Until approximately two decades ago, the Democratic Action Party (DAP) struggled to make inroads in Johor due to: (1) the unique historical developments in the state, which benefited its primary opponent Barisan Nasional (BN), and (2) the decentralized party structure in Johor with party branches serving as the main player responsible for grassroots mobilization and campaigning, which resulted in an underdeveloped and less cohesive state party structure. Despite Lee Kaw playing a crucial leadership role for the nascent party to take root in the state, Johor remained in the periphery during the initial decades of the party’s establishment. The party managed to achieve some electoral success only in central Johor around the Kluang. The party achieved a rare breakthrough in Johor during the 1990 General Election when numerous Chinese educationalists allied with the DAP under the call of then Dong Zong chairman Lim Fong Seng. However, the national alliance frayed soon after, with the DAP losing its momentum in Johor by the next general election. Dr Boo Cheng Hau inherited the decentralized state leadership structure when he became the DAP Johor chairman in 2005. Under Dr Boo’s leadership the party prioritized welfare provision and constituency services in several state constituencies, particularly Skudai (in Gelang Patah) and Bentayan (in Bakri). The grassroots machinery was also strengthened while mechanisms were established to resolve intra-party conflicts in the lead-up to general elections. In the 2008 General Election, these efforts paid off and DAP Johor achieved its (till then) best results by capturing four state constituencies--including Skudai and Bentayan--in addition to the Bakri parliamentary seat. In the aftermath of GE2008, where DAP made unprecedented gains in Penang, Selangor and Perak, the national DAP leadership began to shift their attention towards Johor as the latter was perceived as the next frontline state. The party continued its upward swing and made unprecedented gains in the 2013 General Election. As DAP maintained its momentum, coupled with the success of other Pakatan Harapan (PH) component parties in Johor during the 2018 General Election, the DAP under the PH coalition displaced BN as the Johor state government.

When the Pakatan Harapan (PH) federal government fell in February 2020, PH also lost control over the states of Johor, Malacca, Perak and Kedah. In Sabah, PH-aligned Warisan was replaced by the PN-aligned United Alliance of Sabah. PH maintained its hold on three states—Selangor, Penang and Negeri Sembilan. Selangor’s position is of unique interest, given the largest share of PH assemblypersons comprising members from the People’s Justice Party (Parti Keadilan Rakyat, or PKR), the party which has faced significant elite splits in 2020. The present stability of PH’s survival in Selangor can be accounted for by the sheer majority it possesses within the legislative assembly, comprising forty-one out of fifty-six state seats. Unless a significant share of assemblypersons were to defect, the change in state government would be highly unlikely. PH built a strong base in Selangor during its time in power over more than a decade, securing performative legitimacy and rooting itself strongly within the community. PH has benefited from the highly urbanized and educated demographic profile of Selangor. However, the economic fallout from the COVID-19 pandemic has likely changed the landscape, which may in turn affect how constituents will now respond to goodies offered by the federal government. Although PH in Selangor has survived the national storm, its future performance remains uncertain. This year’s political realignment, public opinion towards PN and the 2018 redelineation exercise where the number of Malay-majority seats has grown may hamper PH’s ability to maintain its strong margin. The political fragmentation that continues to unfold will see further party and coalitional realignment, which will invariably impact PH’s strength in Selangor.

This extensive reference examines extreme political movements and the political, cultural, and economic conditions that breed them, from the alt-right in the United States to the Houthi rebel movement in Yemen and the question of Taiwan's independence. Nationalism Today: Extreme Political Movements around the World is an authoritative guide for students and teachers who seek to understand nationalist movements across the globe. The two-volume work opens with essays that describe different types of nationalist movements: extremist, revisionist, and separatist. Arranged by country, the entries that follow provide the geographic, cultural, economic, and political context for the development of nationalist movements. The entries provide expert analysis of specific movements and lay the groundwork for comparison of the many different types of extreme political movements that are exerting themselves around the world today. In addition, easy-to-read tables give cultural, economic, and political facts and figures for each country. A comprehensive scholarly bibliography of secondary sources rounds out the book.

