This collection examines critically, and with an eye to reform, conceptions and conditions of corporate blameworthiness in law. It draws on legal, moral, regulatory and psychological theory, as well as historical and comparative perspectives. These insights are applied across the spheres of civil, criminal, and international law. The collection also has a deliberate focus on the 'nuts and bolts' of the law: the legal, equitable and statutory principles and rules that operate to establish corporate states of mind, on which responsibility as a matter of daily legal practice commonly depends.The collection therefore engages strongly with scholarly debates. The book also speaks, clearly and cogently, to the judges, regulators, legislators, law reform commissioners, barristers and practitioners who administer and, through their respective roles, incrementally influence the development of the law at the coalface of legal practice.

This collection examines critically, and with an eye to reform, conceptions and conditions of corporate blameworthiness in law. It draws on legal, moral, regulatory and psychological theory, as well as historical and comparative perspectives. These insights are applied across the spheres of civil, criminal, and international law. The collection also has a deliberate focus on the 'nuts and bolts' of the law: the legal, equitable and statutory principles and rules that operate to establish corporate states of mind, on which responsibility as a matter of daily legal practice commonly depends.The collection therefore engages strongly with scholarly debates. The book also speaks, clearly and cogently, to the judges, regulators, legislators, law reform commissioners, barristers and practitioners who administer and, through their respective roles, incrementally influence the development of the law at the coalface of legal practice.

This book provides an account of the international emergence of corporate manslaughter offences to criminalise deaths in the workplace during the last twenty years, identifying the limitations of health and safety regulation that have prompted this development.

This book seeks to reframe the normative narrative of the 'culpable person' in American criminal law through a more humanising lens. It embraces such a reframed narrative to revise the criteria of the current voluntarist architecture of culpability and to advance a paradigm of punishment that positions social rehabilitation as its core principle. The book constructs this narrative by considering behavioural and neuroscientific insights into the functions of emotions, and socio-environmental factors within moral behaviour in social settings. Hence, it suggests culpability notions that reflect a more contextualised view of human conduct, and argues that such revised notions are better suited to the principle of personal guilt. Furthermore, it suggests a model of 'punishment' that values the dynamic power of change of individuals, and acknowledges the importance of social relationships and positive environments to foster patterns of social (re)integration. Ultimately, this book argues that the potential adoption of the proposed models of culpability and punishment, which view people through a more comprehensive lens, may be a key factor for turning criminal justice into a less punitive, more inclusionary and non-stigmatising system.

We live in an era defined by corporate greed and malfeasance—one in which unprecedented accounting frauds and failures of compliance run rampant. In order to calm investor fears, revive perceptions of legitimacy in markets, and demonstrate the resolve of state and federal regulators, a host of reforms, high-profile investigations, and symbolic prosecutions have been conducted in response. But are they enough? In this timely work, William S. Laufer argues that even with recent legal reforms, corporate criminal law continues to be ineffective. As evidence, Laufer considers the failure of courts and legislatures to fashion liability rules that fairly attribute blame for organizations. He analyzes the games that corporations play to deflect criminal responsibility. And he also demonstrates how the exchange of cooperation for prosecutorial leniency and amnesty belies true law enforcement. But none of these factors, according to Laufer, trumps the fact that there is no single constituency or interest group that strongly and consistently advocates the importance and priority of corporate criminal liability. In the absence of a new standard of corporate liability, the power of regulators to keep corporate abuses in check will remain insufficient. A necessary corrective to our current climate of graft and greed, Corporate Bodies and Guilty Minds will be essential to policymakers and legal minds alike. “[This] timely work offers a dispassionate analysis of problems relating to corporate crime.”—Harvard Law Review

There are many actions that we attribute, at least colloquially, to states. Given their size and influence, states are able to inflict harm far beyond the reach of a single individual. But there is a great deal of unclarity about exactly who is implicated in that kind of harm, and how we should think about responsibility for it. It is a commonplace assumption that democratic publics both authorize and have control over what their states do; that their states act in their name and on their behalf. In Not In Their Name, Holly Lawford-Smith approaches these questions from the perspective of social ontology, asking whether the state is a collective agent, and whether ordinary citizens are members of that agent. If it is, and they are, there's a clear case for democratic collective culpability. She explores alternative conceptions of the state and of membership in the state; alternative conceptions of collective agency applied to the state; the normative implications of membership in the state; and both culpability (from the inside) and responsibility (from the outside) for what the state does. Ultimately, Lawford-Smith argues for the exculpation of ordinary citizens and the inculpation of those working in public services.

