In a period when the monarch was the key figure in the Portuguese government, the struggle for the throne among members of the royal family was of crucial significance. Against a backdrop of new liberal ideas, economic conservatism, and modernization, Dom Pedro challenged his brother, Dom Miguel (the Usurper), on behalf of his young daughter (Maria II) for the throne. But this struggle for the throne, and for a workable constitution, did little to change the fundamentally agrarian economy, so that in the end neither the monarch, nor the liberal ideals of the urban elite, nor foreign pressures had any fundamental effect on society as a whole. The Concession of Évora Monte describes the economic and political problems unleashed by the Peninsular War and the evacuation of the court to Brazil; the 1820 revolution, the first Portuguese constitution, and the counter revolution; the attempt by Dom Pedro when he became king (while also emperor of Brazil) to introduce the new Constitutional Charter and pass the throne on to his young daughter; the usurpation of the throne by his brother Dom Miguel; the War of the Two Brothers in which Dom Pedro defeated Dom Miguel and forced him into exile. The signing of the Concession in 1834 marked the end of the civil war, but it did not bring peace and stability. The changes introduced by the victorious Dom Pedro did not solve the basic issues of Portuguese society, nor did the efforts of his daughter, Maria II, during the 1830s and the 1840s. Several attempts were made to impose a new liberal constitution on the country, but in the end it was the formation after 1850 of new political parties sharing the governing which brought stability. The country remained conservative despite the modernization which came to the cities but which penetrated the countryside only to a degree. This book argues that liberalism in Portugal was an urban phenomenon involving a very small minority of the people, and points to a variety of reasons for this. Portugal remained a rural, conservative society into the twentieth century and throughout the Salazar regimes until, perhaps, the Carnation Revolution in 1974.

This book explores and analyzes developments in the military institution, military engagements as well as the larger security environment of (including non-war violence and maritime regions linking to) the Portuguese Empire in India. These developments occurred under the onslaught of the early modern globalization. The research shows that far from being dilapidated or archaic, the Portuguese colonial military there kept up with some developments in technology and organization in a competitive environment. Although the colonial military was not the most important reason in accounting for the survival of the Portuguese Estado da Índia, nor was the military profession the most lucrative occupation, the Portuguese experience gave indication of how a colonial state and society was able to survive against coalescing threats from the position of weakness. Located in the period and geographical region of the wax and waning of the Mughal and Maratha empires, Portuguese India was not necessarily a more violent place than the surrounding territories although resistance to and uprising against the Portuguese was usually underestimated. Beginning from the attempt at political and military centralization (and standardization) in the eighteenth century, the abolition of the army of the Estado da Índia in the nineteenth marked nominally the end of an era that may have a reverberation on the pacifist perception of Goa today.

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The long-standing parliamentary convention known as the ‘Royal Prerogative’ has always allowed Prime Ministers to take the country to war without any formal approval by Parliament. The dramatic vote against any military strike on Syria on 29 August 2013 blew that convention wide open, and risks hampering Great Britain’s role as a force for good in the world in the future. Will MPs ever vote for war? Perhaps not – and this book proposes a radical solution to the resulting national emasculation. By writing the theory of a Just War (its causes, conduct and ending) into law, Parliament would allow the Prime Minister to act without hindrance, thanks not to a Royal Prerogative, but to a parliamentary one.