The commander, or chief of staff, of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) is a prominent public figure in Israel. His decisions, advice, and persona are held in high regard by Israel's public and leadership, and have indirect impacts on social, economic, and foreign affairs. But until now, an in-depth study on the role and performance of the IDF's chiefs of staff has been sorely absent. In this study, Meir Finkel offers a robust and original comparative perspective on the IDF chiefs of staff throughout modern Israel's history, examining their conduct in six key areas: identifying change in the strategic environment, developing familiarity with all military domains, managing crises with wartime generals, rehabilitating the army after a botched war, leading a transformation in force design, and building relationships with the political echelon. The challenging and critical role of the chief of staff demands profound knowledge and authority in a vast and diverse range of fields. By providing a perspective that the IDF's known history has lacked until now, Finkel gives insights that may assist current and future high-rank leaders worldwide in carrying out their important work and offers lessons to students everywhere of strategy, military history, and military transformation.

Includes 4 figures, 13 maps and 4 tables. Renowned Military Historian Dr Christopher Gabel investigates the effects of the Railroad on the strategies employed by both the Union and Confederate Generals of the Civil War. According to an old saying, “amateurs study tactics: professionals study logistics.” Any serious student of the military profession will know that logistics constantly shape military affairs and sometimes even dictate strategy and tactics. This excellent monograph by Dr. Christopher Gabel shows that the appearance of the steam-powered railroad had enormous implications for military logistics, and thus for strategy, in the American Civil War. Not surprisingly, the side that proved superior in “railroad generalship,” or the utilization of the railroads for military purposes, was also the side that won the war.

His campaigns, military thought, and insurgent strategy There are many biographies of the Prophet, and they tend to fall into three categories: pious works that emphasize the virtues of the early Islamic community, general works for non-Muslim or non-specialist readers, and source-critical works that grapple with historiographical problems inherent in early Islamic history. In The Generalship of Muhammad, Russ Rodgers charts a new path by merging original sources with the latest in military theory to examine Muhammad's military strengths and weaknesses. Incorporating military, political, and economic analyses, Rodgers focuses on Muhammad’s use of insurgency warfare in seventh-century Arabia to gain control of key cities such as Medina. Seeking to understand the operational aspects of these world-changing battles, he provides battlefield maps and explores the supply and logistic problems that would have plagued any military leader at the time. Rodgers explains how Muhammad organized his forces and gradually built his movement against sporadic resistance from his foes. He draws from the hadith literature to shed new light on the nature of the campaigns. He examines the Prophet's intelligence network and the employment of what would today be called special operations forces. And he considers the possibility that Muhammad received outside support to build and maintain his movement as a means to interdict trade routes between the Byzantine Empire and the Sasanid Persians.

In the first full biography of Lieutenant General John McAllister Schofield (1831-1906), Donald B. Connelly examines the career of one of the leading commanders in the western theater during the Civil War. In doing so, Connelly illuminates the role of politics in the formulation of military policy, during both war and peace, in the latter half of the nineteenth century. Connelly relates how Schofield, as a department commander during the war, had to cope with contending political factions that sought to shape military and civil policies. Following the war, Schofield occupied every senior position in the army--including secretary of war and commanding general of the army--and became a leading champion of army reform and professionalism. He was the first senior officer to recognize that professionalism would come not from the separation of politics and the military but from the army's accommodation of politics and the often contentious American constitutional system. Seen through the lens of Schofield's extensive military career, the history of American civil-military relations has seldom involved conflict between the military and civil authority, Connelly argues. The central question has never been whether to have civilian control but rather which civilians have a say in the formulation and execution of policy.

