The book explores how small states adjust their military strategies in response to external shocks. Using primary sources from four Nordic countries, (Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden), this volume explores how small states have adjusted their military strategies in response to external shocks of the 21st century. The 9/11 terrorist attacks, the Russian interventions in Georgia and Ukraine, and the rise of the Islamic State have all forced the Nordic states to adopt new strategies. While the responses have not been uniform, their differing relations to the EU and NATO have not prevented these countries from behaving similarly in military affairs. Limitations in military capacity has led all four countries to pursue strategies that include cooperation with more resourceful partners. It is necessary for them to cooperate with others to protect and promote their national interests. Moreover, the Nordic cosmopolitan outlook expresses milieu-shaping ambitions that we generally would not expect small states to pursue against a potential great power aggressor. This book will be of much interest to students of military strategy, defense studies, security studies, and international relations.

This book provides a comprehensive assessment of the global diffusion of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) and its impact on military innovation trajectories in small states. Although the 'Revolution in Military Affairs' (RMA) concept has enjoyed significant academic attention, the varying paths and patterns of military innovation in divergent strategic settings have been overlooked. This book seeks to rectify this gap by addressing the broad puzzle of how the global diffusion of RMA-oriented military innovation – the process of international transmission, communication, and interaction of RMA-related military concepts, organizations, and technologies - has shaped the paths, patterns, and scope of military innovation of selected small states. In a reverse mode, how have selected small states influenced the conceptualization and transmission of the RMA theory, processes, and debate? Using Israel, Singapore and South Korea as case studies, this book argues that RMA-oriented military innovation paths in small states indicate predominantly evolutionary trajectory, albeit with a varying patterns resulting from the confluence of three sets of variables: (1) the level of strategic, organizational, and operational adaptability in responding to shifts in the geostrategic and regional security environment; (2) the ability to identify, anticipate, exploit, and sustain niche military innovation – select conceptual, organizational, and technological innovation intended to enhance the military’s ability to prepare for, fight, and win wars, and (3) strategic culture. While the book represents relevant empirical cases for testing the validity of the RMA diffusion hypotheses, from a policy-oriented perspective, this book argues that these case studies offer lessons learned in coping with the security and defence management challenges posed by military innovation in general. This book will be of much interest for students of military innovation, strategic studies, defence studies, Asian politics, Middle Eastern politics and security studies in general.

A comparison of Singapore and Taiwan presents an interesting case study for those wishing to understand how small states struggle to overcome their strategic disadvantage. Since their independence, Singapore and Taiwan have faced numerous challenges resulting from their relative strategic disadvantage. They have struggled to overcome vulnerable bases, an unformed conception of state, and weak governmental institutes for defence. While territorial borders are difficult to change, both states have focused on nation building, economic growth, and military build-up in order to overcome their predicaments. During the Cold War, both states employed similarly authoritarian policies to preserve their survival. However, in the post-Cold War era, Taiwan has experienced political and economic weakness in the face of the rising China, while Singapore, with its polity of one-party domination, has continued to strengthen its hard and soft power. This book examines the unique context for each case, drawing comparisons and offering analysis of their distinct approaches.

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This book examines the security, defence and foreign policy choices and challenges of small states in NATO and its small partner states in the new security environment. The main aim of the book is to analyse how these states are dealing with current and emerging security challenges and how they might better prepare for these challenges. A special focus is on ‘new’ security threats and solutions, such as drones and hybrid warfare. Simultaneously, the book focusses on how small states are responding to emerging ‘old threats’, such as Russian aggression in its neighbouring states and increased activity in the North Atlantic. The book makes an attempt to answer questions like: How are the small states of NATO and its small partner states adjusting to the new geo-political and geo-economic environment? Do small states in NATO manage the tension between alliance commitments differently from small states that are not members of NATO? What are the core strategic interests of the NATO and non-NATO partner small states? The book is about the external dimension of inherent size-related difficulties in states and how small states compensate for their inbuilt structural weaknesses compared with their larger neighbouring states. One third of the member states of NATO are small and most NATO partner states are small states too. Small states frequently have a disproportionate effect on global politics and they are more often affected by global shifts of power, yet they have less resources available to address security challenges. The aim of the book is to enhance the understanding of the role of small states in the changing global international security environment. The book presents the theory of shelter (which is derived from the diverse and extensive literature on small states) and uses it to examine how small states respond to new and old security threats. Shelter theory addresses three interrelated issues of common concerns to small states: the reduction of risk before a possible crisis event, assistance in absorbing shocks in times of crises, and help in recovering after such an event. In short, shelter theory claims that small states need external shelter in order to survive and prosper. They are dependent on the economic, political, and societal shelter provided by larger states, as well as regional and international organizations.

