Exhaustively researched account. Stalking the facts relentlessly in the official records of the United States and Australia, in unofficial reports and interviews, and in Japanese documents with the help of Commander Sadao Seno, the Warners have written what will remain for the foreseeable future the definitive history of the Battle of Savo Island.

Based on hitherto unavailable information from Allied and Japanese sources, this analysis, printed in 1950 as confidential material--since declassified, is an attempt to represent the outlook of the involved commanders on both sides. Because of the controversial nature of this Allied tactical defeat in night action, special attention is devoted to the Japanese and Allied preparations for the engagement, and a virtual minute-by-minute account of the operations of both forces from 7 through 9 August 1942 is provided. In Chapter XXIII, 'Battle Lessons, ' the decisions of the commanders are evaluated and constructive analytical criticism and corrective suggestions are offered.

A highly illustrated account of the series of naval battles around the embattled island of Guadalcanal in late 1942. The battle for Guadalcanal that lasted from August 1942 to February 1943 was the first major American counteroffensive against the Japanese in the Pacific. The battle of Savo Island on the night of 9 August 1942, saw the Japanese inflict a severe defeat on the Allied force, driving them away from Guadalcanal and leaving the just-landed marines in a perilously exposed position. This was the start of a series of night battles that culminated in the First and Second battles of Guadalcanal, fought on the nights of 13 and 15 November. One further major naval action followed, the battle of Tassafaronga on 30 November 1942, when the US Navy once again suffered a severe defeat, but this time it was too late to alter the course of the battle as the Japanese evacuated Guadalcanal in early February 1943. In this compact, engaging volume, Mark Stille examines the contrasting fortunes experienced by both sides over the intense course of naval battles around the island throughout the second half of 1942 that did so much to turn the tide in the Pacific.

As the United States enters into the 21st century, it will face new and different challenges that will be more complex than those encountered in the past. Evolutions in doctrine, training, and equipment modernization, influenced by informational and technological advances, will enhance U.S. ability to accomplish national objectives. Valuable lessons learned can be realized by studying past operations that failed to understand the threat and capitalize on friendly capabilities. The Battle of Savo Island in August 1942 is one such event. This short but violent naval engagement, a daring Japanese night surface attack conducted at the beginning of the Guadalcanal campaign on 9 August 1942, was a significant tactical victory for the Imperial Japanese Fleet and has been called the worst blue water defeat in the U.S. Navy's history. This study will address the shortcomings at Savo Island, particularly in terms of intelligence, command and control, training, force protection, and leadership and discuss these concepts as they apply to current and future operations in the 21st century.

As the United States enters into the 21st century, it will face new and different challenges that will be more complex than those encountered in the past. Evolutions in doctrine, training, and equipment modernization, influenced by informational and technological advances, will enhance U.S. ability to accomplish national objectives. Valuable lessons learned can be realized by studying past operations that failed to understand the threat and capitalize on friendly capabilities. The Battle of Savo Island in August 1942 is one such event. This short but violent naval engagement, a daring Japanese night surface attack conducted at the beginning of the Guadalcanal campaign on 9 August 1942, was a significant tactical victory for the Imperial Japanese Fleet and has been called the worst blue water defeat in the U.S. Navy’s history. This paper will address the shortcomings at Savo Island, particularly in terms of intelligence, command and control, training, force protection, and leadership and discuss these concepts as they apply to current and future operations in the 21st century.

As the United States enters into the 2 1st century, it will face new and different challenges that will be more complex than those encountered in the past. Evolutions in doctrine, training, and equipment modernization, influenced by informational and technological advances, will enhance U.S. ability to accomplish national objectives. Valuable lessons learned can be realized by studying past operations that failed to understand the threat and capitalize on friendly capabilities. The Battle of Savo Island in August 1942 is one such event. This short but violent naval engagement, a daring Japanese night surface attack conducted at the beginning of the Guadalcanal campaign on 9 August 1942, was a significant tactical victory for the Imperial Japanese Fleet and has been called the worst blue water defeat in the U.S. Navy's history. This study will address the shortcomings at Savo Island, particularly in terms of intelligence, command and control, training, force protection, and leadership and discuss these concepts as they apply to current and future operations in the 21st century.

Based on hitherto unavailable information from Allied and Japanese sources, this analysis, printed in 1950 as confidential material--since declassified, is an attempt to represent the outlook of the involved commanders on both sides. Because of the controversial nature of this Allied tactical defeat in night action, special attention is devoted to the Japanese and Allied preparations for the engagement, and a virtual minute-by-minute account of the operations of both forces from 7 through 9 August 1942 is provided. In Chapter XXIII, 'Battle Lessons, ' the decisions of the commanders are evaluated and constructive analytical criticism and corrective suggestions are offered.