Over the past decade and a half we have seen how far countries can go in changing their economic and political system. Transition from central planning to market economy has been both difficult and challenging. Some countries have proceeded quite well but others are very far away. To ensure success of transition, countries will need to develop institutions that are necessary for private markets to operate successfully and establish a government which, will help the market economy to develop.

How have tax systems, whose primary role is to raise resources to finance public expenditures, evolved in the transition countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union? Mitra and Stern find that: (1) the ratio of tax revenue-to-GDP decreased largely due to a fall in revenue from corporate income tax; (2) the fall in revenue from the corporate income tax led to a decline in the importance of income taxes, notwithstanding a rise in the share of individual income tax; (3) social security contributions together with payroll taxes became less important in the Commonwealth of Independent States; and (4) domestic indirect taxes gained in importance in overall tax revenues. Apart from the increased role of personal income taxation, these developments go in a direction opposite to those observed in poor countries as they get richer. They show a key aspect of transition, namely a movement from a system where the government exercised a preeminent claim on output and income before citizens had access to the remainder, to one with a greatly diminished role for the public sector, as reflected in a lower ratio of public expenditure to GDP, where the government needs to collect revenue in order to spend. Can expected levels of public expenditure be financed by the basic instruments of a modern tax system without creating significant distortions in the private sector? The authors suggest that transition countries, depending on their stage of development, should aim for a tax revenue-to-GDP ratio in the range of 22 to 31 percent, comprising value-added tax (6 to 7 percent), excises (2 to 3 percent), income tax (6 to 9 percent), social security contribution together with payroll tax (6 to 10 percent), and other taxes such as on trade and on property (2 percent). The authors' analysis also sheds light on the links between tax policy, tax administration, and the investment climate in transition countries. This paper - a joint product of the Office of the Regional Vice President, Europe and Central Asia Region and the Office of the Senior Vice President and Chief Economist, Development Economics - is part of a larger effort in the Bank on the subject of transition meets development.

Selection of studies relating to taxation in developing countries. The papers are organized under the following subjects: approaches to development taxation, lessons from experience, taxation and incentives, problems in direct taxation, the reform of indirect taxation, the role of local taxes, tax administration and tax policy. Contributors: Carl S. Shoup, Vito Tanzi, Richard Goode, Charles E. McLure, Richard Bird, Oliver Oldman, Sijbren Cnossen and many others.

Written by experts in the field, this book uses the modern theory of public finance to analyze tax and pricing policy in developing countries.

This paper discusses important tax policy issues facing developing countries today. It views tax policy from both the macroeconomic perspective, which focuses on broad questions such as the level and composition of tax revenue, and the microeconomic perspective, which focuses on certain design aspects of selected major taxes, such as the personal income tax, the corporate income tax, the value-added tax, excises, and import tariffs. It provides a review of the rote of tax incentives in these countries, and identifies some policy challenges posed by the globalization of the world economy.

Many countries, especially developing ones, follow procyclical fiscal polices, namely spending goes up (taxes go down) in booms and spending goes down (taxes go up) in recessions. We provide an explanation for this suboptimal fiscal policy based upon political distortions and incentives for less-than-benevolent government to appropriate rents. Voters have incentives similar to the "starving the Leviathan" classic argument, and demand more public goods or fewer taxes to prevent governments from appropriating rents when the economy is doing well. We test this argument against more traditional explanations based purely on borrowing constraints, with a reasonable amount of success.

The Fund has long played a lead role in supporting developing countries’ efforts to improve their revenue mobilization. This paper draws on that experience to review issues and good practice, and to assess prospects in this key area.