The need to quickly enter into conflict and succeed in the initial engagements is an enduring demand on militaries around the world. Given today's dynamic geopolitical environment, the concept of successful, rapid transition or organizational and mental readiness is more relevant than ever. Using the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) as a case study, Meir Finkel explores four important but generally neglected challenges of a swift transition from peace to wartime operations. He investigates the challenging mental transition from peace or routine security employment to a higher-intensity mode of action in combat. Then, Finkel explains that militaries must be capable of rapidly resolving debated prewar concepts and doctrine even as war breaks out. He also discusses how to integrate and employ new weapons systems delivered at the last minute or during a conflict. Lastly, he delves into methods for managing the tension between the need to win every tactical engagement in low-intensity conflict and the preparation of forces for a high-intensity conflict. With clear applications for the IDF and US armed services, Finkel's study offers specific examples of hard-to-accomplish rapid transitions as well as broad suggestions for how to improve readiness. Military Agility will appeal to military personnel and leadership, strategists, historians with an interest in comparative analysis, and policymakers.

A commander and an officer with the IDF recount their experiences in the Yom Kippur War, offering insight into Israel’s military leadership. At the Decisive Point in the Sinai is a firsthand account of Operation Stouthearted Men—arguably the 1973 Yom Kippur War’s most intense engagement. General Jacob Even and Colonel Simcha B. Moaz were key leaders in Major General Ariel Sharon’s division. Together, Even and Maoz recount the initial stages of the Suez crossing, examine the Israel Defense Forces’ (IDF) response to Egypt’s surprise attack, and explain Sharon’s role in the transition from defense to offense. They detail Sharon’s struggle to convince his superiors of his plan and argue that an effective division commander is not only revealed by his leadership of subordinates but also by his ability to influence his senior officers. Even and Maoz challenge students of military leadership by offering a case study on effective leadership. “At the Decisive Point is the single best volume I have ever read on the Yom Kippur War. It bridges the gap between the two standard forms of writing on the 1973 conflict?the memoir and the historical monograph?and does so in a very effective manner.” —Robert M. Citino, author of The Wehrmacht Retreats: Fighting a Lost War, 1943 “The authors’ work, in sum, presents an interesting and informative account of the Yom Kippur War on the Sinai front.” —Israel Affairs

Contains seven case studies evaluating Confederate and Union generals who might be considered "capable failures": officers of high pre-war reputation, some with distinguished records in the Civil War. Explores the various reasons these men suffered defeat such as flaws of character, errors of judgment, lack of preparation, or circumstances beyond their control. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR

On Flexibility presents a force planning concept that will enable armies to cope with the growing diversity of battlefield requirements, and especially with technological and doctrinal surprises, through applied adaptability and flexibility, minimizing the over dependence on intelligence and prediction involved in this process today.

General George C. Marshall, chief of staff of the U.S. Army during World War II, faced the daunting task not only of overseeing two theaters of a global conflict but also of selecting the best generals to carry out American grand strategy. Marshall and His Generals is the first and only book to focus entirely on that selection process and the performances, both stellar and disappointing, that followed from it. Stephen Taaffe chronicles and critiques the background, character, achievements, and failures of the more than three dozen general officers chosen for top combat group commands—from commanders like Dwight Eisenhower and Douglas MacArthur to some nearly forgotten. Taaffe explores how and why Marshall selected the Army’s commanders. Among his chief criteria were character (including “unselfish and devoted purpose”), education, (whether at West Point, Fort Leavenworth, or the Army War College), and striking a balance between experience and relative youth in a war that required both wisdom and great physical stamina. As the war unfolded, Marshall also factored into his calculations the combat leadership his generals demonstrated and the opinions of his theater commanders. Taaffe brings into sharp focus the likes of Eisenhower, MacArthur, George Patton, Omar Bradley, Walter Krueger, Robert Eichelberger, Courtney Hodges, Lucian Truscott, J. Lawton Collins, Alexander “Sandy” Patch, Troy Middleton, Matthew Ridgeway, Mark Clark, and twenty-five other generals who served in the conflict. He describes their leadership and decision-making processes and provides miniature biographies and personality sketches of these men drawn from their personal papers, official records, and reflections of fellow officers. Delving deeper than other studies, this path-breaking work produces a seamless analysis of Marshall’s selection process of operational-level commanders. Taaffe also critiques the performance of these generals during the war and reveals the extent to which their actions served as stepping stones to advancement. Ambitious in scope and filled with sharp insights, Marshall and His Generals is essential reading for anyone interested in World War II and military leadership more generally.