Features the abstract and downloadable version of an article entitled "Characteristics of Government Supported Firms" by Fredrik Bergstrom and presented by the Stockholm School of Economics as part of its Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance.

Presents "Financial Markets and Trade Policy," written by Helena Svaleryd and Jonas Vlachos for the Stockholm School of Economics. Addresses the hypothesis that institutions which affect domestic risk reduction can facilitate liberal trade policy.

"The authors examine the legal and business environments, financing channels, and governance mechanisms of various types of firms in India and compare them to those from other countries. Despite its English commonlaw origin, strong legal protection provided by the law, and a democratic government, corruption within India's legal system and government significantly weakens investor protection in practice. External financing of firms has been dominated by nonmarket sources of financing, while the characteristics of listed firms are similar to those from countries with weak investor protection. The evidence, including results based on a survey of small and medium-scale private firms, shows that alternative financing channels provide the most important source of funds. The authors also find that informal governance mechanisms, such as those based on reputation, trust, and relationships are more important than formal mechanisms (such as courts) in resolving disputes, overcoming corruption, and supporting growth. "--World Bank web site.

Includes sections "Rassegna delle pubblicazioni economiche" and "Rassegna della stampa economica periodica."

Presents the paper entitled "On the Power and Interpretation of Panel Unit Root Tests" written by Sune Karlsson and Mickael Lothgren for the Stockholm School of Economics Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance. Includes an abstract, a list of keywords, and a downloadable version of the paper.

When and why does government interference in the market process succeed and when and why does it fail? The limits of government and the consequences for economic growth of government interference in markets are the central themes in this book. Theoretical as well as case-oriented empirical studies are included. The anthology contains selected papers presented at the Sixth Conference of the International Joseph A. Schumpeter Society in Stockholm. There is no way to understand how an economy at large behaves without taking a close look at the actors who make it behave. There is no way to understand the agents operating in markets without placing them in the context of the institutions that determine the incentives that pull, and the competition that pushes, them in different directions and together coordinate all actors into a fairly consistent macro-economic whole. This also means that successful policymaking, whether directed at the macro or micro levels of the economy, demands insights on the part of the policymaker that go far beyond what mainstream economic theory is capable of providing. The volume is divided into two parts: Theories of State Interference and Consequences of State Interference and Non-Interference. The volume is remarkably current, including essays on Microsoft versus Netscape; Russia's Agrarian Dilemma; the Expanding Public Sector; and a contribution to fundamental economic policy analysis concerning prospects for democratic capitalism. The volume is serious, concrete, rich in statistical data of present-day worth and empirical research of larger theoretical value. Gunnar Eliasson is author of Technology Generation or a National Prestige Project: The Swedish Aircraft Industry (in Swedish). His colleague, Nils Karlson is president of the City University of Stockholm. Among his writings are The Future of the Social Insurance System; Can the Present Problems of Mature Welfare States Be Solved; and States within States.

For many Americans, capitalism is a dynamic engine of prosperity that rewards the bold, the daring, and the hardworking. But to many outside the United States, capitalism seems like an initiative that serves only to concentrate power and wealth in the hands of a few hereditary oligarchies. As A History of Corporate Governance around the World shows, neither conception is wrong. In this volume, some of the brightest minds in the field of economics present new empirical research that suggests that each side of the debate has something to offer the other. Free enterprise and well-developed financial systems are proven to produce growth in those countries that have them. But research also suggests that in some other capitalist countries, arrangements truly do concentrate corporate ownership in the hands of a few wealthy families. A History of Corporate Governance around the World provides historical studies of the patterns of corporate governance in several countries-including the large industrial economies of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States; larger developing economies like China and India; and alternative models like those of the Netherlands and Sweden.