Have you ever heard of the American occupation of the Rhineland after World War I? When the war in Europe was over on November 11th, 1918, an American Army of Occupation comprising 250,000 men started moving from France towards the east. Their destination: The Rhine. In the armistice, Germany had granted the victorious powers the right to occupy the Rhineland. And so it happened that thousands and thousands of young Americans came to a land full of castles, vineyards and centuries-old traditions. In their headquarters in Koblenz, the American Army of Occupation controlled large areas along the rivers Rhine and Mosel. Not only did they get to know the local customs, they also brought their own culture with them. Donuts, baseball or American football became a common thing in the Rhineland. And last but not least, there were the German Fräuleins that attracted the young Americans. Only in 1923, the last occupation troops left the Rhineland. Today, this part of German-American history is almost completely forgotten. The German historian Marc Holzheimer intends to change this. In his book, he retells the story of the American Occupation of the Rhineland. It covers the events along Rhine and Mosel as well as the political context in international affairs. Furthermore, the book contains plenty of contemporary photographs, which allow the reader to get a real impression of the occupation time. The American Occupation of the Rhineland, 1918-1923 - worth reading for anyone who is interested in history!

America's involvement in WWI marked its first major entry into European politics. The final cost of that involvement required the U.S. to supply a force to occupy part of the German Rhineland after the war. The force provided was first known as Third Army and then later as the American Forces in Germany (AFG). It consisted of the best divisions in the American Army. With a starting strength of a quarter million doughboys, the Americans marched to the Rhine and began their occupation period in December 1918. When the American phase of the occupation ended in 1923, the force consisted of one thousand soldiers. Many future WWII leaders of the Army and Marine Corps served in this force; including five who would become Marine Commandant, four Army Chiefs of Staff, ten four-star Generals, and, surprisingly, a National Football League Head coach.

The American Army in Germany, 1918–1923: Success against the Odds by Dean A. Nowowiejski fills a gap in American military and political history through thorough research and a compelling narrative of the Rhineland occupation. After the armistice ended the fighting on the Western Front in World War I, the US Third Army marched into the American occupation zone around the city of Koblenz, Germany, in December 1918. American forces remained there as part of an “inter-Allied” coalition until early 1923. Nowowiejski reintroduces us to a successful military diplomat, Major General Henry T. Allen, who faced two major challenges: build an efficient army and handle the complexity of working with the Allied powers of France, Britain, and Belgium in the Inter-Allied Rhineland High Commission (IARHC). Allen’s ability to balance the interests of the French with those of the occupied Germans made him an indispensable participant in the High Commission. As the French sought revenge and added security against Germany, Allen moderated their actions with diplomatic skill. When the French sent forces into Germany in 1920 and 1921, Allen ensured that the US zone around Koblenz remained free of French interference. These achievements were without the support of the administration, and Congress had no desire to take part in European affairs. Allen also had to create a competent American army in the Rhineland so that the Allied powers and the Germans would respect American views and interests. He successfully took a large number of new recruits, who replaced World War I combat veterans, and molded them into a professional fighting force. As a result, the American Forces in Germany became an exemplar for the entire US Army and a symbol to the Allies and Germans of American power and resolve. This force competently accomplished the difficult task of postwar occupation according to the highest international standards. The US administration made the decision in 1922 to radically cut back the size of Allen’s army, and in 1923 to remove all US troops from Germany. The author analyzes this withdrawal as a “missed opportunity” for US leverage on diplomatic developments in Europe.

In January 1923 French and Belgian forces occupied Germany's Ruhr District and seized its prime industrial assets in lieu of unpaid reparations. This unilateral attempt to enforce the crumbling Versailles settlement precipitated a wider struggle for long-term control of Western Germany andultimately for the very survival of the Weimar Republic. The Ruhr Crisis is the first comprehensive account of a definitive and mutually self-defeating confrontation, which marked one of the great untold tragedies of European history yet, paradoxically, sowed the seeds of Franco-Germanreconciliation after 1949. It demonstrates how and why the people of the Ruhr waged a grass-roots mass campaign of passive resistance against the invaders, and evaluates the human and political price of their ultimate failure. To this end, the author exploits a broad range of local and regionalsources, many for the first time, to bring together the high politics of the crisis and intimate, often disturbing, accounts of the daily struggle in the mines, towns, and villages of the Ruhr. It is a ground-breaking contribution to the history of inter-war Germany.

The St. Mihiel salient, created during the initial German invasion in 1914, had withstood multiple French efforts to regain the territory. Yet even though the Germans had established strong defensive positions around St. Mihiel and its neighboring villages and towns, the salient was highly vulnerable to attack and was an optimal target for a potential American operation. Until this point in the war, members of the American Expeditionary Forces had not fought in a formation larger than a corps, and then only under French or British leadership. Now, as part of the American First Army under General John J. Pershing, they prepared to launch an offensive that would demonstrate to the Allies and the Germans alike that the Americans were capable of operating as an independent command. The AEF's successful efforts in the St. Mihiel Offensive, and the hard-won operational and tactical lessons that it learned during the battle, helped set the stage for the grand Allied offensive that would seize the initiative on the Western Front and blaze a path toward ultimate victory in the war.

John Maynard Keynes, then a rising young economist, participated in the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 as chief representative of the British Treasury and advisor to Prime Minister David Lloyd George. He resigned after desperately trying and failing to reduce the huge demands for reparations being made on Germany. The Economic Consequences of the Peace is Keynes' brilliant and prophetic analysis of the effects that the peace treaty would have both on Germany and, even more fatefully, the world.