The March 11, 2011, Great East Japan Earthquake and tsunami sparked a humanitarian disaster in northeastern Japan. They were responsible for more than 15,900 deaths and 2,600 missing persons as well as physical infrastructure damages exceeding $200 billion. The earthquake and tsunami also initiated a severe nuclear accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station. Three of the six reactors at the plant sustained severe core damage and released hydrogen and radioactive materials. Explosion of the released hydrogen damaged three reactor buildings and impeded onsite emergency response efforts. The accident prompted widespread evacuations of local populations, large economic losses, and the eventual shutdown of all nuclear power plants in Japan. "Lessons Learned from the Fukushima Nuclear Accident for Improving Safety and Security of U.S. Nuclear Plants" is a study of the Fukushima Daiichi accident. This report examines the causes of the crisis, the performance of safety systems at the plant, and the responses of its operators following the earthquake and tsunami. The report then considers the lessons that can be learned and their implications for U.S. safety and storage of spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste, commercial nuclear reactor safety and security regulations, and design improvements. "Lessons Learned" makes recommendations to improve plant systems, resources, and operator training to enable effective ad hoc responses to severe accidents. This report's recommendations to incorporate modern risk concepts into safety regulations and improve the nuclear safety culture will help the industry prepare for events that could challenge the design of plant structures and lead to a loss of critical safety functions. In providing a broad-scope, high-level examination of the accident, "Lessons Learned" is meant to complement earlier evaluations by industry and regulators. This in-depth review will be an essential resource for the nuclear power industry, policy makers, and anyone interested in the state of U.S. preparedness and response in the face of crisis situations.

The present report is a revision of Safety Series No. 75-INSAG-3 (1988), updating the statements made on the objectives and principles of safe design and operation for electricity generating nuclear power plants. It includes the improvements made in the safety of operating nuclear power plants and identifies the principles underlying the best current safety policies to be applied in future plants. It presents INSAG's understanding of the principles underlying the best current safety policies and practices of the nuclear power industry.

The explosion on 26 April 1986 at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant and the consequent reactor fire resulted in an unprecedented release of radioactive material from a nuclear reactor and adverse consequences for the public and the environment. Although the accident occurred nearly two decades ago, controversy still surrounds the real impact of the disaster. Therefore the IAEA, in cooperation with other UN bodies, the World Bank, as well as the competent authorities of Belarus, the Russian Federation and Ukraine, established the Chernobyl Forum in 2003. The mission of the Forum was to generate 'authoritative consensual statements' on the environmental consequences and health effects attributable to radiation exposure arising from the accident as well as to provide advice on environmental remediation and special health care programmes, and to suggest areas in which further research is required. This report presents the findings and recommendations of the Chernobyl Forum concerning the environmental effects of the Chernobyl accident.

On the basis of the principles included in the Fundamental Safety Principles, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SF-1, this Safety Requirements publication establishes requirements applicable to the design of nuclear power plants. It covers the design phase and provides input for the safe operation of the power plant. It elaborates on the safety objective, safety principles and concepts that provide the basis for deriving the safety requirements that must be met for the design of a nuclear power plant. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Applying the safety principles and concepts; 3. Management of safety in design; 4. Principal technical requirements; 5. General plant design; 6. Design of specific plant systems.

Proceedings of a symposium, Vienna, 6-10 November 1989. The purpose was to provide a forum for review of actual experience gained and lessons learned from recovery techniques and operations in response to serious accidents at nuclear facilities and accidents associated with radioactive materials, and also to consider the development of emergency planning and preparedness resources. A special feature of the symposium programme was a full session on an accident involving a chemical explosion in a high level waste tank at a plutonium extraction plant in the Southern Urals in the USSR in 1957.