This book provides information on the issue of the capabilities and affordability of the FCS program. The Future Combat System (FCS) is the U.S. Army's multi-year, multi-billion dollar program at the heart of the Army's transformation efforts. It is the Army's major research, development, and acquisition program consisting of 14 manned and unmanned systems tied together by an extensive communications and information network. The FCS program exists in a dynamic national security environment which could significantly influence the program's outcome. The primary issues presented to 110th Congress are the capabilities and affordability of the FCS program, and the likelihood, given a myriad of factors, that the Army will be able to field its first FCS-equipped brigade by 2014 and eventually field up to 15 FCS-equipped brigades. This book will address a variety of issues including the program's timeline, budget, program management issues, current program developmental progress and challenges, and FCS's relevance in the current and potential future security environments.

This is a print on demand edition of a hard to find publication. The Future Combat System (FCS) was a multi-year, multi-billion dollar program at the heart of the Army¿s transformation efforts. It was to be the Army¿s major R&D, and acquisition program consisting of 14 manned and unmanned systems tied together by an extensive commun. and info. network. The FCS program has been characterized as a high-risk venture due to the advanced technologies involved and the challenge of networking all of the FCS subsystems together. Contents of this report: (1) Program Origins; (2) Program Overview; Current FCS Program Status; Army¿s Modernization Strategy; Budget Issues; (3) Issues for Congress: MGV Cancellation; Army Modernization Strategy and Spin Outs; Proposed Ground Combat Vehicles. Illustrations.

The U.S. Army's Future Combat Systems program aimed to field an ambitious system of systems, with novel technologies integrated via an advanced wireless network. The largest and most ambitious planned acquisition program in the Army's history, it was cancelled in 2009, and some of its efforts transitioned to follow-on programs. This report documents the program's complex history and draws lessons from its experiences.

The Future Combat System (FCS) is the U.S. Army's multiyear, multibilliondollar program at the heart of the Army's transformation efforts. It is to be the Army's major research, development, and acquisition program consisting of 18 manned and unmanned systems tied together by an extensive communications and information network. FCS is intended to replace such current systems as the M-1 Abrams tank and the M-2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicle with advanced, networked combat systems. The FCS program has been characterized by the Army and others as a high- risk venture due to the advanced technologies involved as well as the challenge of networking all of the FCS subsystems together so that FCSequipped units can function as intended. The FCS program exists in a dynamic national security environment which could significantly influence the program's outcome. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and potential defense budget cuts could play a role in shaping the FCS program. The revised FCS program timeline -- including four "Spin-Outs" whereby equipment is to be tested first by a FCS evaluation brigade and then introduced into the current force -- has extended the program's timeline by four years and has added additional funding requirements, but it has also served to reduce some of the risk associated with this admittedly high-risk venture. The overall FCS program budget has risen steadily since the program's inception and because the program is still in its early stages, its full costs are not yet known. The FCS program is managed by a lead systems integrator group consisting of major defense contractors Boeing and Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC). Although widely criticized, the Army adopted this program management approach because it maintains it did not have the required acquisition, scientific, and engineering staff to manage a program of this complexity and scope. The program's recent conversion from an Other Transaction Authority (OTA) agreement to a Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) contract -- in part due to congressional pressure -- raises concerns regarding increasing program costs as well as the Army's ability to take on a larger role in overseeing and executing this highly complex and technologically risky program. The FCS is experiencing a number of program development issues - with some technologies advancing quicker than anticipated, others progressing along predicted lines, while still others not meeting the Army's expectations. Congress, in its authorization, appropriation, and oversight roles may wish to review the FCS program in terms of its capabilities and program costs. This report will be updated as the situation warrants.

