At its peak in the 1950s and 1960s, automobile manufacturing was the largest, most profitable industry in the United States and residents of industry hubs like Detroit and Flint, Michigan had some of the highest incomes in the country. Over the last half-century, the industry has declined, and American automakers now struggle to stay profitable. How did the most prosperous industry in the richest country in the world crash and burn? In Wrecked, sociologists Joshua Murray and Michael Schwartz offer an unprecedented historical-sociological analysis of the downfall of the auto industry. Through an in-depth examination of labor relations and the production processes of automakers in the U.S. and Japan both before and after World War II, they demonstrate that the decline of the American manufacturers was the unintended consequence of their attempts to weaken the bargaining power of their unions. Today Japanese and many European automakers produce higher quality cars at lower cost than their American counterparts thanks to a flexible form of production characterized by long-term sole suppliers, assembly and supply plants located near each other, and just-in-time delivery of raw materials. While this style of production was, in fact, pioneered in the U.S. prior to World War II, in the years after the war, American automakers deliberately dismantled this system. As Murray and Schwartz show, flexible production accelerated innovation but also facilitated workers’ efforts to unionize plants and carry out work stoppages. To reduce the efficacy of strikes and combat the labor militancy that flourished between the Depression and the postwar period, the industry dispersed production across the nation, began maintaining large stockpiles of inventory, and eliminated single sourcing. While this restructuring of production did ultimately reduce workers’ leverage, it also decreased production efficiency and innovation. The U.S. auto industry has struggled ever since to compete with foreign automakers, and formerly thriving motor cities have suffered the consequences of mass deindustrialization. Murray and Schwartz argue that new business models that reinstate flexible production and prioritize innovation rather than cheap labor could stem the outsourcing of jobs and help revive the auto industry. By clarifying the historical relationships between production processes, organized labor, and industrial innovation, Wrecked provides new insights into the inner workings and decline of the U.S. auto industry.

Over the past 100 years the European Automotive Industry has been repeatedly challenged by best practice. First by the United States, through the development of ‘mass production’ pioneered by Henry Ford and more recently by ‘lean production techniques’ as practised by the leading Japanese producers, particularly Toyota. It has consistently risen to these challenges and has shown it can compete and even outperform its competitors with world-class products. However, the European - dustry is now faced with growing competition and growth from new emerging low-cost countries and needs to re-define its competitive advantage to remain at the forefront of the sector. Automotive growth is driven by two factors, new m- kets and new technologies. Global competition is increasing, with technology and product differentiation becoming the most important sales factors, but with c- tinued cost pressure. Within the market the winners will be more profitable and the losers will disappear. The Automotive Industry makes a significant contribution to the socio-economic fabric of the European Union. Manufacturing output represents €700 billion and research and development spending €24 billion. European automotive suppliers number 5000 member companies and represent 5 million employees and generate €500 billion in revenues. These are significant figures that generate wealth and high value employment within the EU. European firms must consistently improve their competitive position to ensure that the industry does not migrate to growing new markets.

This volume presents realistic estimates for the level of fuel economy that is achievable in the next decade for cars and light trucks made in the United States and Canada. A source of objective and comprehensive information on the topic, this book takes into account real-world factors such as the financial conditions in the automotive industry, costs and benefits to consumers, and marketability of high-efficiency vehicles. The committee is composed of experts from the fields of science, technology, finance, and regulation and offers practical evaluations of technological improvements that could contribute to increased fuel efficiency. The volume also examines potential barriers to improvement, such as high production costs, regulations on safety and emissions, and consumer preferences. This practical book is of considerable interest to car and light truck manufacturers, policymakers, federal and state agencies, and the public.

As the University of Michigan Center for Japanese Studies reflected on the deteriorating position of the domestic auto industry in the fall of 1980, and the strong competitive threat being posed by the Japanese automakers, we were struck by the extraordinary low quality of the public discussion of these critical issues. The national importance of the issues seemed only matched by the superficiality of the analyses being offered. The tendency to think in terms of scapegoats was particularly evident. The Japanese as the basic cause of our problems has been a particularly notable theme. To be sure, cooperation with the Japanese in formulating a rational overall trade policy may be an important part of the solution. It has also been fashionable to blame it all on American auto industry management for not concentrating on the production of small cars when "everyone knew" that was the thing to do. Alternatively, government meddling was blamed for all our problems. Clearly, the complex problem we faced required more penetrating analyses. It seemed therefore, that the time was ripe for a public seminar which moved beyond the rhetoric of the moment and probed some of the deeper causes of our problems and possible directions for future policy. In holding the January 1981 auto conference, the Center took it as their task to begin addressing the critical issues facing the industry, with particular, but not exclusive, attention to examining the role of the Japanese auto industry. They had in mind not to simply conduct a rational discussion of the trade issue but to probe the sources of Japanese competitive strength, especially those features whose study might profit them. In these proceedings, they bring those discussions to a wider audience. Question and answer sessions at the conference were necessarily short and a few speakers delivered abbreviated remarks; this volume restores a number of omissions, and provides additional answers to some pertinent questions put by the audience. The Center hopes to encourage the serious problem-solving these complex issues demand. Far too much time has been spent trying to fix the blame. [intro]

At the time of the U.S.-Japan auto conferences in March 1983, the hoped-for economic recovery as manifested in auto sales had revealed itself quite modestly. Three months later, the indicators were more robust and certainly long overdue for those whose livelihood depends on the health of the industry--some of whom are university professors. With Japanese import restrictions in place until March 1984 and drastically reduced break-even points for domestic manufactures, rising consumer demand holds great promise for the industry. The rapidly rising stock prices of the auto-makers captures well the sense of heightened optimism, as do the various forecasts for improved profits. While the news is certainly welcome, it nevertheless should be greeted with caution. As Mr. Perkins noted at the conference, "we have a tendency to forget things very quickly. If we have a boom market this year, there is a good chance that a lot of things we learned will be forgotten." To put the matter differently and more bluntly, with growing prosperity there is the risk that management will fall back into old habits, making impossible the achievement of sustained quality and productivity improvement. Similarly, the commitment to develop cooperative relations with workers and suppliers will weaken. The union will be under membership pressure to retrieve concessions rather than to take the longer-term view. This longer-term view recognizes that "up-front increases" and adherence to existing work rules increasingly come at the sacrifice of future job security. Government policymakers will turn their attention away from the industry. This may not mean a great deal given how weakly focused their attentions has been during the last three years and how mixed and contradictory government auto policies have been for over a decade.

This book has proved its worth over the years as a text for courses in Production Management at the Faculty of Automotive Engineering in Turin, Italy, but deserves a wider audience as it presents a compendium of basics on Industrial Management, since it covers all major topics required. It treats all subjects from product development and “make or buy”-decision strategies to the manufacturing systems setting and management through analysis of the main resources needed in production and finally exploring the supply chain management and the procurement techniques. The very last chapter recapitulates the previous ones by analysing key management indicators to pursue the value creation that is the real purpose of every industrial enterprise. As an appendix, a specific chapter is dedicated to the basics of production management where all main relevant definitions, techniques and criteria are treated, including some numerical examples, in order to provide an adequate foundation for understanding the other chapters. This book will be of use not only to Automotive Engineering students but a wide range of readers who wish to gain insight in the world of automotive engineering and the automotive industry in general.