The first comprehensive monograph on the defence of superior orders after the second world war, which remains pre-eminent in the field, the republication of this highly-sophisticated work once again makes this book available to scholars and students in the field. First published in 1965, Yoram Dinstein set the standard for future analysis of this issue, providing a ground-breaking interpretation that integrated domestic and international law to provide a subtle and nuanced challenge to the countervailing perceptions of the time, shaped as they were by the Nuremburg and Eichmann trials. The recent jurisprudence of the ad hoc Tribunals has shown remarkably similar analyses to those offered by Dinstein in this book, demonstrating that this key work remains relevant today. Reviewing the relevant precedents that existed at the time, this book shows that superior orders were not, in and of themselves, a defence, but that orders were relevant to other defences, and therefore should not be entirely ignored. Assessing the issue on a conceptual and practical level, and offering an extraordinary level of detail, this is a is a seminal work in international criminal law. It makes required reading for scholars, students, and practitioners of international criminal law.

The legal consequence of the superior orders defense has long been debated as one of the major problems in international criminal law. Several controversial issues such as the immunity of the state, the absolute character of military discipline, and immunity on the grounds of mistake of law and/or coercion have been complexly interwoven in the debates. The Execution of Illegal Orders and International Criminal Responsibility provides a comprehensive portrait of the relevant debates at the international level up to the present, analyzes the conflicting views, and shows the significance of the development of international rules for the superior orders defense as well as the implication of the fact that issues concerning some detailed or related rules have been left unresolved. This study presents to present a new standpoint not only on dealing with the problem of the superior orders defense but also on reconsidering the international stipulation of rulemaking with regard to criminal matters.

This paper endeavours to critically assess Article 33 of the Statute of the International Criminal Court on superior orders by comparing it with customary international law. The author notes that case law and the legal literature have never clarified the content of the customary rule on this matter. Two apparently conflicting approaches have emerged. The conditional liability approach, generally adopted by national legal systems, admits the plea as a complete defence, unless the subordinate knew or should have known the illegality of the order or unless the order was manifestly illegal. By contrast relevant international instruments prior to the Rome Statute have invariably taken the absolute liability approach, according to which obedience to orders is never a defence. The author contends that close scrutiny of national legislation and case law shows that the divergences in international practice are more apparent than real and that the customary rule on superior orders upholds the absolute liability approach. By adopting the conditional liability approach with regard to war crimes, Article 33 of the Rome Statute has departed from customary international law without any well-grounded reasons. This departure is all the more questionable since it is basically inconsistent with the codification of war crimes effected through Article 8 of the Rome Statute. This Article lays down an exhaustive list of war crimes covering acts that are unquestionably and blatantly criminal. It would therefore appear to be impossible to claim that orders to perpetrate any of those acts are not manifestly unlawful or that subordinates could not recognize their illegality.

Atrocities such as genocide or crimes against humanity are usually committed by a large number of perpetrators. Moreover, those who masterminded the crimes may not have actively participated. This book sets out how these people can be held responsible for their crimes by international criminal tribunals.

Principles of International Criminal Law is one of the leading textbooks in the field. This third edition builds on the highly-successful work of the previous editions, setting out the general principles governing international crimes as well as the fundamentals of both substantive and procedural international criminal law.

A soldier obeys illegal orders, thinking them lawful. When should we excuse his misconduct as based in reasonable error? How can courts convincingly convict the soldier's superior officer when, after Nuremberg, criminal orders are expressed through winks and nods, hints and insinuations? Can our notions of the soldier's "due obedience," designed for the Roman legionnaire, be brought into closer harmony with current understandings of military conflict in the contemporary world? Mark J. Osiel answers these questions in light of new learning about atrocity and combat cohesion, as well as changes in warfare and the nature of military conflict. Sources of atrocity are far more varied than current law assumes, and such variations display consistent patterns. The law now generally requires that soldiers resolve all doubts about the legality of a superior's order in favor of obedience. It excuses compliance with an illegal order unless the illegality - as with flagrant atrocities - would be immediately obvious to anyone. But these criteria are often in conflict and at odds with the law's underlying principles and policies. Combat and peace operations now depend more on tactical imagination, self-discipline, and loyalty to immediate comrades than on immediate, unreflective adherence to the letter of superiors' orders, backed by threat of formal punishment. The objective of military law is to encourage deliberative judgment. This can be done, Osiel suggests, in ways that enhance the accountability of our military forces, in both peace operations and more traditional conflicts, while maintaining their effectiveness. Osiel seeks to "civilianize" military law while building on soldiers' own internal ideals of professional virtuousness. He returns to the ancient ideal of martial honor, reinterpreting it in light of new conditions, arguing that it should be implemented through realistic training in which legal counsel plays an enlarged role rather than by threat of legal prosecuti