There are 2 fed. material support statutes have been at the heart of the Justice Dept¿s. terrorist prosecution efforts. One provision outlaws providing material support for the commission of certain designated offenses that might be committed by terrorists. The other outlaws providing material support to certain terrorist org. They share a common definition of the term ¿material support,¿ some aspects of which have come under constitutional attack. Contents of this report: (1) Introduction; (2) Background; (3) Support of Designated Terrorist Org.: Attempt, Conspiracy, Aiding and Abetting; Material Support; Other Constitutional Challenges; Terrorist Org.; Consequences of Charge or Conviction; Extraterritorial Jurisdiction; Civil Actions; (4) Support of Terrorism.

Section 6603 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 amends two federal terrorist assistance prohibitions. Those amendments were to expire on December 31, 2006, P.L. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3762-764 (2004). P.L. 109-160 extended their expiration date until February 3, 2006, 119 Stat. 2957 (2005); P.L. 109-170 extended it yet again until March 10, 2006, 120 Stat. 3 (2006). Section 104 of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act and Terrorism Prevention Reauthorization Act (H.R. 3199), made the amendments permanent, P.L. 109-177, 120 Stat. 195 (2006). In their present form the amendments, found in section 6603 of the act: (1) amend the definitions of "material support or resources," "training," and "expert advice or assistance" as those terms are used in 18 U.S.C. 2339A and 2339B, and of "personnel" as used in section 2339B; (2) add a more explicit knowledge requirement to section 2339B; (3) expand the extraterritorial jurisdiction reach of section 2339B; (4) enlarge the list of federal crimes of terrorism, 18 U.S.C. 2332b(g)(5); (5) add the enlarged list to the inventory of predicate offenses for 18 U.S.C. 2339A (material support for the commission of certain terrorist crimes) and consequently for 18 U.S.C. 2339B (material support for designated terrorist organizations); and (6) preclude prosecution for certain violations committed with the approval of the Secretary of State and concurrence of the Attorney General (e.g., stings). This is an abbreviated version of CRS Report RL33035, Material Support of Terrorists and Foreign Terrorist Organizations: Sunset Amendments, without the footnotes, appendix, and some of the citations to authority found in the longer, parent report.

The material support statutes, 18 U.S.C. 2339A and 2339B, have been among the most frequently prosecuted federal anti-terrorism statutes. Section 2339A outlaws: (1)(a) attempting to, (b) conspiring to, or (c) actually (2)(a) providing material support or resources, or (b) concealing or disguising (i) the nature, (ii) location, (iii) source, or (iv) ownership of material support or resources (3) knowing or intending that they be used (a) in preparation for, (b) in carrying out, (c) in preparation for concealment of an escape from, or (d) in carrying out the concealment of an escape from (4) an offense identified as a federal crime of terrorism. Section 2339B outlaws: (1)(a) attempting to provide, (b) conspiring to provide, or (c) actually providing (2) material support or resources (3) to a foreign terrorist organization (4) knowing that the organization (a) has been designated a foreign terrorist organization, or (b) engages, or has engaged, in "terrorism" or "terrorist activity." The sections use a common definition for the term "material support or resources: " any service or tangible or intangible property. The Supreme Court recently held that the forms of material support in the challenge before it were not unconstitutionally vague nor was their proscription inconsistent with the ...

Section 6603 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) temporarily amended two federal terrorist assistance prohibitions. Those amendments expire on December 31, 2006, P.L. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3762-764 (2004). Under the provisions of H.R. 3199, as passed by the House, and S. 1389, as passed by the Senate, the amendments would become permanent. In response to court decisions that found certain of their central terms unconstitutionally vague, section 6603 amended the federal statutes that outlaw assistance to terrorists and foreign terrorist organizations, 18 U.S.C. 2339A, 2339B. Initial judicial reaction suggests they may still be considered vague. Section 6603 temporarily rejected a narrow construction of the knowledge requirements under section 2339B, an interpretation which might have dissipated any vagueness problems. Section 6603 expanded the overseas application of section 2339B as well. It permits federal prosecution of an act proscribed in section 2339B and committed entirely abroad by a foreign national if the offender can be brought to this country for trial. Section 2339A outlaws providing material support or resources with the intent that they be used for the commission of certain predicate terrorism offenses. Section 6603 enlarged the list of predicate offenses to include any federal crime of terrorism (18 U.S.C. 2332b(g)(5)(B)) and added two crimes to the list, 18 U.S.C. 1361 (destruction of federal property) and 18 U.S.C. 2156 (production of defective national defense material). Finally, section 6603 added an immunity provision under which an individual or entity who provides assistance in violation of section 2339B may not be prosecuted in certain instances if the offense was committed with the prior approval of the Secretary of State and the Attorney General.

