Conflict and intervention in the Middle East are not uncommon occurrences. Yet when civil strife erupted in Lebanon in 1975, the events that followed were unusual indeed. Unlike most patterns of intervention, Syria displayed remarkable tactical flexibility by first intervening on behalf of the rebels, its traditional allies, then shifting its allegiance mid-war to the Lebanese incumbents. Also, whereas most intervention scenarios end with a process of decommitment, Syria eventually occupied parts of Lebanon to become an enduring military entity there. Delving into primary Syrian and Lebanese sources, Weinberger unravels the history, competing factions, religion, politics, and culture of the region and presents an intriguing and complex portrait of intervention by a regional power.

Despite the bitter conflict that divided Jerusalem and Damascus, a fascinating process of indirect – through the United States – and tacit understandings emerged with regard to Lebanon in the 1970s. This derived largely from the Israeli deterrence posture which held in check Syrian military involvement in Lebanon. This book, first published in 1987, traces the development of the Israeli and Syrian involvement in Lebanon between 1975 and 1985, and of the deterrence dialogue which evolved between them. It also places this dialogue within the larger context of the overall Israeli-Syrian deterrence equation. War and Intervention in Lebanon is a fascinating and relevant work, of great value to those with an interest in International Relations and Middle Eastern history, politics and diplomacy.

This book is a comprehensive examination of the Syrian involvement in the Lebanese crisis. It focuses on the Syrian interests in Lebanon, the motivation of the Assad regime for intervening in the Lebanese crisis, and the pattern of Syrian actions in Lebanon.

Lebanon experienced serious instability and ethno-national conflict following the Syrian withdrawal in 2005, compounded by the Arab Spring, which led to regional instability and civil war in Iraq and Syria. Why did consociational democracy fail? Was failure inevitable? What impact could external powers play in creating an environment where consociationalism might be successfully implemented? This book addresses these key questions and provides a comprehensive analysis of how internal and external elite relations influence the chances of a successful regulation of ethno-national conflict through power-sharing. Exploring the roles played by Syria, Qatar, Iran, Saudi Arabia, the United States and France, it argues that external actors in the Lebanese conflict largely determined whether power-sharing was successfully established and shows that the consociational democratic model cannot provide long-term conflict regulation in their absence. The author argues that relationships between internal and external actors determine the prospects for successful conflict regulation and pinpoints the crucial role of the external forces in the creation of power-sharing agreements in Lebanon concluding that future success is dependent on the maintenance of positive, exogenous pressures. This book will be of key interest to students and scholars studying politics, international relations, and Middle East studies.

Conflict and intervention in the Middle East are not uncommon occurrences. Yet when civil strife erupted in Lebanon in 1975, the events that followed were unusual indeed. Unlike most patterns of intervention, Syria displayed remarkable tactical flexibility by first intervening on behalf of the rebels, its traditional allies, then shifting its allegiance mid-war to the Lebanese incumbents. Also, whereas most intervention scenarios end with a process of decommitment, Syria eventually occupied parts of Lebanon to become an enduring military entity there. Delving into primary Syrian and Lebanese s.

After fifteen years of reconstruction in a relatively peaceful environment spanning the years 1990 to 2004, Lebanon has experienced successive violent political events resulting from complex entangled internal and external struggles. The Syrian crisis and its political, economic and demographic consequences on Lebanon have increased these tensions. This atlas sheds light on these new challenges and adds new data that complete the analyses already published in the Atlas du Liban. Territoires et société (Atlas of Lebanon. Territories and Society) released in 2007 by the same research team. Some of its components are included in this edition. Beyond the international regional crisis and the population movements, it takes into account Lebanon’s socio-economic dimensions, the environmental issues linked to uncontrolled urbanization and to natural risks, as well as conflicts due to local territorial management. This atlas is the result of a collaborative endeavor between French and Lebanese researchers. It uses a geographical approach that puts in the foreground a spatial analysis of social and natural phenomena. Public sources are scarce in Lebanon, especially at the local scale. They are sometimes less reliable and difficult to access. It is particularly the case for the Lebanese census data, conversely data are abundantly available on the refugees population, which is less known than the population of refugees. International data help compare Lebanon to its neighbors. Thematic data produced by some ministries are helpful to provide a detailed view regarding specific domains. Analyses processed on aerial and satellite images have produced essential data on urbanization and environment. Local thematic fieldwork surveys have provided additional data. The book consists of seven chapters. The first one deals with the territorial state-building seen in the light of regional geopolitics, and emphasizes internal violence and the reemergence of militias and armed groups that fight each other and the state army. Lebanon is once again perceived as a territory divided between multiple allegiances. The second chapter is devoted to the analysis of population dynamics, despite the lack of reliable data whose sources are subject to discussion. It includes analyses of internal population flows, the Lebanese diaspora, and the assessment of Syrian refugees’ influx. The third chapter shows the fragility of the Lebanese economic model. Its dependency on foreign investments and on...

Lebanon experienced serious instability and ethno-national conflict following the Syrian withdrawal in 2005, compounded by the Arab Spring, which led to regional instability and civil war in Iraq and Syria. Why did consociational democracy fail? Was failure inevitable? What impact could external powers play in creating an environment where consociationalism might be successfully implemented? This book addresses these key questions and provides a comprehensive analysis of how internal and external elite relations influence the chances of a successful regulation of ethno-national conflict through power-sharing. Exploring the roles played by Syria, Qatar, Iran, Saudi Arabia, the United States and France, it argues that external actors in the Lebanese conflict largely determined whether power-sharing was successfully established and shows that the consociational democratic model cannot provide long-term conflict regulation in their absence. The author argues that relationships between internal and external actors determine the prospects for successful conflict regulation and pinpoints the crucial role of the external forces in the creation of power-sharing agreements in Lebanon concluding that future success is dependent on the maintenance of positive, exogenous pressures. This book will be of key interest to students and scholars studying politics, international relations, and Middle East studies.

In Spheres of Intervention, James R. Stocker examines the history of diplomatic relations between the United States and Lebanon during a transformational period for Lebanon and a time of dynamic changes in US policy toward the Middle East. Drawing on tens of thousands of pages of declassified materials from US archives and a variety of Arabic and other non-English sources, Stocker provides a new interpretation of Lebanon’s slide into civil war, as well as insight into the strategy behind US diplomatic initiatives toward the Arab-Israeli conflict. During this period, Stocker argues, Lebanon was often a pawn in the games of larger powers. The stability of Lebanon was an aim of US policy at a time when Israel’s borders with Egypt and Jordan were in active contention. Following the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War, the internal political situation in Lebanon became increasingly unstable due to the regional military and political stalemate, the radicalization of the country’s domestic politics, and the appearance of Palestinian militias on Lebanese territory. US officials were more deeply involved in Lebanese affairs than most outside the region realized. After a series of internal crises in 1969, 1970, and 1973, civil war broke out in Lebanon in 1975. The conflict reached a temporary halt after a Syrian military intervention the following year, but this was only an end to the first stage of what would be a sixteen-year civil war. During these crises, the US sought to help the Lebanese government in a variety of ways, including providing military aid to the Lebanese military, convincing Arab countries to take measures to help the Lebanese government, mediating Lebanon’s relations with Israel, and even supporting certain militias.