This book traces the emergence and contestation of State responsibility for rebels during the nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. In the context of decolonisation and capitalist expansion in Latin America, it argues that the mixed claims commissions-and the practices of intervention associated with them-served to insulate economic order against revolution, by taking the question of who assumed the risk of harm by rebels out of the scope of national authority. The jurisprudence of the commissions was contradictory and ambiguous. It took a lot of interpretive work by later scholars and codifiers to rationalise rules of responsibility out of these shaky foundations, as they battled for the meaning and authority of the arbitral practice. The legal debates were structured around whether the standard of protection against rebels owed to aliens was nationally or internationally determined and whether it was domestic or international authority that adjudicated such standard-a struggle over the internationalisation of protection against rebels.

Analysis of questions of State responsibility and attribution arising from the conduct of rebels and governments in civil war situations.

This book analyses all relevant questions of State responsibility and attribution arising from the conduct of rebels and governments in the context of civil wars and rebellions aiming at the establishment of a new government or the creation of a new State. Based on a comprehensive analysis of both old and recent State practice, and case law, including investment awards, as well as the works of scholars and the International Law Commission, the book identifies ten basic rules which can be used by States and international tribunals. It explains the history, content and scope of application of the specific solutions adopted in Article 10 of the International Law Commission Articles on State responsibility to address particular problems. The book also critically revisits some of the solutions that have been put forward by tribunals and scholars, and examines a number of questions which have never been addressed by them before.

This book critically analyses the origins, the creation, and the evolution of an international law on investment contract protection.

This book offers a new account of Nauru's imperial history and examines its significance in the history of international law.

This interdisciplinary exploration of the modern historiography of international law invites a diverse assessment of the indissoluble unity of the old and the new in the most global of all legal disciplines. The study of the history of international law does not only serve a better understanding of how international law has evolved to become what it is and what it is not. Its histories, which rethink the past in the present, also influence our perception of contemporary matters in international law and our understandings of how they may potentially unfold. This multi-perspectival enquiry into the dominant modes of international legal history and its fundamental debates may also help students of both international law and history to identify the historical approaches that best suit their international legal-historical perspectives and best address their historical and legal research questions.

Ever wonder why militant groups behave as they do? For instance, why did Al Qaeda attack the World Trade Center whereas the African National Congress tried to avoid civilian bloodshed? Why does Islamic State brag over social media about its gory attacks, while Hezbollah denies responsibility or even apologizes for its carnage? This book shows that militant group behaviour depends on the tactical intelligence of the leaders. The author has extensively studied the political plights of hundreds of militant groups throughout world history and reveals that successful militant leaders have followed three rules. These rules are based on original insights from the fields of political science, psychology, criminology, economics, management, marketing, communication, and sociology. It turns out thereâs a science to victory in militant history. But even rebels must follow rules.

An analysis of international human rights law's applicability and effectiveness in geographic areas where the State has lost territorial control.

This paper argues that the rule enshrined in article 10 of the International Law Commission's articles on State responsibility, according to which violations of international law by rebels that subsequently seize power are attributable to the State, rests neither on sound precedential nor systemic grounds. It seeks to demonstrate that this provision rather constitutes the outcome of a political choice to lessen impunity and promote accountability in case of violation of international law by non-State actors. Since the rule is not based on any precise precedent nor systemic logic but only on political motives, there is no reason why one could not resort to similar motives to attempt to refine the currently hazy scope of application of that rule. Along this line of reasoning, this paper submits that - contrary to what has been advocated by the ILC and its Special Rapporteur - excluding the responsibility of the State for acts committed by victorious rebels in situations of national reconciliation or power-sharing agreements is not justified. It is argued that the exclusion of the application of the rule of attribution of the victorious rebels should only apply in cases where rebels eventually seize power through democratic elections. It is eventually explained that the ILC's limitation to the scope of application of article 10 could have been more easily justified if the responsibility of the State for acts of victorious rebels had been designed as a rule of attribution of responsibility and not as a rule of attribution of conduct.

Radical international legal history of the expansionary project of statehood and its role in generating profound distributional inequalities