The U.S. government's power to categorize individuals as terrorist suspects and therefore ineligible for certain long-standing constitutional protections has expanded exponentially since 9/11, all the while remaining resistant to oversight. Crimes of Terror: The Legal and Political Implications of Federal Terrorism Prosecutions provides a comprehensive and uniquely up-to-date dissection of the government's advantages over suspects in criminal prosecutions of terrorism, which are driven by a preventive mindset that purports to stop plots before they can come to fruition. It establishes the background for these controversial policies and practices and then demonstrates how they have impeded the normal goals of criminal prosecution, even in light of a competing military tribunal model. Proceeding in a linear manner from the investigatory stage of a prosecution on through to sentencing, the book documents the emergence of a "terrorist exceptionalism" to normal rules of criminal law and procedure and questions whether the government has overstated the threat posed by the individuals it charges with these crimes. Included is a discussion of the large-scale spying and use of informants rooted in the questionable "radicalization" theory; the material support statute--the government's chief legal tool in bringing criminal prosecutions; the new rules regarding generation of evidence and the broad construction of that evidence as relevant at trial; and a look at the special sentencing and confinement regimes for those convicted of terrorist crimes. In this critical examination of terrorism prosecutions in federal court, Professor Said reveals a phenomenon at odds with basic constitutional protections for criminal defendants.

Jimmy Gurulé knows how to bankrupt terrorists like few others do. As Undersecretary of the Treasury for Enforcement, he spearheaded the fight against al-Qaeda s global bank accounts, helping to earn the highest grade awarded on the 9/11 Commissioners report card. As an author, he performs once again. Unfunding Terror provides policymakers and laymen alike a clear roadmap on how to keep terrorists out of the global financial system. Timothy J. Roemer, Center for National Policy, former US Congressman and member of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Commission) Jimmy Gurulé has given us a superbly comprehensive and well-written assessment of why, regarding terrorism, Deep Throat s principle is bang on: follow the money. R. James Woolsey, venture partner, VantagePoint, and former Director of Central Intelligence, US A detailed study by a true scholar-practitioner, Unfunding Terror explains the legal response to terror finance in language accessible to both the expert and layman. Required reading. Matthew Levitt, Director, Stein Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy and former Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Intelligence and Analysis, US Professor Gurulé is comprehensive: he describes the problem (terrorist funding by those in the free world), analyzes the legal responses (make it a crime, freeze terrorist assets, impose regulations on financial institutions), critiques the administration s and international community s efforts to unfund terrorists (political rhetoric, not in fact backed up with effective strategies or implementation), and outlines concrete legal and administrative remedies. Would that they to whom the recommendations are addressed act on them quickly. Too much is at stake to let terrorists, who condemn the West as corrupt, get their funding to attack the US and its allies from the West itself. That would be a form of social suicide. G. Robert Blakey, Notre Dame Law School, US The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks that claimed the lives of 2,973 innocent civilians required as much as $500,000 to stage. At the time, al Qaeda was operating on an annual budget of between $30 and $50 million. However, despite the obvious fact that terrorists need money to terrorize, preventing the financing of terrorism was not a priority for the United States or the international community prior to 9/11. Jimmy Gurulé, former Under Secretary for Enforcement in the US Department of the Treasury, provides the first book-length, comprehensive analysis of the legal regime that evolved following the terrorist attacks. The book begins with a discussion of how shutting down the pipelines of funding is as important as dismantling the terrorist cells themselves. Next, the book covers the various means and methods used by terrorist groups to raise money, and examines how money is transferred globally to finance their lethal activities. The principal components of the legal strategy to disrupt the financing of terrorism are then discussed and evaluated. Unfortunately, the author concludes that the legal regime has met with mixed results, and finds that the sense of urgency to deprive terrorists of funding that existed following 9/11 has since dissipated. As a result, international efforts to freeze terrorist assets have dramatically declined. Moreover, the US Department of Justice has suffered several embarrassing and disappointing legal defeats in prosecuting major terrorist financiers. The author provides numerous recommendations to Congress, the Executive Branch, and the UN Security Council for strengthening the legal regime to deny terrorists the money needed to wage global jihad, acquire weapons of mass destruction, and launch another terrorist attack on the scale of 9/11. Unfunding Terror fills an important gap in the literature and will be essential reading for counter-terrorism experts, law enforcement and national se

How does a group that operates terror cells and espouses violence become a ruling political party? How is the world to understand and respond to Hamas, the militant Islamist organization that Palestinian voters brought to power in the stunning election of January 2006? This important book provides the most fully researched assessment of Hamas ever written. Matthew Levitt, a counterterrorism expert with extensive field experience in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza, draws aside the veil of legitimacy behind which Hamas hides. He presents concrete, detailed evidence from an extensive array of international intelligence materials, including recently declassified CIA, FBI, and Department of Homeland Security reports. Levitt demolishes the notion that Hamas’ military, political, and social wings are distinct from one another and catalogues the alarming extent to which the organization’s political and social welfare leaders support terror. He exposes Hamas as a unitary organization committed to a militant Islamist ideology, urges the international community to take heed, and offers well-considered ideas for countering the significant threat Hamas poses.