections and surveys * Threat and vulnerability assessment.