Mergers and Acquisitions Basics: All You Need to Know provides an introduction to the fundamental concepts of mergers and acquisitions. Key concepts discussed include M&As as change agents in the context of corporate restructuring; legal structures and strategies employed in corporate restructuring; takeover strategies and the impact on corporate governance; takeover defenses; and players who make mergers and acquisitions happen. The book also covers developing a business plan and the tools used to evaluate, display, and communicate information to key constituencies both inside and outside the corporation; the acquisition planning process; the negotiation, integration planning, and closing phases; financing transactions; and M&A post-merger integration.This book is written for buyers and sellers of businesses, financial analysts, chief executive officers, chief financial officers, operating managers, investment bankers, and portfolio managers. Others who may have an interest include bank lending officers, venture capitalists, government regulators, human resource managers, entrepreneurs, and board members. The book may also be used as a companion or supplemental text for undergraduate and graduate students taking courses on mergers and acquisitions, corporate restructuring, business strategy, management, governance, and entrepreneurship. - Describes a broad view of the mergers and acquisition process to illustrate agents' interactions - Simplifies without overgeneralizing - Bases conclusions on empirical evidence, not experience and opinion - Features a recent business case at the end of each chapter

Two strengths distinguish this textbook from others. One is its presentation of subjects in the contexts wherein they occur. The other is its use of current events. Other improvements have shortened and simplified chapters, increased the numbers and types of pedagogical supplements, and expanded the international appeal of examples.

The Traditional Approach To M&A Was To Restrict The Emergence Of Monopolies. The Modern Approach Embodied In The Takeover Regulations Is Meant To Ensure Efficient Use Of Corporate Resources And Protect The Interests Of Minority Shareholders. The Two Streams Of Corporate Restructuring Are Governed By Different Legislations. Company Law Governs Mergers And Sebi Regulations Govern Takeovers. The Value Of Mergers Which Is Governed By Economic Factors Is Quite Large And Practically Ten Times The Value Of Takeovers. The Market Approach Of Takeovers, However, Instills Discipline In Regard To Use Of Corporate Resources By Promoters And Managements. The Corporate Raider Can Always Approach The Shareholders Directly.The Book Analyses Both The Approaches And Identifies The Need For Strengthening Competition Policy And Preventing The Misuse Of Buyback Provisions For Insider Trading.

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Takeovers: A Strategic Guide to Mergers and Acquisitions

This collection examines the forces, both external and internal, that lead corporations to behave efficiently and to create wealth. Corporations vest control rights in shareholders, the author argues, because they are the constituency that bear business risk and therefore have the appropriate incentives to maximize corporate value. Assigning control to any other group would be tantamount to allowing that group to play poker with someone else's money, and would create inefficiencies. The implicit denial of this proposition is the fallacy of the so-called stakeholder theory of the corporation, which argues that corporations should be run in the interests of all stakeholders. This theory offers no account of how conflicts between different stakeholders are to be resolved, and gives managers no principle on which to base decisions, except to follow their own preferences. In practice, shareholders delegate their control rights to a board of directors, who hire, fire, and set the compensation of the chief officers of the firm. However, because agents have different incentives than the principals they represent, they can destroy corporate value unless closely monitored. This happened in the 1960s and led to hostile takeovers in the market for corporate control in the 1970s and 1980s. The author argues that the takeover movement generated increases in corporate efficiency that exceeded $1.5 trillion and helped to lay the foundation for the great economic boom of the 1990s.

The standard approach to the legal foundations of corporate governance is based on the view that corporate law promotes separation of ownership and control by protecting non-controlling shareholders from expropriation. This book takes a broader perspective by showing that investor protection is a necessary, but not sufficient, legal condition for the efficient separation of ownership and control. Supporting the control powers of managers or controlling shareholders is as important as protecting investors from the abuse of these powers. Rethinking Corporate Governance reappraises the existing framework for the economic analysis of corporate law based on three categories of private benefits of control. Some of these benefits are not necessarily bad for corporate governance. The areas of law mainly affecting private benefits of control – including the distribution of corporate powers, self-dealing, and takeover regulation – are analyzed in five jurisdictions, namely the US, the UK, Italy, Sweden, and the Netherlands. Not only does this approach to corporate law explain separation of ownership and control better than just investor protection; it also suggests that the law can improve the efficiency of corporate governance by allowing non-controlling shareholders to be less powerful.