From a Nietzschean perspective, the author disputes the often-postulated lineage between Nietzsche and Derrida. Peter Bornedal argues instead that they have very different epistemological programs: the deconstructionist and postmodernist projects undermine beliefs in reason and logic in a manner that cannot be found in Nietzsche.

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The term “scientism” is used in several ways. It is used to denote an epistemological thesis according to which science is the source of our knowledge about the world and ourselves. Relatedly, it is used to denote a methodological thesis according to which the methods of science are superior to the methods of non-scientific fields or areas of inquiry. It is also used to put forward a metaphysical thesis that what exists is what science says exists. In recent decades, the term “scientism” has acquired a derogatory meaning when it is used in defense of non-scientific ways of knowing. In particular, some philosophers level the charge of “scientism” against those (mostly scientists) who are dismissive of philosophy. Other philosophers, however, embrace scientism, or some variant thereof, and object to the pejorative use of the term. This book critically examines arguments for and against different varieties of scientism in order to answer the central question: Does scientism pose an existential threat to academic philosophy? Or should philosophy become more scientific?

In a series of ten articles from leading American and European scholars, Pragmatist Epistemologies explores the central themes of epistemology in the pragmatist tradition through a synthesis of new and old pragmatist thought, engaging contemporary issues while exploring from a historical perspective. It opens a new avenue of research in contemporary pragmatism continuous with the main figures of pragmatist tradition and incorporating contemporary trends in philosophy. Students and scholars of American philosophy will find this book indispensable.

What is the epistemological value of testimony? What role does language, images, and memory play in its construction? What is the relationship between the person who attests and those who listen? Is bearing witness a concept that is exclusively based in interpersonal relations? Or are there other modes of communicating or mediating to constitute a constellation of testimony? Testimony/Bearing Witness establishes a dialogue between the different approaches to testimony in epistemology, historiography, law, art, media studies and psychiatry. With examples including the Holocaust, the Khmer Rouge Killing Fields and the Armenian genocide the volume discusses the chances and limits of communicating epistemological and ethical, philosophical and cultural-historical, past and present perspectives on the phenomenon and concept of bearing witness.

Nietzsche’s Naturalist Deconstruction of Truth: A World Fragmented in Late Nineteenth-Century Epistemology offers a new interpretation of Nietzsche’s discussions of truth and knowledge, covering the period from his early essay “On Truth and Lies in an Extra-Moral Sense” to his late notebooks. It places these discussions in the context of the neo-Kantian, Naturalist, Positivist, and Pragmatic schools influential in Nietzsche’s late nineteenth-century Europe. Peter Bornedal argues for a view of Nietzsche’s epistemological thought as an elaboration of this paradigm: proposing ideas that are anti-metaphysical and anti-theological in their polemic orientation, and in general promoting new scientific naturalist ideals in the discussions of knowledge. Bornedal suggests that the rational pursuit of these new ideals to the unencumbered mind logically leads to Nihilism in its most profound epistemological sense. Nietzsche’s “critique of metaphysics” is thus seen as having sprung from sources different from and, at times, in patent opposition to more recent postmodern and deconstructionist critiques. This book contextualizes Nietzsche in relation to a number of philosophical peers and juxtaposes him to contemporary thinkers in a way that resolves some of the difficulties that have plagued recent Nietzsche scholarship.

How has technology changed what it means to be human and to be a member of a human society? How has technology changed the way we acquire knowledge of the world we inhabit? In light of these changes and the direction we are moving, how should the pursuit of knowledge be organized? Social Epistemology and Technology provides insights into such questions relating to public self-awareness regarding technology. The concerns addressed in this book apply to a large and diverse audience including, but not limited to, those interested in social epistemology, technology, cultural studies, trans-humanism, augmented subjectivity, futurology, human sciences, social sciences, political sciences, communication, psychology, science and technology studies, and philosophy. This is the first book of its kind to focus solely on technology and its socially specific epistemological themes. It offers insight into public self-awareness regarding technology by providing an understanding of persons in relation to the technological changes that have occurred, and continue to occur, across the societies they people.

This book develops new ideas in feminist epistemology by exploring diverse and sometimes positive roles for ignorance. The author argues that epistemic values cannot simply be reduced to the value of increasing knowledge and that ignorance is not merely inescapable for epistemic agents, but, rather, is valuable. She shows that ignorance-friendly epistemology offers a better descriptive and normative account of human epistemic practices. --publisher.

Current academic philosophy is being challenged from several angles. Subdisciplinary specialisations often make it challenging to articulate philosophy’s relevance for the societal questions of our day.Additionally, the success of the ‘scientific method’ puts pressure on philosophers to articulate their methods and specify how these can be successful. How does philosophical progress come about? What can philosophy contribute to our understanding of today’s world? Moreover, can it also contribute to resolving urgent societal challenges, such as anthropogenic climate change? This edited volume evaluates the place of philosophy in the age of science. It addresses three related sub-themes: philosophical progress, philosophical method and philosophy’s societal relevance. Fourteen authors engage with these sub-themes, focusing on the topics of their philosophical expertise, such as the philosophy of religion, evolutionary ethics and the nature of free will. In doing so, they explore their methods of enquiry, and look at how progress in their research comes about.

This book offers a comprehensive overview of the arguments relating to the extent and manner to which social influences enable epistemic agents.