The Future Combat System (FCS) is the U.S. Army's multiyear, multibillion- dollar program at the heart of the Army's transformation efforts. It is to be the Army's major research, development, and acquisition program consisting of 18 manned and unmanned systems tied together by an extensive communications and information network. FCS is intended to replace such current systems as the M-1 Abrams tank and the M-2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicle with advanced, networked combat systems. The FCS program has been characterized by the Army and others as a high-risk venture due to the advanced technologies involved as well as the challenge of networking all of the FCS subsystems together so that FCS-equipped units can function as intended. The FCS program exists in a dynamic national security environment which could significantly influence the program's outcome. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and potential defense budget cuts could play a role in shaping the FCS program. The revised FCS program timeline including four "Spin-Outs" whereby equipment is to be tested first by a FCS evaluation brigade and then introduced into the current force has extended the program's timeline by four years and has added additional finding requirements, but it has also served to reduce some of the risk associated with this admittedly high-risk venture.

In today's environment of rapidly evolving conflicts, the Army's goal is to have units that have the combat power of heavy units but that can be transported anywhere in the world in a matter of days. To address concerns about the armored vehicle fleet's aging and the difficulties involved in transporting it as well as to equip the Army more suitably to conduct operations overseas on short notice using forces based in the United States the service created the Future Combat Systems (FCS) program in 2000. A major modernization effort, the program is designed in part to develop and purchase vehicles to replace those now in the heavy forces; the new vehicles would be much lighter, thereby easing the deployment of units equipped with them. In the analysis presented in this report, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) examined the current status of the Army's fleet of armored vehicles and assessed the speed of deployment of the service's heavy forces. It also evaluated the FCS program, considering the program's costs as well as its advantages and disadvantages and comparing it with several alternative plans for modernizing the Army's heavy forces.

Issues Facing the Army's Future Combat Systems Program

GAO-03-1010R Issues Facing the Army's Future Combat Systems Program

Roughly half of the Army's combat forces at the end of 2005 were so-called heavy units-forces that are equipped with armored vehicles and that provide significant firepower. To support those units, the Army maintains a fleet of approximately 28,000 armored vehicles. Now that the Cold War is over, some defense experts have questioned the relevance of such vehicles to the current national security strategy and their continued usefulness (notwithstanding their contributions to recent operations, such as Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom). The average age of the armored combat vehicle fleet at the end of 2005 was relatively high, and the fleet comprises vehicles designed several decades ago. Moreover, units equipped with the vehicles in the current fleet are too large and too heavy to be moved overseas easily and quickly by the Air Force's C-17s, the most numerous of its long-range transport planes. For all practical purposes, heavy units must be transported overseas by ship-a process that takes weeks. In today's environment of rapidly evolving conflicts, the Army's goal is to have units that have the combat power of heavy units but that can be transported anywhere in the world in a matter of days. To address concerns about the armored vehicle fleet's aging and the difficulties involved in transporting it-as well as to equip the Army more suitably to conduct operations overseas on short notice using forces based in the United States-the service created the Future Combat Systems (FCS) program in 2000. A major modernization effort, the program is designed in part to develop and purchase vehicles to replace those now in the heavy forces; the new vehicles would be much lighter, thereby easing the deployment of units equipped with them. But the FCS program, poised to develop a total of 18 new systems (including eight manned vehicles to replace those in the Army's current armored fleet) and a network to connect them all will not field any new vehicles until December 2014 at the earliest. Furthermore, because those new vehicles will be expensive, the Army plans to buy relatively small quantities of them each year. As a result, the armored vehicles now in the Army's combat units will not all be replaced by FCS components until after 2035, a prospect that has evoked concerns about the costs of maintaining those older vehicles and upgrading them to prevent their becoming obsolete. In addition, questions have been raised about the FCS program's technical feasibility and affordability. Some experts doubt that the Army can develop and test the necessary technologies in time to start producing lightweight manned vehicles by 2012-a requisite for meeting the deadline to field them according to the Army's current schedule. Another concern is funding for the quantities of FCS equipment that the Army is now planning to buy. Any reduction in the FCS procurement rate would force the Army to retain its already aging armored vehicles even longer and to invest more funds in their maintenance.