Of related interest . . . PSYCHOLOGICAL SERVICES FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT —Theodore H. Blau This unique training guide/reference was written in response to the ever-growing demand for psychological services in law enforcement agencies. Written by one of the nation's most respected experts in forensic psychology, it offers psychologists now working in law enforcement agencies and those interested in entering the field, a detailed overview of the many functions psychologists serve within those agencies. Organized by sections corresponding to the major functions psychologists perform—assessment, intervention, consultation, and training—the book deals with all issues that psychologists working in law enforcement will encounter in their practice, including officer recruitment, fitness-for-duty evaluations, stress counseling, drug and alcohol counseling, hostage negotiations, investigative hypnosis, management consultation, and much more. 1994 (0-471-55950-4) 454 pp. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL EXAMINATION OF THE CHILD —Theodore H. Blau Over twenty-five years in the making and the result of examinations of over four thousand children, this book is a comprehensive guide to performing psychological examinations on children. Covering virtually every aspect of the examination procedure, it offers specific recommendations and step-by-step guidelines to everything from office decor, requisite equipment, test selection, rating categories, and techniques for minimizing stress to administering tests, writing reports, and making recommendations. Closely following Dr. Blau's famous Basic Psychological Examination package, the book guides readers in their assessment of environmental pressure, behavioral responses, intellectual factors, neuropsychological status, response capabilities, academic achievement, and personality. 1991 (0-471-63559-6) 279 pp. THE PSYCHOLOGIST AS EXPERT WITNESS —Theodore H. Blau This very practical guide arms mental health professionals with everything they need to serve comfortably and effectively as expert witnesses. With the help of numerous real-life examples, excerpts from transcripts, sample forms, checklists, and legal documents, it shows you how to: prepare for your day in court; avoid being manipulated by attorneys; write up depositions and psychological and technical reports; and much more. And, as the use of mental health professionals as expert witnesses continues to extend beyond traditional judicial applications, the author addresses a wide range of untraditional situations and types of cases in which readers may be called upon to serve, including cases of liability and personal injury, eyewitness identification research, trademark and patent litigation, and others. 1984 (0-471-87129-X) 424 pp. PSYCHIATRY AND CRIMINAL CULPABILITY How do we distinguish between sin and sickness? Few cases in recent memory so well typify the current confusion over this question as that of Jeffrey Dahmer. The confessed killer of fifteen young men, Dahmer had sex with and cannibalized his victims' bodies. Yet, because he was not found to be mentally ill—the threshold requirement in tests of legal insanity-—he was convicted and sentenced to 936 years imprisonment. How is it that such a severely disturbed person as Dahmer is adjudged sane and therefore culpable, while "Twinkiedefense" killer, Dan White and would-be presidential assassin John Hinckley, Jr., are deemed not guilty by reason of insanity? What are the origins of tests for criminal responsibility, and how is mental illness defined under them? Can causal links be shown to exist between specific crimes and disorders? Psychiatry and Criminal Culpability explores, in-depth, these questions and many others at the heart of one of the most controversial issues in our criminal justice system today. Throughout, Dr. Ralph Slovenko, an acknowledged expert whose professional experience straddles both the worlds of psychiatry and the law, brings a wealth of scholarship and direct experience to bear on the subject. Citing numerous landmark cases and historical formulations of criminal responsibility dating back to biblical times, he traces the evolution of current legal and psychiatric notions of culpability and the relationship between culpability and insanity. Writing for both a mental health and legal audience, Dr. Slovenko clearly and eloquently addresses a wide range of important topical issues. He explains the distinctions between the defenses of not guilty by reason of insanity, guilty but mentally ill, and diminished capacity. He identifies the types of mental illness that currently qualify under the test of criminal responsibility, including disorders that psychiatrists do not regard as psychotic, but which, nevertheless, many experts assert negate responsibility. He explores the role of the mental health professional as an expert character witness in cases where it is uncertain whether the accused committed the crime in question. And much more. Fascinating, thought-provoking, and enlightening, Psychiatry and Criminal Culpability helps guide mental health and legal professionals through the moral and technical complexities of one of the knottiest issues of our day.

"This collection brings together a team of outstanding scholars from across the common law to explore the treatment of misleading silence in private law doctrine and theory, embracing a comparative analysis. Whereas previous studies have been contractual in focus, here the topic is explored from across the full spectrum of private law. Its approach encompasses equitable, common law and statutory principles and draws on theoretical, historical, cross-disciplinary and doctrinal perspectives. This is truly a landmark publication in private law, with no equivalent in the common law world. Contributors: Professor Rick Bigwood; Professor Michael Bryan; Professor John Cartwright; Professor Mindy Chen-Wishart; Professor Simone Degeling; Professor Pamela Hanrahan; Professor Luke Harding; Professor Matthew Harding; Professor Catharine MacMillan; Professor Hector MacQueen; Professor Donna Nagy; Justice Andrew Phang; Professor Pauline Ridge; Professor Andrew Robertson; Ms Anna Williams"--

When someone commits a crime, what are the limits on a state's authority to define them as worthy of blame, and thus liable to punishment? This book answers that question, building on two ideas familiar to criminal lawyers: actus reus and mens rea, usually translated as "guilty act" and "guilty mind." In Guilty Acts, Guilty Minds, Stephen P. Garvey proposes an understanding of actus reus and mens rea as limits on the authority of a state, and in particular the authority of a democratic state, to ascribe guilt to those accused of crime. Garvey argues that actus reus and mens rea are necessary conditions for legitimate state punishment. Drawing on the work of political philosophers, moral philosophers, and criminal law theorists, Garvey provides clear explanations of how these concepts apply to a wide variety of cases. The book charges readers to consider practical examples and ask: whatever you believe regarding the justice of the rules, did the state act within the scope of its legitimate authority when it enacted those rules into law? Based on extensive research, this book presents a new theory in which the concepts of actus reus and mens rea mark the limits of state power rather than simply describe the elements of a crime. Making the compelling distinction between legitimacy and justice, Guilty Acts, Guilty Minds provides an important perspective on the limits of state authority.

This book seeks to reframe the normative narrative of the 'culpable person' in American criminal law through a more humanising lens. It embraces such a reframed narrative to revise the criteria of the current voluntarist architecture of culpability and to advance a paradigm of punishment that positions social rehabilitation as its core principle. The book constructs this narrative by considering behavioural and neuroscientific insights into the functions of emotions, and socio-environmental factors within moral behaviour in social settings. Hence, it suggests culpability notions that reflect a more contextualised view of human conduct, and argues that such revised notions are better suited to the principle of personal guilt. Furthermore, it suggests a model of 'punishment' that values the dynamic power of change of individuals, and acknowledges the importance of social relationships and positive environments to foster patterns of social (re)integration. Ultimately, this book argues that the potential adoption of the proposed models of culpability and punishment, which view people through a more comprehensive lens, may be a key factor for turning criminal justice into a less punitive, more inclusionary and non-stigmatising system.