In Systematicity, Paul Hoyningen-Huene answers the question "What is science?" by proposing that scientific knowledge is primarily distinguished from other forms of knowledge, especially everyday knowledge, by being more systematic. "Science" is here understood in the broadest possible sense, encompassing not only the natural sciences but also mathematics, the social sciences, and the humanities. The author develops his thesis in nine dimensions in which it is claimed that science is more systematic than other forms of knowledge: regarding descriptions, explanations, predictions, the defense of knowledge claims, critical discourse, epistemic connectedness, an ideal of completeness, knowledge generation, and the representation of knowledge. He compares his view with positions on the question held by philosophers from Aristotle to Nicholas Rescher. The book concludes with an exploration of some consequences of Hoyningen-Huene's view concerning the genesis and dynamics of science, the relationship of science and common sense, normative implications of the thesis, and the demarcation criterion between science and pseudo-science.

In 1988, Jerry Fodor and Zenon Pylyshyn challenged connectionist theorists to explain the systematicity of cognition. In a highly influential critical analysis of connectionism, they argued that connectionist explanations, at best, can only inform us about details of the neural substrate; explanations at the cognitive level must be classical insofar as adult human cognition is essentially systematic. This volume reassesses Fodor and Pylyshyn's 'systematicity challenge' for a post-connectionist era, covering the most important recent developments in the systematicity debate.

Interest in German Idealism--not just Kant, but Fichte and Hegel as well--has recently developed within analytic philosophy, which traditionally defined itself in opposition to the Idealist tradition. Yet one obstacle remains especially intractable: the Idealists' longstanding claim that philosophy must be systematic. In this work, the first overview of the German Idealism that is both conceptual and methodological, Paul W. Franks offers a philosophical reconstruction that is true to the movement's own times and resources and, at the same time, deeply relevant to contemporary thought. At the center of the book are some neglected but critical questions about German Idealism: Why do Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel think that philosophy's main task is the construction of a system? Why do they think that every part of this system must derive from a single, immanent and absolute principle? Why, in short, must it be all or nothing? Through close examination of the major Idealists as well as the overlooked figures who influenced their reading of Kant, Franks explores the common ground and divergences between the philosophical problems that motivated Kant and those that, in turn, motivated the Idealists. The result is a characterization of German Idealism that reveals its sources as well as its pertinence--and its challenge--to contemporary philosophical naturalism.

The current wave of critical and historical engagement with idealist texts affords an unprecedented opportunity to discover the richness and value of the thought of F. W. J. Schelling. In this volume leading scholars offer compelling reasons to regard Schelling as one of Kant's most incisive interpreters, a pioneering philosopher of nature, a resolute philosopher of human finitude and freedom, a nuanced thinker of the bounds of logic and self-consciousness, and perhaps Hegel's most effective critic. The volume provides a wide-ranging presentation of Schelling's original contribution to, and internal critique of, the basic insights of German idealism, his role in shaping the course of post-Kantian thought, and his sensitivity and innovative responses to questions of lasting metaphysical, epistemological, ethical, aesthetic, and theological importance.

External representations (pictures, diagrams, graphs, concrete models) have always been valuable tools for the science teacher. This book brings together the insights of practicing scientists, science education researchers, computer specialists, and cognitive scientists, to produce a coherent overview. It links presentations about cognitive theory, its implications for science curriculum design, and for learning and teaching in classrooms and laboratories.

"Perception and cognition are tightly related. As our primary mode of contact with the world, perception is the informational and causal foundation of our cognitive processes; it is fundamental to our empirical thinking, believing, and action planning. Traditional accounts of the mind consider perception and cognition to be distinct, yet highly interrelated, systems. Much interdisciplinary empirical and theoretical work, from cognitive scientists and philosophers, has attempted to elucidate the complex relations holding among these systems, suggesting the existence not only of influences of perception on cognition but also vice versa. However, many questions are left unanswered. Given that perception is a guide to our thinking about and acting upon the world appropriately, the two systems must be able to 'talk' to one another; information carried by perception must be of a form adequate to be 'taken in' by our various cognitive systems. The question arises: What kinds of structural similarities must hold between perceptual and cognitive representations for such 'communication' to be possible? And how exactly do perceptual and cognitive representations interact? Some researchers have argued that the links between perception and cognition are so tight as to instill doubt as to the significance of the distinction between the two systems in the first place. Yet others insist that perception and cognition remain distinct. The aim of this Research Topic is to deepen our understanding of the kinds of interaction among perception and cognition and of the nature of the representational structures that would enable such interaction." -- Provided by publisher.

In The Systemic View as a Basis for Philological Thought, Olga Valentinova, Vladimir Denisenko, Sergey Preobrazhenskii, andMikhail Rybakov explore the interrelation of language material, structure, and functions in various subjects of philological research, such as grammatical systems of language, semantics, linguistic personality, literary text, and formal aspects of verse. Their systemic approach is rooted in the theories of Wilhelm von Humboldt and his followers, including Russian scholars Alexander Potebnya, Gustav Shpet, and more recently Gennadii Prokop’evichMel’nikov (1928–2000). The authors use the concept of systematicity as an opportunity to see the studied whole in development, to show and explain the functional interaction of linear and supra-linear connections, to explain their interdependence, and to predict further changes within the system. This book displays the scientific potential of the systemic approach to linguistics and related spheres, employing the framework of systematicity to revise the modern trends of philology and to map out an alternative paradigm for linguistic and philological thought that could restore the status of philology as a holistic science.

Robert Cummins presents a series of essays motivated by the following question: Is the mind a collection of beliefs and desires that respond to and condition our feeling and perceptual experiences, or is this just a natural way to talk about it? What sort of conceptual framework do we need to understand what is really going on in our brains?

This book challenges the standard view that modern hermeneutics begins with Friedrich Ast and Friedrich Schleiermacher, arguing instead that it is the dialectic of reflective and teleological reason in Kant’s Critique of Judgment that provides the actual proto-hermeneutic foundation. It is revolutionary in doing so by replacing interpretive truth claims by the more appropriate claim of rendering opaque contexts intelligible. Taking Gadamer’s comprehensive analysis of hermeneutics in Truth and Method (1960) as its point of departure, the book turns to Kant’s Critiques, reviewing his major concepts as a coherent system in relation to his sensus communis. At the heart of the book is the interaction between reflective, bottom-up search and teleological, top-down interpretative projection as provided in Part II of the third Critique. This text contends that Kant’s broad definition of nature invites the liberation of the reflective-teleological judgment from its biological exemplifications and so permits us to establish its generalised status as a path-breaking, methodological tool. Kant’s dialectic of reflective search and meaning bestowing, stipulated teleology is asserted to anticipate a series of motifs commonly associated with hermeneutics. Figures covered include Dilthey, Husserl, Ingarden, Heidegger, Gadamer, Apel, Habermas, Ricoeur, Derrida, Foucault, Lyotard, Deleuze, Vattimo, Nancy and Caputo. Their collective contributions to interpretation allow for a review of the evolution of hermeneutics from the perspective of the Kantian critique of the limitations of human cognition. The book is written for the informed, general reader, but will likewise appeal to advanced undergraduate and graduate students as well as researchers in the humanities and social sciences.