How a strategist's ideas were catastrophically ignored in 1914—but shaped Britain’s success in the Second World War and beyond Leading historian Andrew Lambert shows how, as a lawyer, civilian, and Liberal, Julian Corbett (1854–1922) brought a new level of logic, advocacy, and intellectual precision to the development of strategy. Corbett skillfully integrated classical strategic theory, British history, and emerging trends in technology, geopolitics, and conflict to prepare the British state for war. He emphasized that strategy is a unique national construct, rather than a set of universal principles, and recognized the importance of domestic social reform and the evolving British Commonwealth. Corbett's concept of a maritime strategy, dominated by the control of global communications and economic war, survived the debacle of 1914–18, when Britain used the German "way of war" at unprecedented cost in lives and resources. It proved critical in the Second World War, shaping Churchill’s conduct of the conflict from the Fall of France to D-Day. And as Lambert shows, Corbett’s ideas continue to influence British thinking.

In this seminal reassessment of the historical foundation of British counter doctrine and practice, David French challenges our understanding that in the two decades after 1945 the British discovered a kinder and gentler way of waging war amongst the people.

Presents the first full-length study of one of Britain's most important military thinkers, Major-General Sir Charles E. Callwell.

This 2005 book explores the evolution of Americans' first way of war, to show how war waged against Indian noncombatant population and agricultural resources became the method early Americans employed and, ultimately, defined their military heritage. The sanguinary story of the American conquest of the Indian peoples east of the Mississippi River helps demonstrate how early Americans embraced warfare shaped by extravagant violence and focused on conquest. Grenier provides a major revision in understanding the place of warfare directed on noncombatants in the American military tradition, and his conclusions are relevant to understand US 'special operations' in the War on Terror.

A major contribution to our understanding of contemporary warfare and strategy by one of the world's leading military historians.

From the first interactions between European and native peoples, to the recent peace-keeping efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq, military issues have always played an important role in American history. Ways of War comprehensively explains the place of the military within the wider context of the history of the United States, showing its centrality to American culture and politics. The chapters provide a complete survey of the American military's growth and development while answering such questions as: How did the American military structure develop? How does it operate? And how have historical military events helped the country to grow and develop? Features Include: Chronological and comprehensive coverage of North American conflicts since the seventeenth century and international wars undertaken by the United States since 1783 Over 100 maps and images, chapter timelines identifying key dates and events, and text boxes throughout providing biographical information and first person accounts A companion website featuring an extensive testbank of discussion, essay and multiple choice questions for instructors as well as student study resources including an interactive timeline, chapter summaries, annotated further reading, annotated weblinks, additional book content, flashcards and an extensive glossary of key terms. Extensively illustrated and written by experienced instructors, Ways of War is essential reading for all students of American Military History.

During the presidency of Lyndon Johnson, the British government sought to avoid escalation of the war in Vietnam and to help bring about peace. The thinking that lay behind these endeavours was often insightful and it is hard to argue that the attempt was not worth making, but the British government was able to exert little, if any, influence on a power with which it believed it had, and needed, a special relationship. Drawing on little-used papers in the British archives, Nicholas Tarling describes the making of Britain’s Vietnam policy during a period when any compromise proposed by London was likely to be seen in Washington as suggestive of defeat, and attempts to involve Moscow in the process over-estimated the USSR’s influence on a Hanoi determined on reunification.

This study will provide a badly-needed survey and synopsis of the scholarly literature on strategic culture and ways of war.

Controversial new history of counterinsurgency which challenges its claims as an effective strategy of waging war.