A clearly articulated, well-defined, and relatively stable grand strategy is supposed to allow the ship of state to steer a steady course through the roiling seas of global politics. However, the obstacles to formulating and implementing grand strategy are, by all accounts, imposing. The Oxford Handbook of Grand Strategy addresses the conceptual and historical foundations, production, evolution, and future of grand strategy from a wide range of standpoints. The seven constituent sections present and critically examine the history of grand strategy, including beyond the West; six distinct theoretical approaches to the subject; the sources of grand strategy, ranging from geography and technology to domestic politics to individual psychology and culture; the instruments of grand strategy's implementation, from military to economic to covert action; political actors', including non-state actors', grand strategic choices; the debatable merits of grand strategy, relative to alternatives; and the future of grand strategy, in light of challenges ranging from political polarization to technological change to aging populations. The result is a field-defining, interdisciplinary, and comparative text that will be a key resource for years to come.

Domingo explores the potential of cyber capabilities for small states in the Asia-Pacific, the most active region for cyber conflict. He develops a systematic explanation for why Brunei, New Zealand, and Singapore have developed or are developing cyber capabilities. Studies on cyber conflict and strategy have substantially increased in the past decade but most have focused on the cyber operations of powerful states. This book moves away from the prominence of powerful states and explores the potential of cyber capabilities for small states in the Asia-Pacific, the most active region for cyber conflict. It develops a systematic explanation of why Brunei, New Zealand, and Singapore have developed or are developing cyber capabilities despite its obscure strategic value. The book argues that the distribution of power in the region and a "technology-oriented" strategic culture are two necessary conditions that influence the development of cyber capabilities in small states. Following this argument, the book draws on neoclassical realism as a theoretical framework to account for the interaction between these two conditions. The book also pursues three secondary objectives. First, it aims to determine the constraints and incentives that affect the utilization of cyber capabilities as foreign policy instruments. Second, the book evaluates the functionality of these cyber capabilities for small states. Lastly, it assesses the implications of employing cyber capabilities as foreign policy tools of small states. This book will be an invaluable resource for academics and security analysts working on cyber conflict, military strategy, small states, and International Relations in general.

Defence Industries in the 21st Century explores the transformation in the global defence industrial production through examining the interaction between international and domestic factors. With the global defence industry and arms market likely continue to expand and mature, the ways in which this progression could influence international politics remain obscure. In practice, as the contents of this book show, the defence industrial bases and arms export policies of emerging states display significant variance. This variance is the result of a unique balance between domestic and international factors that has shaped the defence industrialisation behaviour and policies of the less industrialised states. One of the most important conclusions of the book is that the interplay between domestic and international factors clearly influences the variation in the emerging states’ defence industrialisation policies, as well as their success or failure. While international factors create opportunities, they also limit the options available to emerging economies. Domestic factors also play an important role by shaping the policy choices of the states’ decision makers. Exploring the balance between international and domestic factors and the ways in which they influence defence industrialisation in emerging states, Defence Industries in the 21st Century will be of great interest to scholars of Defence Industries, Arms Manufacturing, and Defence, Strategic and Security Studies more generally. The chapters were originally published in Defence Studies, Comparative Strategy and All Azimuth.