Taking Philosophy Seriously initiates a meta-philosophical dialogue that challenges the division between academic and practical philosophy. In contradistinction to the perfectionist tradition of philosophy, it offers a melioristic view of philosophy that rethinks the approach to philosophy, reinvigorates its academic teaching and secures the respectability of its practitioners outside the academe. It addresses the neglected topic of philosophers’ education through a subtle analysis of the mentor-apprentice relationship and the remedies philosophers have found to its tensions. It reveals the problems inherent in emulating past practical philosophies from Alexandrian times, the Enlightenment or the 19th century, and the necessity of reevaluating the tools, reconsidering the means, and rethinking the methods of the contemporary practice of philosophy. To that purpose, it problematizes the notions of dialogue, self-knowledge, and self-transformation, and questions the feasibility of autonomy and self-integration as well as the differentiation between philosophy and psychology. It offers original solutions to the problems it highlights and points to unique benefits in the practice of philosophy that contribute to resolving the contemporary crisis of philosophy. This book combines high academic standards and an accessible style, and will engage academic and practical philosophers alike, professionals in education and the helping professions, and the general public.

Applying evolutionary biology to traditional philosophical problems, this volume establishes a naturalistic approach to our understanding of life's major problems. Ruse argues thoughtfully that to understand the problems of knowledge and moral thought and behavior, we must know that we are the end-products of the natural process of evolution rather than the special creation of a supernatural god. Copyright © Libri GmbH. All rights reserved.

This book presents an original worldview, Homo risibilis, wherein self-referential humor is proposed as the path leading from a tragic view of life to a liberating embrace of human ridicule. Humor is presented as a conceptual tool for holding together contradictions and managing the unresolvable conflict of the human condition till Homo risibilis resolves the inherent tension without epistemological cost. This original approach to the human condition allows us to effectively address life’s ambiguities without losing sight of its tragic overtones and brings along far-ranging personal and social benefits. By defining the problem that other philosophies and many religions attempt to solve in terms we can all relate to, Homo risibilis enables an understanding of the Other that surpasses mere tolerance. Its egalitarian vision roots an ethic of compassion without requiring metaphysical or religious assumptions and liberates the individual for action on others’ behalf. It offers a new model of rationality which effectively handles and eventually resolves the tension between oneself, others, and the world at large. Amir’s view of the human condition transcends the field of philosophy of humor. An original worldview that fits the requirements of traditional philosophy, Homo risibilis is especially apt to answer contemporary concerns. It embodies the minimal consensus we need in order to live together and the active role philosophy should responsibly play in a global world. Here developed for the first time in a complete way, the Homo risibilis worldview is not only liberating in nature, but also illuminates the shortcomings of other philosophies in their attempts to secure harmony in a disharmonious world for a disharmonious human being.

This is a wonderful book, intended as a companion and guide to a reading of the Ethics . Sparshott's intention is to display the continuity of thought in the text, rather than the traditional approach of examining and criticizing individual sections. The chapters are entitled What is Best for People (I i-xii; 1094a1-1102a4), Reason in Action (I xiii-VI; 1102a5-1145a11); The Pathology of Practical Reason (VII; 1145a15-1154b34); Love, Consciousness, and Society (VIII-IX; 1155a1-1172a15); The Worth of Pleasure (X i-v; 1172a19-1176a29); and The Good Life and the Best Life: Outline of a Discourse (X vi-viii; 1176a30-1179a32), and there is an interesting appendix on the world of Aristotle's theoretical construction. All Greek is transliterated and a glossary provided for these terms. The author's love of his topic is obvious throughout this book, which is written with clarity and cogency. It deserves to be read by everyone seeking to understand Aristotle's Ethics .

This introductory volume presents an overview of the philosophy of film, a burgeoning sub-discipline of Aesthetics. It offers a sampling of paradigmatic instances of philosophers and philosophical film theorists discussing the movies in a fashion that takes cinema as seriously as any other Fine Art, leaving little doubt that doing philosophy of film is a serious intellectual enterprise.

This volume presents the state of the art of philosophical practice worldwide from the perspectives of leading philosophical practitioners, both counselors and institutional consultants. Philosophical practice has developed in different directions in different parts of the world, with the focus in Europe and North America being mostly on client counseling and corporate consultancy, while in Asia it is more community-based and more closely aligned with psychotherapy. In all cases, philosophical practitioners strive to transcend the boundaries of academic philosophy and reach out to the public, to corporations, to the policy makers, to the medical, legal and many other professions. The chapters of this book illustrate both the breadth of philosophical practice and its various methodological directions, while, at the same time, showing how philosophy can be relevant to everyday life, not just for individuals, but for the economy, the government, international organizations, the helping and therapeutic professions, and the educational system. The volume is primarily a companion for students of applied philosophy on all levels, as well as for modern psychotherapists, educational professionals and academics. It is designed to support a variety of undergraduate and postgraduate courses in philosophy and applied psychology, ranging from ancient ethics to philosophical practice sui generis, or to the philosophy of psychology.

The contributors to this volume argue that whilst there is a commonplace superstition conspiracy theories are examples of bad beliefs (and that the kind of people who believe conspiracy theories are typically irrational), many conspiracy theories are rational to believe: the members of the Dewey Commission were right to say that the Moscow Trials of the 1930s were a sham; Woodward and Bernstein were correct to think that Nixon was complicit in the conspiracy to deny any wrongdoing in the Watergate Hotel break in; and if we either accept the terrorist events of 9/11 were committed by Al-Qaeda, or that the Bush Administration was responsible, then it seems we are endorsing some theory about a conspiracy to commit an act of terror on American soil. As such, there is no reason to reject conspiracy theories sui generis. This volume challenges the prima facie that conspiracy theories are irrational beliefs, arguing that we should treat conspiracy theories and the phenomena of conspiracy theories seriously. It presents fresh perspectives from the wider philosophical, sociological and psychological community on what is becoming an issue of increasing relevance in our time.

"Philosophers suffer from a peculiar occupational hazard; people are always coming up and asking them just what it is that they do and how they do it. This is not the sort of question that biologists or economists or musicians get asked; people know, pretty well, what they do, and they may or may not be interested in the details. But a philosopher is different - it is very hard to imagine just what he does with his time"--

Two Philosophers Ask and Answer the Big Questions About the Search for Faith and Happiness For seekers of all stripes, philosophy is timeless self-care. Notre Dame philosophy professors Meghan Sullivan and Paul Blaschko have reinvigorated this tradition in their wildly popular and influential undergraduate course “God and the Good Life,” in which they wrestle with the big questions about how to live and what makes life meaningful. Now they invite us into the classroom to work through issues like what justifies our beliefs, whether we should practice a religion and what sacrifices we should make for others—as well as to investigate what figures such as Aristotle, Plato, Marcus Aurelius, Iris Murdoch, and W. E. B. Du Bois have to say about how to live well. Sullivan and Blaschko do the timeless work of philosophy using real-world case studies that explore love, finance, truth, and more. In so doing, they push us to escape our own caves, ask stronger questions, explain our deepest goals, and wrestle with suffering, the nature of death, and the existence of God. Philosophers know that our “good life plan” is one that we as individuals need to be constantly and actively writing to achieve some meaningful control and sense of purpose even if the world keeps throwing surprises our way. For at least the past 2,500 years, philosophers have taught that goal-seeking is an essential part of what it is to be human—and crucially that we could find our own good life by asking better questions of ourselves and of one another. This virtue ethics approach resonates profoundly in our own moment. The Good Life Method is a winning guide to tackling the big questions of being human with the wisdom of the ages.