This is a study of the Second Battle of Fallujah, also known as Operation Al-Fajr and Operation Phantom Fury. Over the course of November and December 2004, the I Marine Expeditionary Force conducted a grueling campaign to clear the city of Fallujah of insurgents and end its use as a base for the anticoalition insurgency in western Iraq. The battle involved units from the Marine Corps, Army, and Iraqi military and constituted one of the largest engagements of the Iraq War. The study is based on interviews conducted by Marine Corps History Division field historians of battle participants and archival material. The book will be of primary interest to Marines, other service members, policy makers, and the faculty and students at the service schools and academies. Historians, veterans, high school through univeristy history departments and students as well as libraries may be interested in this book as well. With full color maps and photographs.

The U.S. Marine Corps' war in Vietnam was a mixtureof large-scale conventional battles against mainViet Cong and North Vietnamese Army (NVA)units and smaller pacification operations designed to securethe South Vietnamese population from Communist insurgents.During the latter half of 1965, Marine forces foughtrepeated engagements against large Viet Cong units, mostnotably the 1st Viet Cong Regiment. The first battle, a fight inAugust to secure the area around Chu Lai called OperationStarlite, inflicted significant casualties upon this force. However,within just a few months, the Communist unit reconstituteditself, forcing the Marines to launch another operationto destroy the formation in December. The Marines codenamedthis action Operation Harvest Moon.Operation Harvest Moon has largely been overlooked inhistories of the Vietnam War. While Operation Starlite wasconsidered a major success and a clear demonstration of thesuperiority of America's conventional military forces comparedto the Viet Cong, Harvest Moon was less decisive.The following year, the Marine Corps' attention also beganto shift north toward the demilitarized zone (DMZ) as moreregular North Vietnamese combat forces put pressure on theMarines' area of operations. Consequently, the battle wasovershadowed by larger engagements.Nevertheless, the operation was important for a numberof reasons. Harvest Moon was the Marines' last large-scale,conventional operation of 1965 in Vietnam. Fought in thevalleys and hills between the city of Tam Ky and the inlandoutpost of Hiep Duc, it was the largest combined operationbetween Marine units and the South Vietnamese militaryto that date. Perhaps most importantly, the battle demonstratedmany of the frustrations and problems faced by allthe American forces in South Vietnam as they tried to defeatthe Viet Cong-led insurgency. The disparity in the fightingabilities between the Marines and South Vietnamese Armyunits hindered combat effectiveness. The lack of coordinationbetween the two forces, and between the Marine Corpsand U.S. Air Force, also led to heavy losses on the allied side.Enjoying logistical support from North Vietnam, the 1st VietCong Regiment was able to defeat South Vietnamese forceswhile largely evading American units.

Includes more than 30 photos, maps and plans This study examines a counterinsurgency campaign conducted during the Iraq War between the fall of 2005 and spring of 2006 in the district of al-Qaim on the Syrian border. In many ways, the struggle to clear and hold the district marked a turning point for the U.S. Marines fighting to bring security and stability to al-Anbar Province. The tactics and procedures utilized by the Marines of Regimental Combat Team 2 as well as its numerous supporting units served as a model for future operations in 2006 and 2007. The Iraq War began in 2003 with a lightning quick assault by Coalition forces that toppled Saddam Hussein’s Ba’athist regime within a matter of weeks. During the months immediately following the overthrow of the old regime, a lack of adequate security forces and indecision among policy makers rapidly led to a collapse of order and stability. By the summer a broad insurgency conducted by former regime loyalists, criminals, and Islamic fundamentalist fighters had broken out against the U.S. occupation of the country. The U.S.’ initial goal of creating an independent, democratic government was superseded by the more basic and pressing need to establish a secure and stable Iraqi state. The lack of a unified approach to U.S. strategy in Iraq meant that it often fell to the commanders of smaller units (brigades, regiments, and battalions) to devise an effective means for defeating the insurgency in their particular areas of responsibility. It was in this type of operating environment that the commander of Regimental Combat Team 2, Colonel Stephen W. Davis, and one of his battalion commanders, Lieutenant Colonel Julian D. Alford of 3d Battalion, 6th Marines, undertook a concerted campaign to clear and secure al-Qaim District in western Iraq.

Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the U.S.-led coalition military operation in Iraq, was launched on March 20, 2003, with the goal of removing Saddam Hussein¿s regime and destroying its ability to use weapons of mass destruction. The focus of OIF has shifted from regime removal to helping the Gov¿t. of Iraq improve security, establish a system of governance, and foster economic development. This report addresses these policy issues: Identifying how U.S. national interests and strategic objectives, in Iraq and the region, should guide further U.S. engagement; Monitoring and evaluating the impact of the changes in the U.S. presence and role in Iraq; and Laying the groundwork for a traditional bilateral relationship. Map. A print on demand report.

Making history useful to the reader - this is one of the missions of the Combat Studies Institute. We strive to produce works that recount historical events to inform decision makers and to enable experiential learning. This collection of events put together by John McGrath, which occurred in Iraq during the 2003-2005 timeframe, addresses that mission.

This cogent global history traces the evolution of land warfare since the start of the Crimean War. Jeremy Black argues that although it has always been critical to the outcome of conflicts worldwide, land warfare has become undervalued in comparison to air power in modern military thinking. In practice, land warfare was crucial during the American Civil War, the two world wars, and the conflicts of the Cold War. Indeed, the revival of great power confrontation has led to an urgent need to re-examine the entire contemporary period. Looking to the future, the book shows convincingly that we must consider the nature of the military for non-state actors as well for as the major powers.Ultimately, Black contends, there is no substitute for the control over territory provided by boots on the ground.

This paper clearly shows the immediate relevancy of historical study to current events. One of the most common criticisms of the U.S. plan to invade Iraq in 2003 is that too few troops were used. The argument often fails to satisfy anyone for there is no standard against which to judge. A figure of 20 troops per 1000 of the local population is often mentioned as the standard, but as McGrath shows, that figure was arrived at with some questionable assumptions. By analyzing seven military operations from the last 100 years, he arrives at an average number of military forces per 1000 of the population that have been employed in what would generally be considered successful military campaigns. He also points out a variety of important factors affecting those numbers-from geography to local forces employed to supplement soldiers on the battlefield, to the use of contractors-among others.

Volume 5, Deep Maneuver: Historical Case Studies of Maneuver in Large-Scale Combat Operations, presents eleven case studies from World War II through Operation Iraqi Freedom focusing on deep maneuver in terms of time, space and purpose. Deep operations require boldness and audacity, and yet carry an element of risk of overextension - especially in light of the independent factors of geography and weather that are ever-present. As a result, the case studies address not only successes, but also failure and shortfalls that result when conducting deep operations. The final two chapters address these considerations for future Deep Maneuver.