How does China maintain authoritarian rule while it is committed to market-oriented economic reforms? This book analyzes this puzzle by offering a systematic analysis of the central-local governmental relationship in rural China, focusing on rural taxation and political participation. Drawing on in-depth interviews with Chinese local officials and villagers, and combining them with game-theoretic analyses, it argues that the central government uses local governments as a target of blame for the problems that the central government has actually created. The most recent rural tax reforms, which began in 2000, were a conscious trade-off between fiscal crises and rural instability. For the central government, local fiscal crises and the lack of public goods in agricultural areas were less serious concerns than the heavy financial burdens imposed on farmers and the rural unrest that the predatory extractive behavior of local governments had generated in the 1990s, which threatened both economic reforms and authoritarian rule.

This book examines questions of change and inertia in the context of the longstanding grievances over excessive taxation in rural China. How can some changes be sustained, whilst others cannot? How can a longstanding administrative practice be changed or even terminated, especially when previous attempts at change have failed? Using extensive interview data with local and central bureaucrats, Li's findings highlight the role of parallel developments and agency in the change process, as well as the prevalence of contingency and uncertainty. It also elegantly blends the narrative of the rural tax and administrative reforms with theoretical discussions to deepen our understanding of policy process and institutional change in 21st century China. Despite the authoritarian political system, the Chinese state-in-action which emerges from this book sees actions stemming from both the central and local levels, mediated by strategic design as well as contingency. This book will be of interest to students and scholars of Chinese Studies, political science and policy and development studies.

The financial burden imposed upon the Chinese farmer by local taxes has become a major source of discontent in the Chinese countryside and a worrisome source of political and social instability for the Chinese government. Bernstein and Lü examine the forms and sources of heavy, informal taxation, and shed light on how peasants defend their interests by adopting strategies of collective resistance (both peaceful and violent). Bernstein and Lü also explain why the central government, while often siding with the peasants, has not been able to solve the burden problem by instituting a sound, reliable financial system in the countryside. While the regime has, to some extent, sought to empower farmers to defend their interests - by informing them about tax rules, expanding the legal system, and instituting village elections, for example, these attempts have not yet generated enough power from 'below' to counter powerful, local official agencies.

Containing ten quality chapters on China''s rural reforms and agricultural development, this first volume from the Series on Developing China: Translated Research from China emphasizes the importance of countryside, agriculture and the role of peasants in China''s economy. While the Chinese revolution has traveled a path of OC encircling the cities from the rural areasOCO, Chinese reforms were likewise started in promoting the household contract responsibility system in the rural areas OCo the majority of its population living in the countryside makes it the focus of the reforms. Such structural issues that readjustment of interests entailed as urban-rural divide and poor-rich gap are closely related to the rural reform. For this, a rural study centered on the three rural issues (agriculture, rural areas and peasants), or peasantography, is actually an academic OC gold mineOCO, which contains the richest possibilities for Chinese social science to contribute to the world. The above mentioned chapters cover an extensive range of issues in rural reform and agricultural development in China, including property right, food trade structure, the Township and Village Enterprises, non-agricultural employment, the mobility of labor force, land distribution, taxation and saving behavior. The research approach ranges from a macro- to microeconomics level, while in terms of research methodology, property theory, game model and quantitative economics are used, in combination with historiography and empirical case studies. Sample Chapter(s). Chapter 1: Academic Inquiries into the Chinese Success Story (116 KB). Contents: Academic Inquiries into the OC Chinese Success StoryOCO (Z-L Deng); Gender Inequality in the Land Tenure System of Rural China (L Zhu); The Allocation of Decision-Making Power and Changes in the Decision-Making Style: Systematic Thoughts on China''s Rural Problems (S-G Zhang & N Zhao); Farmers'' Tax Burden in Rural China: A Political Economy Analysis (R Tao et al.); Effects of Labor Out-Migration and Income Growth and Inequality in Rural China (S Li); Grain versus Food: A Hidden Issue in China''s Food Policy Debate (F Lu); Saving Behavior in a Transition Economy: An Empirical Case Study of Rural China (G-H Wan et al.); Township Enterprises and Their Interest Distribution in Reform: A Three-Player Game Model (R-Z Ke); Rural Interregional Inequality and Off-Farm Employment in China (P Zhang); Food Demand and Nutritional Elasticity in Poor Rural Areas of China (J-W Zhang & F Cai); Reform in China''s Rural Areas: The Changes in the Relationship between the State and Land Ownership OCo A Retrospect on the Changes in Economic Institutions (Q-R Zhou). Readership: Economists, political scientists, sociologists, advanced undergraduates and graduate students interested in China''s economy, rural areas and society."

I suggest that if the Chinese leadership wants to enjoy political stability in poor agricultural areas and maintain its authority as a ruling Party in the long run, the answer lies not in blaming bad governance on local governments or undermining local authorities' popular legitimacy and administrative capacity, but in expanding true institutions of democratic accountability.

Based on a treasure trove of information collected through fieldwork interviews and painstaking documentary research through the Chinese and Western language presses, this book analyzes one of the most important reforms implemented in China over the past decade – the rural tax and fee reform, also known as the "Third Revolution in the Countryside". The aim of the tax was to improve social stability in rural China, which has become increasingly shaken by peasant protests, many of them large-scale and violent. By examining the gap between the intentions of the reform and the eventual outcomes, Göbel provides new insights into the nature of intergovernmental relations in China and highlights the ways in which the relationship between the state and the rural populace has fundamentally changed forever. The Politics of Rural Reform in China will appeal to students and scholars of Chinese politics, governance and development studies.

Explores the economic, social and financial changes that have transformed China's rural governance over the past twenty years.

"A distinctive and important contribution."—Thomas P. Bernstein, author of Up to the Mountains and Down to the Villages

China is now facing the challenge of designing and carrying out new reforms of its taxation system. This book covers a wide range of topics critical to China's future tax reform. Several prominent scholars and government officials have contributed papers which range from general tax issues to specific problem areas in tax policy design, implementation and legislation in China. The collaborative efforts between the Chinese and foreign scholars combine first hand knowledge of the current situation of China's tax reform with modern economic theory and methodology, and highlight key issues which are the focus of research on China's tax system today. Several papers also examine the linkages between tax reform and reforms in other areas in China, such as monetary and housing reforms, thus giving a more complete picture of the task ahead.

Tax administration improvements have contributed significantly to a doubling of China’s tax-to-GDP ratio and the substantial reduction in taxpayers’ compliance costs since the mid-1990s. This paper describes the key features of China’s tax administration and their evolution over the last 20 years. It also identifes emerging challenges to the tax system and areas where further tax administration improvements are needed to sustain tax revenue and reduce taxpayers’ compliance costs in the future.