Today, we tend to react skeptically to claims about our access to the animal mind, the political importance of compassion, and the natural origins of community. However, such claims were widespread in the Restoration and eighteenth century, the long Age of Sensibility. Even so famous a skeptic as the Enlightenment philosopher David Hume wrote that animals undoubtedly feel, think, love, hate, will, and even reason. In "The Animal Claim," Tobias Menely shows that for Hume and other thinkers of his time, the acknowledgment of creaturely voice was crucial to their theories of community. Looking primarily to the long eighteenth century in Britain, Menely argues that sympathyincluding sympathy with animalscame to be regarded as a foundational resource of social relation, and that it fell to poets, in particular, to represent creaturely voice in the public sphere. Menely connects this development to new ideas of political community in Britain and the emergence of a viable discourse of animal rights in the age of legislative reform. The result is an original contribution to both animal studies and eighteenth-century scholarship."

This unique book establishes potential future avenues within the law to enhance the welfare of animals and grant them recognised legal status. Charting the direction of the animal-human relationship for future generations, it explores the core concepts of property law to demonstrate how change is possible for domestic animals. As an ethical context for future developments the concept of a ‘right of place’ is proposed and developed.

Do all animals have rights? Is it morally wrong to use mice or dogs in medical research, or rabbits and cows as food? How ought we resolve conflicts between the interests of humans and those of other animals? Philosophical inquiry is essential in addressing such questions; the answers given must have enormous practical importance. Here for the first time in the same volume, the animal rights debate is argued deeply and fully by the two most articulate and influential philosophers representing the opposing camps. Each makes his case in turn to the opposing case. The arguments meet head on: Are we humans morally justified in using animals as we do? A vexed and enduring controversy here receives its deepest and most eloquent exposition.

THE argument for animal rights, a classic since its appearance in 1983, from the moral philosophical point of view. With a new preface.

A fresh view of animals and what we owe them. Do animals have moral standing? Do they count, morally speaking? In Animal Rights, Mark Rowlands argues that they do and explores the implications of this idea. He identifies three different waves in animal rights writing. The first wave was defined by a traditional dispute between utilitarianism (represented by Peter Singer) and rights-based approaches (represented by Tom Regan) to ethics. The second wave was defined by an expansion in a conception of ethics, which saw utilitarian and rights-based approaches supplemented by other ethical traditions, including contractualism, virtue ethics, and care ethics. The third wave was defined by an expansion in our conception of animals, driven by exciting new developments in the field of comparative psychology. Each of these waves had ramifications for how we understand the moral status of animals, but, this book argues, and reinforces, the core idea that animals deserve moral respect. In earlier waves, discussions of animal ethics had been focused on the issue of animal suffering. But the third wave is defined by the idea that animals are far more than merely sufferers or enjoyers of experiences but are instead authors of their own lives: creatures capable of choosing how to live, shaped by a conception of their life and how they would like it to go. Rowlands writes that, no matter what moral theory you choose, the most plausible version of that theory entails that animals have moral standing and that our obligations to them are far more substantial than many of us care to acknowledge.

In a world increasingly concerned with the human species and its future, Marian Stamp Dawkins argues that we need to rethink some of the fundamental questions regarding animal welfare. How are we justified in projecting human emotions on to animals? What kind of mental lives do they have? What can science tell us about their quality of life?

At the same time, he argues that humans have a greater interest in life and liberty than most species of nonhuman animals.

This book considers the efficacy of the common regulatory model of the licensing regime as a means of regulating animal use in England, with a particular focus on wild animals and the regime’s ability to ensure animal welfare needs are met. Using information gleaned from over 550 inspection reports relating to the period 2008 through 2019, obtained using FOI Act requests, the book analyses the extent to which animals used by these industries are protected by law. Tyson analyses the limitations present in the practical application of English legislation responsible for creating a number of relevant licensing regimes.The regimes discussed include: The Zoo Licensing Act 1981, the now repealed Welfare of Wild Animals in Travelling Circuses Regulations 2012, and the Animal Welfare (Licensing of Activities Involving Animals) Regulations 2018, introduced under the Animal Welfare Act 2006. Exploring the weakness in the use of this type of regulatory model, Tyson proposes compelling recommendations for change in future policy development. Making an important contribution to the question of enforcement of animal welfare laws, this book provides useful and original insights into the implementation of licensing regimes, and will be of particular interest to scholars of animal welfare law, animal ethics, and critical animal studies.

Those who believe in God often puzzle over how God could permit evil and suffering in the world. Nature Red in Tooth and Claw focuses specifically on non-human animal suffering, and whether or not it raises problems for belief in the existence of a perfectly good creator.

Argues that the way humans treat animals results from the contradiction between the ideas that animals have some rights, but that they are also property, and offers ways to resolve the conflict.