A comprehensive and challenging analysis of the British defence of Egypt, primarily against fascist Italy, in the critical lead-up period to the Second World War. Culminating in the decisive defeat of the Italian military threat at Sidi Barrani in December 1940, this is a fascinating new contribution to the field. The security of Egypt, a constant of British imperial strategy, is a curiously neglected dimension of the still burning appeasement debate. Steven Morewood adds to the originality of his interpretation by suggesting the old view should be reinstated: that Mussolini should and could have been stopped in his empire-building at the Abyssinian hurdle. Thereafter, as Nazi Germany tore the Versailles peace settlement to shreds, the drift to war accelerated as British resolve and credibility were brought into question. The fascist dictators in Rome and Berlin held no respect for weakness and Mussolini became the conduit through which Hitler could apply pressure to a sensitive British interest through reinforcing Libya at critical moments.

A comprehensive and challenging analysis of the British defence of Egypt, primarily against fascist Italy, in the critical lead-up period to the Second World War. Culminating in the decisive defeat of the Italian military threat at Sidi Barrani in December 1940, this is a fascinating new contribution to the field.

This book is a new look at the evolution of operational art and its complex roots in history.

This volume presents new and established scholars writing on a range of subjects from the Dervishes of the 1890s to the terrorism and guerrilla wars of the post-1945 period.

How British naval power in the Indian Ocean played a critical early role in WWII: “Commands the reader's attention. . . . a history game-changer.” —Warship, Naval Books of the Year This new work tells the compelling story of how the Royal Navy secured the strategic space from Egypt in the west to Australasia in the East through the first half of the Second World War—and explains why this contribution, made while Russia’s fate remained in the balance and before American economic power took effect, was so critical. Without it, the war would certainly have lasted longer and decisive victory might have proved impossible. After the protection of the Atlantic lifeline, this was surely the Royal Navy’s finest achievement, the linchpin of victory. The book moves authoritatively between grand strategy, intelligence, accounts of specific operations, and technical assessment of ships and weapons. It challenges established perceptions of Royal Navy capability and will change the way we think about Britain’s role and contribution in the first half of the war. The Navy of 1939 was stronger than usually suggested and British intelligence did not fail against Japan. Nor was the Royal Navy outmatched by Japan, coming very close to a British Midway off Ceylon in 1942. And it was the Admiralty, demonstrating a reckless disregard for risks, that caused the loss of Force Z in 1941. The book also lays stress on the key part played by the American relationship in Britain’s Eastern naval strategy. Superbly researched and elegantly written, it adds a hugely important dimension to our understanding of the war in the East.

This book is a study of the circumstances leading to British intervention in Vietnam in 1945, and the course and consequences of this intervention. The first part of the work links French colonialism with the native communist insurgency, while examining British and Foreign Office attitudes towards French Indochina. The study then looks at the key Anglo-American wartime relationship concerning Indochina and its impact. The second half of the book focuses on the local problems faced by the British in Southern Indochina, and whether commanding general Douglas Gracey was guilty (as critics have suggested) of collusion with French colonialism. It also examines the wider problems linked to available military resources, and the controversial issues of the role of the OSS and the use of Japanese troops to preserve law and order. Finally, the book makes a groundbreaking link between British intervention and the outbreak of the French-Vietminh war in 1946. Britain in Vietnam will be of interest to students of British foreign policy, military history and South-East Asian history in general.

By the 1930s fascist dictator Benito Mussolini reached the conclusion that Italy faced a clear choice: expand its power at the expense of the British and French Empires or face stagnation and decline. He believed that the regimes in the democratic West would not be able to contain their inherent hostility toward fascist dynamism, while their demographic and political weaknesses provided the opportunity for the younger, demographically virile fascist Italy to carve a new empire in the Mediterranean status quo. Through his intervention in the Spanish Civil War and his attempts to challenge French Power in Europe and British imperial domination of the Middle East and East Africa, Mussolini sought to decisively change Italy's long-standing position as the least of the Great Powers. Although the Pact of Steel did not always function smoothly, Mussolini remained loyal to its principles, eventually throwing Italy into the Second World War, where he would belatedly discover that his regime had signally failed to prepare his legions for fighting in a modern war.

This book explores the formation of the Baghdad Pact and Anglo-American defence policies in the Middle East, 1950-1959. It determines the aims with which the pact was established; the failings of the pact, and the struggle that was undertaken against it by hostile countries. It examines the events surrounding the formation, development and collapse of the pact, and Anglo-American attempts to contain the Soviet Union in the Middle East. It also deals with British and American policies towards the pact and Middle Eastern defence. It seeks to examine British and American post-war defence policies in the Middle East and their collective defence projects in the region, such as the Middle East Command and Northern Tier, leading to the Baghdad Pact. It does not attempt to offer a comprehensive history of British and American policies in the Middle East, and particularly aims to explore those policies with regard to the problems of Middle East defence. In addition, it explores the policies of the local members of the pact, and examines the pact's internal structure. It poses the questions of how the members of the pact and the United States perceived the question of Middle East defence; what their basic aims were; and what problems they faced while trying to achieve these aims and implementing their chosen solutions.

This book sets out to explore the formation of the Baghdad Pact and Anglo-American defence policies in the Middle East, 1950-1959.

A capacious history of decolonization, from the decline of empires to the era of globalization Empires, until recently, were everywhere. They shaped borders, stirred conflicts, and set the terms of international politics. With the collapse of empire came a fundamental reorganization of our world. Decolonization unfolded across territories as well as within them. Its struggles became internationalized and transnational, as much global campaigns of moral disarmament against colonial injustice as local contests of arms. In this expansive history, Martin Thomas tells the story of decolonization and its intrinsic link to globalization. He traces the connections between these two transformative processes: the end of formal empire and the acceleration of global integration, market reorganization, cultural exchange, and migration. The End of Empires and a World Remade shows how profoundly decolonization shaped the process of globalization in the wake of empire collapse. In the second half of the twentieth century, decolonization catalyzed new international coalitions; it triggered partitions and wars; and it reshaped North-South dynamics. Globalization promised the decolonized greater access to essential resources, to wider networks of influence, and to worldwide audiences, but its neoliberal variant has reinforced economic inequalities and imperial forms of political and cultural influences. In surveying these two codependent histories across the world, from Latin America to Asia, Thomas explains why the deck was so heavily stacked against newly independent nations. Decolonization stands alongside the great world wars as the most transformative event of twentieth-century history. In The End of Empires and a World Remade, Thomas offers a masterful analysis of the greatest process of state-making (and empire-unmaking) in modern history.