This book examines the staying power of the People's Action Party, a political party that has governed Singapore since June 1959. A political titan with few chinks in its armour, the party has kept winning elections under three prime ministers and Singapore is about to witness a transition to the fourth prime minister. The party's seemingly unstoppable sterling performance makes the issue of the durability of the PAP highly critical. In light of the serious weakness of the Opposition and the strong performance legitimacy of the ruling party, it is worthwhile asking the question, can the PAP stumble and fall? Addressing this question is highly relevant given that similar political parties and structures have almost all collapsed elsewhere — the Barisan Nasional as the latest casualty with its defeat in Malaysia's 2018 General Elections. With an extensive coverage on domestic and international issues, up-to-date developments on the finalisation of the PAP's 4G leadership, the Workers' Party town council saga, and the efforts to form an opposition coalition led by Tan Cheng Bock are also analysed in this book.

Johor is a key battleground in Malaysia’s 14th General Elections. The state is economically vital to the country: it is the birthplace of the United Malays National Organization (UMNO); and it has a large number of parliamentary seats. Johor-specific dynamics that have worked to the advantage of the ruling coalition include: UMNO’s unique links with the state; the tight control over religion; and the phenomenal scale and success of the Federal Land Development Authority (FELDA) scheme. Despite these advantages, support for the ruling coalition has been slipping across the state. Furthermore, the emergence of new parties such as Parti Pribumi Bersatu Malaysia (PPBM) will challenge Barisan Nasional’s control over Johor’s rural and Malay heartland. The redelineation of parliamentary and state constituencies now underway is however likely to benefit BN, and recent survey data indicate that Johoreans are yet to be attracted to the reconfigured opposition coalition, Pakatan Harapan. Thus, while BN may suffer a drop in support, it is likely to retain power in Johor.

The 2018 Malaysian General Election will stand as a major defining event in Malaysian history, when the ruling Barisan Nasional coalition unexpectedly lost power in the country they had ruled for over half a century. This volume brings together scholars who assess one fundamental factor that brought about this game-changing event in Malaysian politics: intra-elite feuding in the leading Malay-based political parties. This study provides an analysis of individual state politics as well as national trends shaped by the actions of leaders in government and the opposition. An indispensable guide for scholars studying the politics of Malaysia and of Southeast Asia more broadly, it will be of great interest for all readers with an interest in Malaysian politics.

The Dictionary of the Modern Politics of South-East Asia provides comprehensive coverage of the political history of this important region since the end of the Second World War.Over 400 alphabetically-organized entries cover Brunei, Burma (Myanmar), Cambodia (Kampuchia), Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. Individual entries provide detailed information and authoritative commentary for the central figures, political parties and organizations, political systems and structures, major events, and key documents, including constitutions and treat.

he Pakatan Harapan (PH) coalition won Malaysia’s 14th general election on 9 May 2018, the first time a regime change took place in the country. However, it lost its majority in late February 2020, when Parti Pribumi Bersatu Malaysia (BERSATU) left the coalition. The four parties in PH had very different ideologies, especially when it comes to issues of race and religion. But despite taking various steps to create a coalition agreement, the more fundamental differences were never reconciled during the coalition’s time in power. PH won GE-14 with a relatively low level of support from the ethnic Malays, who perceived it to be a coalition dominated by the mainly Chinese DAP. Fearmongering about how PH and the DAP were a threat to Malay privileges further weakened PH while in government. Furthermore, BERSATU disliked the possibility that Parti Keadilan Rakyat (KEADILAN) president Anwar Ibrahim might succeed Mahathir Mohamad as prime minister. They did not trust Anwar to champion the Malay agenda if he became prime minister. BERSATU decided as early as in 2019 to explore leaving PH to form a new Malay-led government, and saw the departure as a necessary step for a better chance at winning GE15. This was a controversial decision and it created a major rift within BERSATU itself, with party chairman and then Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad refusing to accept the party’s decision to leave PH. Following Mahathir’s sudden resignation on 24 February 2020, BERSATU immediately announced their departure from PH. This led to a series of events that culminated in the collapse of PH and the formation a Perikatan Nasional government led by the three biggest Malay parties, UMNO, BERSATU and PAS. The whole episode shows that any coalition or political parties that wish to govern Malaysia must not ignore sentiments among the Malays, especially those in rural areas.