The 2013-14 Strategic Asia volume examines the role of nuclear weapons in the grand strategies of key Asian states and assesses the impact of these capabilities—both established and latent—on regional and international stability. In each chapter, a leading expert explores the historical, strategic, and political factors that drive a country's calculations vis-a-vis nuclear weapons and draws implications for American interests.

Argues that, while nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles cast a shadow over Indo-Pakistani relations, they do not create strategic stability. He asserts that the development of command and control mechanisms would enhance stability, but that diplomatic steps focused on missiles must also be considered. Improved command and control and diplomatic engagement will provide some insurance that nuclear weapons are not used in any future conflict.

What do the major states of Asia view as the emerging challenges in their immediate security environment as well as in the broader Asian region? What future security outcomes would make them believe that strategic stability had been achieved in the Asian continent? Central to the latter question is China and the path it will take to rise to superpower status. While all the major Asian states increasingly are both economically and politically engaged with China, doubts remain about China's long-term intentions. This volume discusses the military, diplomatic and economic measures being taken by the major Asian countries and Australia to establish a new framework for strategic stability. In the process, the contributors examine the global pressures that are impacting on these countries' security dilemmas and, from the perspective of these countries, the patterns of expected behaviour that China would have to fulfil for a regional security order to emerge in Asia.

This book explores evolving patterns of nuclear deterrence, the impact of new technologies, and changing deterrent force postures in the South Asian region to assess future challenges for sustainable peace and stability. Under the core principles of the security dilemma, this book analyzes the prevailing security environment in South Asia and offers unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral frameworks to stabilize peace and ensure deterrence stability in the South Asian region. Moreover, contending patterns of deterrence dynamics in the South Asian region are further elaborated as becoming inextricably interlinked with the broader security dynamics of the Asia-Pacific region and the interactions with the United States and China’s Belt and Road Initiative. As India and Pakistan are increasingly becoming part of the competing strategies exercised by the United States and China, the authors analyze how strategic uncertainty and fear faced by these rival states cause the introduction of new technologies which could gradually drift these competing states into more serious crises and military conflicts. Presenting innovative solutions to emerging South Asian challenges and offering new security mechanisms for sustainable peace and stability, this book will be of interest to academics and policymakers working on Asian Security studies, Nuclear Strategy, and International Relations.

As the Indo-Pacific emerges as the world’s most strategically consequential region and competition with China intensifies, the United States must adapt its approach if it seeks to preserve its power and sustain regional stability and prosperity. Yet as China grows more powerful and aggressive and the United States appears increasingly unreliable, the Indo-Pacific has become riven with uncertainty. These dynamics threaten to undermine the region’s unprecedented peace and prosperity. U.S. Strategy in the Asian Century offers vital perspective on the future of power dynamics in the Indo-Pacific, focusing on the critical roles that American allies and partners can play. Abraham M. Denmark argues that these alliances and partnerships represent indispensable strategic assets for the United States. They will be necessary in any effort by Washington to compete with China, promote prosperity, and preserve a liberal order in the Indo-Pacific. Blending academic rigor and practical policy experience, Denmark analyzes the future of major-power competition in the region, with an eye toward American security interests. He details a pragmatic approach for the United States to harness the power of its allies and partners to ensure long-term regional stability and successfully navigate the complexities of the new era.

Publisher Provided Annotation The past 20 years have been a time of relative peace in Asia and, not withstanding the 1997-1998 financial crisis, a period of robust economic growth as well. Currently, however, Asia is beset by a variety of problems that could well imperil the stability it has long enjoyed--including territorial disputes, nuclear rivalry, rising nationalist sentiments, and increased military capabilities. This report summarizes the manner in which the United States can best meet these challenges and thereby ensure continued peace and stability in the region. In the interests of this goal, the report outlines an integrated political, military, and economic strategy that the United States can pursue to inhibit the growth of rivalries in Asia and, more broadly, prevent the rise of instability in the region. Also delineated are changes in U.S. military posture that will be made necessary by this strategy.

The world has entered a second nuclear age shaped by rising nuclear states and military technologies. Gregory Koblentz argues that the United States should work with the other nuclear-armed states to manage threats to nuclear stability in the near term and establish processes for multilateral arms control efforts over the longer term.

Examines the effects of the global economic crisis on the economic performance and strategic goals of selected Asian states. Discusses implications of the crisis for the power and hegemony of the United States. Considers attitudes of Asian powers toward nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament.

During the Cold War, many believed that the superpowers shared a conception of strategic stability, a coexistence where both sides would compete for global influence but would be deterred from using nuclear weapons. In actuality, both sides understood strategic stability and deterrence quite differently. Today’s international system is further complicated by more nuclear powers, regional rivalries, and nonstate actors who punch above their weight, but the United States and other nuclear powers still cling to old conceptions of strategic stability. The purpose of this book is to unpack and examine how different states in different regions view strategic stability, the use or non-use of nuclear weapons, and whether or not strategic stability is still a prevailing concept. The contributors to this volume explore policies of current and potential nuclear powers including the United States, Russia, China, India, Iran, Israel, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia. This volume makes an important contribution toward understanding how nuclear weapons will impact the international system in the twenty-first century and will be useful to students, scholars, and practitioners of nuclear weapons policy.