Terrorist Watch List Screening: Recommendations to Enhance Management Oversight, Reduce Potential Screening Vulnerabilities, and Expand Use of the List

Contents: (1) Introduction; (2) Background: HSPD-6 and Terrorist Screening: NCTC and Terrorist Ident.; TSC and Terrorist Watch-Listing and Screening; (3) CBP and TSA and International Air Passenger Pre-screening: CBP and Advanced Passenger Info. System (APIS); APIS Pre-departure/Pre-arrival Final Rule; (4) TSA ¿No Fly¿ and ¿Automatic Selectee¿ Watchlists; Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS); CAPPS and Checked Baggage Screening; CAPPS and Passenger Screening at Airport Security Checkpoints; TSA Secure Flight Program; (5) Misidentifications: Disclosure Under FOIA and Privacy Act; DHS Redress Mechanisms; (6) Fair, Accurate, Secure, and Timely Redress Act of 2009; (7) Issues for Congress. Illustrations.

Membership in a terrorist organization does not prohibit a person from possessing firearms or explosives under current federal law. However, for homeland security and other purposes, the FBI is notified when a firearm or explosives background check involves an individual on the terrorist watchlist. This statement addresses: (1) how many checks have resulted in matches with the terrorist watchlist; (2) how the FBI uses information from these checks for counterterrorism purposes; and (3) pending legislation that would give the Attorney General authority to deny certain checks. Includes recommendations. Charts and tables.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) maintains a consolidated watch list of known or appropriately suspected terrorists and sends records from the list to agencies to support terrorism-related screening. Because the list is an important tool for combating terrorism, GAO examined (1) standards for including individuals on the list, (2) the outcomes of encounters with individuals on the list, (3) potential vulnerabilities and efforts to address them, and (4) actions taken to promote effective terrorism-related screening. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed documentation obtained from and interviewed officials at TSC, the FBI, the National Counterterrorism Center, the Department of Homeland Security, and other agencies that perform terrorism-related screening.

The Dec. 25, 2009, attempted bombing of flight 253 raised questions about the federal government's ability to protect the homeland and secure the commercial aviation system. This statement focuses on the government's efforts to use the terrorist watchlist to screen individuals and determine if they pose a threat, and how failures in this process contributed to the Dec. 25 attempted attack. This statement also addresses the Transportation Security Admin.'s (TSA) planned deployment of technologies for enhanced explosive detection and the challenges associated with this deployment. Charts and tables.

The FBI and designated state and local criminal justice agencies use the FBI's Nat. Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS) to conduct background checks (BC) on individuals before gun dealers may transfer any firearm to an unlicensed individual. There is no basis to automatically prohibit a person from possessing firearms or explosives because they appear on the terrorist watch list (TWL). Rather, there must be a disqualifying factor, such as a felony conviction or illegal immigration status. This report addresses: (1) the number of NICS BC involving TWL records, and the FBI's current procedures for handling these BC; and (2) has the FBI collected info. from NICS BC involving TWL records and shared this info. with counterterrorism officials? Illus.

Digital Culture & Society is a refereed, international journal, fostering discussion about the ways in which digital technologies, platforms and applications reconfigure daily lives and practices. It offers a forum for inquiries into digital media theory, methodologies, and socio-technological developments. This issue presents empirical studies as well as theoretical and methodological reflections on inequalities and divides in digital cultures. From various (inter-)disciplinary perspectives, the authors examine three main themes - inequality of access, inequality by design and discursive divides, and inequality by algorithms - while suggesting ways for research to move beyond these.