When World War II ended Chiang Kai-shek seemed at the height of his power-the leader of Nationalist China, one of the victorious Allied Powers in 1945 and with the financial backing of the US. Yet less than four years later, he lost the China's civil war against the communists. Offering an insightful chronological treatment of the years 1944–1949, Parks Coble addresses why Chiang was unable to win the war and control hyperinflation. Using newly available archival sources, he reveals the critical weakness of Chiang's style of governing, the fundamental structural flaws in the Nationalist government, bitter personal rivalries and Chiang's personal lack of interest in finance. This major work of revisionist scholarship will engage all those interested in the shaping of twentieth-century history.

The question "Who lost China?" has provoked political vituperation and academic controversy ever since the Chinese Communists drove the Nationalist regime of Chiang Kai-shek off the mainland in 1949. In this study based on a wide array of hitherto unused documentary sources, the author delves deeply into the inner workings of the Nationalist regime and concludes that the Nationalists collapsed largely as a result of their own failings. Most strikingly, he uses the records and memoirs of the Nationalists themselves to document the weaknesses of the Nationalist rule. For even Chiang Kai-shek said of the Kuomintang on the eve of its final defeat in 1949, "This kind of party should long ago have been destroyed and swept away!" To illuminate the factors that contributed to its ultimate defeat, the author examines the Nationalist government during the period 1937-1949 from several different perspectives. He carefully scrutinizes the relationship between the central and provincial governments, the plight of the tax-burdened peasantry in the Nationalist-held areas, the intraparty politics of the regime as expressed in the Youth Corps and the reformist Ko-hsin Movement, the deficiencies of the army during the wars against Japan and the Communists, the failure of the Gold Yüan currency reform of late 1948, and finally, Chiang Kai-shek's own assessment of his army and the civilian branches of his regime during the final phases of the war.

This lively history of China's Nationalist revolution tells the story of a small group of Chinese patriots headed by Sun Yat-sen until his death in 1925. They mobilised men, money, and propaganda to create a provincial base from which they launched a revolutionary military campaign to unify the country, end imperialist privilege, and bring the Kuomintang to power. Soviet Russia induced the fledgling Chinese Communist Party to join the effort, and sent money, arms, military and political experts to guide the revolution. But there was a fatal flaw in this co-operation, and when the fighting was over, the remnant Communist Party had been driven underground, the Russian experts had been expelled, and a faction-riven Nationalist Party led by Chiang Kai-shek could claim to be China's new government. This study of a key period in China's history, reprinted from Volume 12 of The Cambridge History of China, is solidly based in Chinese, Russian, and Western languages sources.

In this ground-breaking study, Hsiao Ting Lin demonstrates that the Chinese frontier was the subject neither of concerted aggression on the part of a centralized and indoctrinated Chinese government nor of an ideologically driven nationalist ethnopolitics. Instead, Nationalist sovereignty over Tibet and other border regions was the result of rhetorical grandstanding by Chiang Kai-shek and his regime. Tibet and Nationalist China's Frontier makes a crucial contribution to the understanding of past and present China-Tibet relations. A counterpoint to erroneous historical assumptions, this book will change the way Tibetologists and modern Chinese historians frame future studies of the region.

Many books have tried to analyze the reasons for the Chinese communist success in China's 1945_1949 civil war, but Suzanne Pepper's seminal work was the first and remains the only comprehensive analysis of how the ruling Nationalists lost that war_not just militarily, but by alienating the civilian population through corruption and incompetence. Now available in a new edition, this authoritative investigation of Kuomintang failure and communist success explores the new research and archival resources available for assessing this pivotal period in contemporary Chinese history. Even more relevant today given the contemporary debates in Hong Kong and Taiwan over the terms of reunification with a communist-led national government in Beijing, this book is essential reading for anyone seeking a nuanced understanding of twentieth-century Chinese politics.

In recent years historians of China have focused increased attention on the critical decades of National rule on the mainland. This recent scholarship has substantially modified our understanding of the political events of this momentous period, shedding light on the character of Nationalist rule and on the sources of the Communist victory in 1949. Yet no existing textbook on modern China presents the events of the period according to these new findings. The five essays in this volume were written by leading authorities on the period, and they synthesize the new research. Drawn from Volume 13 of The Cambridge History of China, they represent the most complete and stimulating political history of the period available in the literature. The essays selected deal with Nationalist rule during the Nanking decade, the Communist movement from 1927 to 1937, Nationalist rule during the Sino-Japanese War, the Communist movement during the Sino-Japanese war, and the Kuomintang-Communist struggle from 1945 to 1949.