This Assessment is aimed at policymakers, analysts, and members of the public who want a serious summary of the threats facing the U.S. in the next decade. Contents: major powers (Russia, Europe, China, Japan, North America); significant regional contingencies (Persian Gulf, Korean peninsula, Arab-Israel conflict, India-Pakistan, proliferation); troubled states (Balkans, Sub-Saharan Africa, Middle Eastern radicalism); transnational problems (international terrorism; international crime; refugees, migration, and population); force structure (threat assessment, key military missions, force structure). Illustrated.

The analysts at the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) assess the strategic equation. They address those issues and factors that will affect U.S. national security strategy over the next 12-18 months. The strategic context in 1997 will be similar to that of 1996 In that it remains complex and uncertain. This year, the way the analysts assess the world of the 21st century is even more important because the Army, along with the other services, are engaged in the congressionally-mandated Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). These conceptions of the future have implications not orly for Force XXI and Army XXI, but also for the kind of Army that will serve the nation when Army XXI systems near obsolescence in 15-20 years. Getting the strategic context about right is important because the Army After Next, although hIghly capable, will also be small by comparison to those forces of only a few years past. Furthermore, decisions made in 1997 as to weapons development and force structure will be evident in the Army of 2010-2015.

The United States faces a new threat environment of unprecedented complexity and unpredictability. In addition to considering regional contingencies and operations other than war, defense planners will also have to meet the new challenges posed by the rise of potential theater-peer competitors, such as China and possibly Russia. This broader set of threats challenges the U.S. military to accomplish a broader set of tasks, including: (1) Establishing how best to incorporate RMA technology and concepts, especially to thwart military ambitions of a theater peer; (2) Maintaining the capability to defeat overwhelmingly a rogue regime in a major regional conflict, while successfully deterring and preparing to defect a second such regime; and (3) Providing a sufficient 'on call' capability for peace operations. Three heuristic force-structure models for the next decade: (1) The Recapitalization Force Model emphasizes continuity of the already excellent force but with some reductions in force structure to finance the recapitalization of equipment as it becomes obsolete; (2) The Accelerated Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) Force Model quickly integrates system-of-systems technologies and radically changes the force structure to take full advantage of the new capabilities; and (3) The Pull Spectrum Force Model responds most directly to the emerging strategic environment by retaining most of the current force while experimenting with RMA technologies and creating an 'on call' capability to deal with operations other than war, requiring a higher budget than the other two forces.

Over the past few years the Department of Defense has been intensifying its study of the global security situation, U.S. force posture, and future defense requirements. The National Defense University contributes to this dialog through Strategic Assessment, an annual publication which applies the expertise of this institution through the leadership of its interdisciplinary research arm, the Institute for National Strategic Studies, with the assistance of specialists from elsewhere in government and academe. Offering such analyses, in both general and particular areas of interest to the national security community is an important aspect of the NDU mission. This volume examines various approaches that the United States might adopt to shape the strategic environment of the future. The current environment is characterized by instability and change. The U.S. Government needs to apply the full range of options at its disposal to achieve national goals and ensure the peace and stability required to preserve our rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. But such options must be studied and conceptualized for years (and in some cases, decades) in advance to take advantage of the opportunities presented by a changing global environment. The recent Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) recommended a series of defense posture changes. This volume reviews these recommendations and takes the next analytical step, to propose what is entailed by such changes. Strategic Assessment 1998: Engaging Power for Peace should prove useful beyond the defense establishment, to all readers with an interest in national security affairs.

How do military organizations assess strategic policy in war? In this book Scott Gartner develops a theory to explain how military and government leaders evaluate wartime performance, how much they change strategies in response to this evaluation, and why they are frequently at odds when discussing the success or failure of strategic performance. Blending history, decision theory, and mathematical modeling, Gartner argues that military personnel do reevaluate their strategies and that they measure the performance of a strategy through quantitative, "dominant" indicators. But different actors within a government use different indicators of success: some will see the strategy as succeeding when others see it as failing because of their different dominant indicators. Gartner tests his argument with three case studies: the British shift to convoys in World War I following the German imposition of unrestricted submarine warfare; the lack of change in British naval policy in the Battle of the Atlantic following the German introduction of Wolf Packs in World War II; and the American decision to deescalate in Vietnam after the Tet Offensive. He also tests his approach in a nonwar situation, analyzing the Carter Administration's decision to launch the hostage rescue attempt. In each case, his dominant indicator model better predicts the observed behavior than either a standard-organization or an action-reaction approach.