This paper explores the macroeconomic impacts of labor and product market deregulation using a small open-economy model with formal and informal markets. We examine both the long-run effects and the transition towards the post-reform equilibrium, while our main focus are reform packages and sequencing. The unofficial sector is a major determinant of the sign, and, in particular, the magnitude of responses. South Africa, an emerging country, is considered when Bayesian estimating the model. Regarding the long run, both labor and product market reforms considerably increase output, although labor market reforms are more successful in decreasing unemployment. Nevertheless, there are short-term costs, for example, a decrease in household consumption, net exports or output, or a decrease in competition. Combining reforms, especially with product market deregulation, are good at reducing short-term costs. Finally, concerning the speed of adjustment, it is usually better to start with a labor market reform.

This paper explores the macroeconomic impacts of labor and product market deregulation using a small open-economy model with formal and informal markets. We examine both the long-run effects and the transition towards the post-reform equilibrium, while our main focus are reform packages and sequencing. The unofficial sector is a major determinant of the sign, and, in particular, the magnitude of responses. South Africa, an emerging country, is considered when Bayesian estimating the model. Regarding the long run, both labor and product market reforms considerably increase output, although labor market reforms are more successful in decreasing unemployment. Nevertheless, there are short-term costs, for example, a decrease in household consumption, net exports or output, or a decrease in competition. Combining reforms, especially with product market deregulation, are good at reducing short-term costs. Finally, concerning the speed of adjustment, it is usually better to start with a labor market reform.

A large percentage of workers and firms operate in the informal economy, outside the line of sight of governments in emerging market and developing economies. This may hold back the recovery in these economies from the deep recessions caused by the COVID-19 pandemic--unless governments adopt a broad set of policies to address the challenges of widespread informality. This study is the first comprehensive analysis of the extent of informality and its implications for a durable economic recovery and for long-term development. It finds that pervasive informality is associated with significantly weaker economic outcomes--including lower government resources to combat recessions, lower per capita incomes, greater poverty, less financial development, and weaker investment and productivity.

This paper assesses the effects of structural reforms on firm-level productivity for 37 developing countries from 2006 to 2014 period. It takes advantage of the IMF Monitoring of Fund Arrangements dataset for reform indexes and the World Bank Enterprise Surveys for firm-level productivity. The paper highlights the following results. Structural reforms such as financial, fiscal, real sector, and trade reforms, significantly improve firm-level productivity. Interestingly, real sector reforms have the most sizeable effects on firm-level productivity. The relationship between structural reforms and firm-level productivity is nonlinear and shaped by some firms’ characteristics such as the financial access, the distortionary environment, and the size of firms. The pace of structural reforms matters since being a “strong reformer” is associated with a clear productivity dividend for firms. Finally, except for financial and trade reforms, all structural reforms under consideration are bilaterally complementary in improving firm-level productivity. These findings are robust to several sensitivity checks.

The Summer 2017 issue of the IMF Research Bulletin highlights new research such as recent IMF Working Papers and Staff Discussion Notes. The Research Summaries are “Structural Reform Packages, Sequencing, and the Informal Economy (by Zsuzsa Munkacsi and Magnus Saxegaard) and “A Broken Social Contract, Not High Inequality Led to the Arab Spring” (by Shantayanan Devarajan and Elena Ianchovichina). The Q&A section features “Seven Questions on Fintech” (by Tommaso Mancini-Griffoli). The Bulletin also includes information on recommended titles from IMF Publications and the latest articles from the IMF Economic Review.

This Selected Issues paper studies the potential for well-sequenced labor and product market reforms to play a more important role in promoting growth and job creation in Morocco. A Dynamic General Equilibrium model is used to assess the macroeconomic effects of different reform scenarios (isolated, coordinated, or sequenced) that reduce hiring costs and/or firms’ entry costs in the presence of a large informal sector. The paper highlights that reforms are most effective if executed in a coordinated fashion, as implementing simultaneous reforms in the labor and product markets could add about 2.5 percent of gross domestic product growth and reduce unemployment by about 2.2 percentage points after five years. If reforms are to be introduced sequentially, due for instance to capacity or political economy constraints, starting with product market reforms is more effective in boosting output in the short-run while starting with labor market reforms would reduce unemployment faster.

Describes the informal economy and highlights its decent work deficit. Proposes an integrated strategy to address underlying causes of informality and to promote decent work in all sectors of the economy, from formal to informal.

Malaysia’s growth momentum has slowed but remains resilient to external headwinds. While monetary policy has paused its tightening cycle, fiscal policy is consolidating, and the ringgit had been under pressure through most of 2023. The government’s commitment to the reform priorities outlined in its national strategic plans is yet to fully materialize, with the economy’s path to high-income status hanging in the balance.

The outlook for the global economy has darkened. Global financing conditions have tightened, industrial production has moderated, trade tensions have intensified, and some large emerging market and developing economies have experienced significant financial market stress. Faced with these headwinds, the recovery in emerging market and developing economies has lost momentum. Downside risks have become more acute and include the possibility of disorderly financial market movements and an escalation of trade disputes. Debt vulnerabilities in emerging market and developing economies, particularly low-income countries, have increased. More frequent severe weather events would raise the possibility of large swings in international food prices, which could deepen poverty. In this difficult environment, it is of paramount importance for emerging market and developing economies to rebuild policy buffers while laying a stronger foundation for future growth by boosting human capital, promoting trade integration, and addressing the challenges associated with informality,

Urgent steps are needed to arrest the rising human toll and economic strain from the COVID-19 pandemic that are exacerbating already-diverging recoveries. Pandemic policy is also economic policy as there is no durable end to the economic crisis without an end to the health crisis. Building on existing initiatives, this paper proposes pragmatic actions at the national and multilateral level to expeditiously defeat the pandemic. The proposal targets: (1) vaccinating at least 40 percent of the population in all countries by the end of 2021 and at least 60 percent by the first half of 2022, (2) tracking and insuring against downside risks, and (3) ensuring widespread testing and tracing, maintaining adequate stocks of therapeutics, and enforcing public health measures in places where vaccine coverage is low. The benefits of such measures at about $9 trillion far outweigh the costs which are estimated to be around $50 billion—of which $35 billion should be paid by grants from donors and the residual by national governments potentially with the support of concessional financing from bilateral and multilateral agencies. The grant funding gap identified by the Access to COVID-19 Tools (ACT) Accelerator amounts to about $22 billion, which the G20 recognizes as important to address. This leaves an estimated $13 billion in additional grant contributions needed to finance our proposal. Importantly, the strategy requires global cooperation to secure upfront financing, upfront vaccine donations, and at-risk investment to insure against downside risks for the world.